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ABSTRACT
TYPES OF POWER ASSERTION AND THE DISTRIBUTION
OF POWER IN MARRIAGE

by
JOYCE E. FOSS

This research explores the types of power assertions,
or "power modes," used by married couples.

The combined

observation and self-report study includes seventy-eight
couples, some of whom were receiving marital counseling.

The

interaction stimulus was the Inventory of Marital Conflict
(IMC) task developed by Olson and Ryder.

This is a highly-

involving, realistic conflict resolution task which induces
disagreement between the participants.
Previous theoretical and empirical work has focused
almost exclusively on explaining variations in the distri
bution of power in marriage.

In this research, new data

are provided concerning relationships between such variables
as personal resources, authority, reported power, and decision
making outcomes.

A contribution in this area is the still

uncommon multi-method (observation ans self-report) and
multi-subject (husbands and wives) approach.
The overriding issue in the project is how marital
partners go about "powering," or the types of power assertions

xiv

they use.

Attention to this issue means going beyond analysis

of the fairly stable distribution of power toward a poten
tially more dynamic, process-oriented approach to confronta
tion and change in families.
Toward this end, the Marital Power Assertion Coding
System (MPACS) was developed to code laboratory interaction
stimulated by the IMC task.

The system contains three broad

divisions, each with several sub-types:
power assertions;

(1) unqualified, direct

(2) qualified, indirect power assertion (in

cludes persuasion, attempts at situation definition, and
consequence identification); and (3) bilateral power assertions
(explicit attempts to bargain or negotiate). In presenting
i
the findings based on this system, emphasis is placed on
basic descriptive information, husband-wife differences in types
of power assertions, verbal aggression as a type of power
assertion, and implications of the research for analogies
between families and zero-sum or mixed motive games.

In

addition, relationships between power modes and the power dis
tribution and outcomes variables are explored.

xv

CHAPTER I
POWER MODES:

A NEGLECTED AREA OF FAMILY STUDY

The voluminous literature on power relations in
families has been characterized by a great deal of contro
versy over concepts, methodology, and theory.

The most

basic issue is how power ought to be defined.

In particular

is power an ability or potential to influence, or does it
refer to actual attempts to influence or control outcomes,
or even only to successful attempts at influence?

Further,

is power a single, unidimensional concept, or is it multi
dimensional— i.e., an umbrella term for all the dimensions
just mentioned?

(These issues are addressed in some detail

in Chapter III, and for recent discussions and critiques
see Olson and Cromwell, 1975; Safilios-Rothschild, 1970;
Sprey, 1972; Straus, 1976; and Turk, 1975).
Some major methodological issues include the rela
tive usefulness of observation and self-report methods
(Olson, 1969; Olson and Rabunsky, 1972; Turk and Bell, 1972)
the use of "win scores" as a measure of power in observation
studies (Turk, 1974); and the use of a single family member
(the wife) to report on marital power (Safilios-Rothschild,
1970).

1

2
The almost exclusive theoretical concern with the
distribution of power, or the relative amounts of power of
family members, has also been questioned (Foss and Straus,
1975; Sprey, 1972, 1975).

It is this last issue which is

of paramount importance here.
The resource theory of power, a variant of exchange
theory (Cromwell and Olson, 1975:24; Smith, 1970), has domi
nated the recent study of marital power relations.

This

approach, at a most basic level, suggests that the marital
partner with the greater personal resources relative to the
other will have a greater ability to influence the other
(Blood and Wolfe, 1960:11-12).

The development of this

theory within family sociology has taken the form of tying
it more closely to exchange theory

(Heer, 1963; Smith, 1970),

as well as specifying it cross-culturally in terms of cul
tural norms about who should have more power (Burr, 1973;
Rodman, 1972).

In addition, the notion of resources has

figured prominently in models of power developed outside
the family sociology arena.

Examples of recent general

developments include Rogers'

(1974) typology of resources

as bases of power, and Buckley and Burns (1975) work on
meta-power.
Until recently, the study of power relations spec
ifically in marriage, based heavily on resource theory, has
been almost solely concerned with one aspect of power
structure:

The relatively stable distribution of power.

Little attention has been paid to processual aspects of

3

power.

In an analysis of measures of family power available

through 1965, Foss and Straus found that almost all measures
referring to the husband-wife relationship focus on the
relative amounts of power (power distribution).

There is a

corresponding lack of measures of how husbands and wives go
about influencing each other (1975:15).^
Others have noted the lack of theoretical attention
to power processes in marriage.

Olson and Cromwell observe

that "very little systematic work has been done on the family
power processes"

(1975:6), and Sprey has called for a shift

in analytical focus to the study of "powering" or the
"ongoing confrontation in which the power inputs of all
participants are reciprocally put to the test"

(1972:236).

It is not suggested here that the distribution of
power is unimportant, nor that it has already received
enough attention.

The recent critiques and assessments of

the state of the art of measuring power distribution them
selves indicate that a great deal still needs to be done
in this area (see Bahr, 1972; Olson and Rabunsky, 1972;
Olson and Cromwell, 1975; Safilios-Rothschild, 1970; Turk
and Bell, 1972).

Rather, it is suggested that preoccupation

with the relative amounts of power of husbands and wives

•^The situation is completely reversed with reference
to parent-child measures. Apparently there is an assumption
that children have little or no power, and thus these
measures focus not on the power distribution, but on the
"powering techniques" used by parents on their children (but
not those used by children on parents) (Foss and Straus, 1975).

4

(power distribution) may blind us to the importance of
also investigating the techniques by which marital partners
attempt to exercise power.

We need to develop measures

and models for the study of types of power assertion (power
modes).
Such an addition to a model of marital power
relations could make at least three basic contributions.
First, asking how decisions or resolutions are reached,
rather than who wins, encourages a shift away from an ex
clusively win-lose view of marital power (Sprey, 1971).
Second, the question "who wins" tends to discourage moving
beyond the individual level of analysis, especially in
studying dyadic relationships like marriage.

In contrast,

examining power modes may encourage less individualistic
analysis.

Third, if structure is defined as a pattern

characteristic of a relationship at a given point in time,
and if the power distribution is an aspect of power struc
ture, then an exclusive focus on the distribution of power
means an exclusive focus on a fairly static aspect of power
relations.

To the extent that types of power assertions

(power modes) develop a characteristic pattern in a marriage,
they too are an aspect of power structure and can be
treated as static.

However, analysis of power modes

seems more likely to contribute to the eventual study of
process and dynamics in power relations.

Thus, a third

potential advantage of extending current models of marital

5

power to include power inodes lies in the development of
an ultimately more dynamic, process-oriented approach.
Based on laboratory observations and self-reports
of seventy-eight married couples, the research described
here has as its overriding goal the exploration of types of
power assertion and their relationships to other important
dimensions of power.

Figure 1 serves as a guide to the

research, by identifying the variables included and offering
a preliminary model of how power modes may be incorporated
into current approaches to marital power relations.
Briefly, power modes are treated as equal in impor
tance to "attributed p o w e r i n providing a bridge between
the personal resources of group members and the outcomes
of group decision-making or conflict resolution.

In the

figure, "power modes," or types of power assertion, is
heavily outlined to indicate that this is the central variable
in the research.

The heavy solid lines indicate the main

relationships to be explored— those between power modes
and personal resources, power distribution norms, attributed
power, and "outcome variables."

Light solid lines indicate

sub-relationships which might be explored in future research,
and/or indicate where mutual causal influence is expected.

9
Attributed power refers to the power distribution,
usually assessed through self-report methods.
See Chapter
III for a detailed discussion.

Attributed
(reported)
Power
Distribution

Personal
Resources

Outcomes
(Unilateral/
Bilateral
Solutions)

Power
Distribution
Norms

Power
Modes

Power Mode
Norms

Figure 1.

Partial Model of Power Relations

OBJECTIVES AND REVIEW OF CHAPTERS
Chapter II presents the method of data gathering
and sample description for the research.

The remaining

chapters are reviewed here in the context of their contri
butions to the objectives of the project.
1.

To Clarify Important Dimensions of Power
This is actually a sub-goal of the project, necessi

tated by the present state of controversy and confusion con
cerning power concepts.

Any current study of power relations

in the family must somehow come to grips with basic conceptual
issues.

In Chapters III and V, variables included in this

study, such as resources, power norms, and power modes, are
discussed in considerable detail.

At the very least, the

rather lengthy discussions of key concepts should make
explicit how power terms are being used in this particular
research.

However, it is also hoped that others will find

the approach offered here useful, and a more general con
tribution toward conceptual clarification in this area will
be made.
2. To Provide Further Data Concerning Resources and the
Distribution of Power in Marriages
The research includes several variables which
refer to personal resources and to the distribution of power.
A second sub-goal of the project is to examine relationships
among these variables, and thus to provide further data
relevant to an aspect of power relations which, while already

8

heavily researched, is by no means sufficiently understood.
Chapter IV is devoted to this issue.
3. To Develop a Typology of, and System of Coding, Power
Assertions Made By Husbands and Wives in the Context of
Laboratory Interaction
The types of power assertions made by marital part
ners are the central concern of this study.

As indicated

above, the focus of research and theory in this area has been
on the distribution of power.

The question of how spouses

go about "powering" has largely been neglected.

Thus, the

development of a coding system for power modes should make
a major contribution toward measurement in this field.
Further, relationships among types of power assertions may
be explored.

In addition, devising a typology of power

assertions in marital interaction should help in ascertaining
the parameters of power modes which can be observed in a
laboratory setting, as well as in providing a baseline which
might ultimately be extended toward examining the broader
range of power assertions which are available in a natural
setting.

The concept of power modes is discussed in detail

in Chapter V, while Chapter VI presents the coding system
devised for the study, basic descriptive findings, and analysis
of inter-code relationships.
4. To Explore Relationships between Power Modes and Variables
Which Represent the Distribution of Power and Personal Re
sources
In particular, possible relationships between power
modes and personal resources, power distribution norms,

9

and self-reports about the power structure (attributed
power) are examined in Chapter VII.

The development of a

typology of power assertions is viewed here as a first step
toward a more dynamic, processual approach to marital power
relations.

The objective of this aspect of the research is

to provide some initial inquiry into relationships between
aspects of the power structure and power processes in
marriage.
5. To Explore Relationships between Power Modes and the.
Outcomes of Conflict Resolution
Beyond the major objective of devising a typology
and coding scheme for powering techniques or power modes,
one thrust of this research is toward examining the extent
to which aspects of the distribution of power may affect or
explain the use of different types of power assertions (see
4 above).

However, it has also been suggested that power

modes act as a bridge between such aspects of the power
structure and the outcomes of decision-making or conflict
resolution events.

Therefore, the types of power assertions

made by marital partners may have important implications for
the kinds of solutions they arrive at.

In order to explore

such implications, the relationships between power modes
and outcome variables are examined in Chapter VII.
Chapter VIII provides an overview of the project.

Finally,

10

CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
The present exploration of power modes and their
relationships to other dimensions of power is based on a
combined self-report and observation study of seventyeight married couples, carried out at the University of
New Hampshire during the summer of 19 75.

This Chapter

describes the sample selection, basic sample characteristics,
and data-gathering procedures for the overall project.

In

addition, features of the larger project which have special
importance for this particular research on power modes are
discussed.
SAMPLE SELECTION
A total of seventy-eight couples participated in
the overall project.
selection procedures.

Couples were chosen through three
An initial attempt to obtain a

random sample from the Dover City Directory provided only
eight couples.'*'

As a result of this poor response, a

■*-For the Dover sample, letters describing the project
were mailed, followed by telephone calls by personnel from a
professional research agency.
Even before all seventy-five
households initially in the sample had been contacted, it
was clear the response was very low.

second procedure was developed for the town of Durham.
Potential subjects were randomly selected from the town
voting lists.

A personal visit was made to the home of

each potential subject couple to determine if the couples
met the criteria for inclusion in the study, and to explain
the nature of the project.

One hundred twenty potential

couples were selected based on the criteria that they be
married and living together in Durham at the time of the
sample selection.

Couples who were divorced, separated, no

longer living in Durham, etc., were not considered part of
the universe from which the sample was drawn.

For the

eligible couples, the personal visit was followed after a
day or two with a phone call to arrange an appointment.
The response rate in Durham was 45 percent, or fifty-four
of the one hundred twenty eligible couples.
Finally, sixteen of the couples were referred to the
project by private marriage counselors and agencies which
provide marriage counseling services in the Seacoast area
(within which the non-agency couples were also located).

2

An attempt was made to contact all of the agencies
and private counselors in the area.
Only one private coun
selor could not be contacted after repeated attempts.
Of
the remaining five private counselors and three agencies,
all expressed considerable interest and the intention of
referring clients. Only one of the private counselors did
not, in fact, refer at least one couple.
With the exception of one agency, all of these sources
followed a procedure of describing the project to client
couples and suggesting that they call the project for an
appointment.
For the other agency, a project staff member
was given names of interested clients and telephoned them
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Differences Among Sub-Samples
The above differences in selection procedures
and response rates suggest possible differences among the
three sub-samples in reasons for participating and
characteristics of the subjects.
Several reasons may be offered as to why the response
in Dover was so much lower than in Durham.

First, the letter

mailed to Dover residents was, in retrospect, too lengthy
and elaborate.

A much briefer and simpler description of

the project was given to Durham residents during the initial
contact at home.

Second, the personal visit in Durham pro

vided an opportunity to clarify the project and allay mis
givings

(not to mention the greater difficulty of saying no

in a face-to-face encounter).

Third, the association of

the project with the University of New Hampshire was probably
a more positive factor for residents of Durham (where the
University of New Hampshire is located) than for those in
Dover.

Last but not necessarily least, it was much easier

for Durham residents to get to the research site.
In terms of assessing the 45 percent response rate
in Durham alone, the length of time required to participate
(about two hours), the fact that videotaping was part of the
procedure, and the necessity of obtaining the participation

for an appointment.
This agency also preferred to have
sessions conducted at its own facilities, so three of the
sixteen sessions with agency couples were not conducted at
the main research site.
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of both spouses, all suggest that a relatively low response
should be expected.

On the other hand, the ten dollar

stipend paid to each non-agency couple, and the number of
people in the community who are involved with the University,
may have produced a higher response than would otherwise
be expected.
The motivation for participating in the project was
probably somewhat different for the couples referred by area
counselors.

The project was presented to these couples

partly as an opportunity for an experience which might be
helpful for them and/or their counselors in dealing with
their problems.

These couples did not receive a stipend, as

it was decided in concert with the counselors that it would
seem strange to receive payment for a counseling-related
experience.

Finally, whether and on what basis agency

couples were selected for referral was left to the discretion
of the counselors.

In addition, some couples who were re

ferred may not actually have contacted the project.

Thus,

the couples included in the sample are not necessarily repre
sentative of couples in marriage counseling in this area.
Given the response rate in the Durham and especially
the Dover sub-samples, and the inclusion of couples referred
by marriage counselors, the generalizability of findings from
the sample as a whole is limited.

Despite this, the com

bined sample has the advantage of being moderately large in
comparison with those used in other observational studies of
marital interaction.

The specific research on power modes includes all
of the seventy-eight couples who participated in the project.
While the larger project required the inclusion of both agency
and non-agency couples, general comparisons of these two
groups are not an objective of this particular study.

How

ever, beyond augmenting the size of the sample, the agency
couples are important to this research in that they may use
a range of power modes which is somewhat different from the
range used by couples who are not in counseling.

The inclusion

of these couples, then, may provide an opportunity to observe
a broader range of power assertions than would be possible
if only non-clinical couples were included.

This is important

for developing the system of coding power modes.

At best,

including agency couples in the study ensures the broadest
possible typology of power modes.

At worst, in this

respect, there are no differences between the two groups
of couples.
BASIC SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Table 2.1 presents basic characteristics of the
wives in the sample, and Table 2.2 presents the same character
istics for the husbands.

Each table also breaks down the

sample information separately for clinical and non-clinical
couples.^

•%ote that the clinical/non-clinical breakdown here
is based on whether the couple was referred to the project
by an area counselor.
Some of the so-called "non-clinical"
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Table 2.1. Sample Characteristics of Wives, for Clinical,
Non-Clinical, and All Couples

Variable
Religion
Protestant
Catholic
Other/None
TOTAL
(N)
Children
None
At least one under
6 years of age
All 6 years of age
or older
TOTAL
(N)
Personal Income
Under $1000
$1000-$5999
$6000-$9999
$10000-$14999
$15000-$19999
$20000-$24999
$25000 and over
TOTAL
(N)
Total Family Income
Under $6000
$6000-$9999
$10000-$14999
$15000-$19999
$20000-$24999
$25000 and over
TOTAL
(N)

Clinical
(%)

Non-Clinical
(%)

All Wives
(%)

75.8
18.8
6.3
100.0
(16)

69.4
21.0
9.7
100.0
(62)

70.5
20.5
9.0
100.0
(78)

37.5

8.1

14.1

25.0

17.7

19.2

37.5
100.0
(16)

74.2
100.0
(62)

66.7
100.0
(78)

26.7
53.3
6.7
6.7

50.0
26.7
11.7
10.0
1.7
100.0
(60)

45.3
32.0
10.7
9.3
1.3
1.3
100.0
(75)

1.7
8.3
18.3
25.0
18.3
28.3
100.0
(60)

2.7
12.0
22.7
24.0
14.7
24.0
100.0
(75)

-

6.7
100.0
(15)
6.7
26.7
40.0
20.0
-

6.7
100.0
(15)

-
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Table 2.1 (Continued)

Variable

Clinical
(%)

Non-Clinical
(%)

All Wives
(%)

Education
High school or less
Partial college
College grad
Graduate work
TOTAL
(N)

50.0
50.0
100.0
(16)

16.1
35.5
35.5
12.9
100.0
(62)

23.1
38.5
28.2
10.3
100.0
(78)

Work Status
Full time
Part time
Other
TOTAL
(N)

43.8
25.0
31.3
100.0
(16)

36.8
22.8
40.4
100.0
(57)

38.4
23.3
38.3
100.0
(73)

2.9

2.2

32.4

26.7

17.6
38.2
8.8
100.0
(34)

13.3
35.6
22.2
100.0
(45)

(62)
42.0
43.2

17.0
33.0
28.0
22.0
100.0
(78)
40.0
38.5

Occupation
Major professional/
executive
Business/profes
sional
9.1
Administrative/minor
professional
Clerical/sales
27.3
Blue collar
63.6
TOTAL
100.0
(N)
(11)
Age
20-29
30-39
40-49
50+
TOTAL
(N)
Mean
Median

(16)
32.1
31.5
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Table 2.2. Sample Characteristics of Husbands, for Clinical,
Non-Clinical, and All Couples

Variable
Religion
Protestant
Catholic
Other/None
TOTAL
(N)
Children
None
At least one under
6 years of age
All 6 years of age
or older
TOTAL
(N)
Personal Income
Under $1000
$1000-$5999
$6000-$9999
$10000-$14999
$15000-$19999
$20000-$24999
$25000 and over
TOTAL
(N)
Total Family Income
Under $6000
$6000-$9999
$10000-$14999
$15000-$19999
$20000-$24999
$25000 and over
TOTAL
(N)

Clinical
(%)

Non-Clinical
(%)

All Husbands
(%)

62.5
37.5
100.0
(16)

71.0
19.4
9.7
100.0
(62)

69.2
23.1
7.7
100.0
(78)

37.5

8.1

14.1

31.3

19.4

21.8

31.3
100.0
(16)

72.6
100.0
(62)

64.1
100.0
(78)

1.7
8.3
6.7
16.7
30.0
20.0
16.7
100.0
(60)

1.3
7.9
14.5
22.4
23.7
15.8
14.5
100.0
(76)

1.7
6.7
13.3
25.0
20.0
33.3
100.0
(60)

1.3
10.5
21.1
23.7
15.8
27.6
100.6
(76)

-

6.3
43.8
43.8
-

6.3
100.0
(16)

-

25.0
50.0
18.8
-

6.3
100.0
(16)
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Table 2.2 (Continued)

Variable

Clinical
(%)

Non-Clinical
(%)

All Husbands
(%)

Education
High school or less
Partial college
College grad
Graduate work
TOTAL
(N)

43.8
37.5
18.8
100.0
(16)

11.3
12.9
33.9
41.9
100.0
(62)

17.9
17.9
30.8
33.3
100.0
(78)

Work Status
Full time
Part time
Other
TOTAL
(N)

81.3
6.3
12.5
100.0
(16)

89.8
3.4
6.8
100.0
(59)

88.0
4.0
8.0
100.0
(75)

46.6

37.5

19.0

15.3

24.1
5.2
5.2
100.0
(58)

22.2
11.1
13.9
100.0
(72)

(62)
43.9
44.0

14.0
33.0
26.0
27.0
100.0
(78)
41.8
41.5

Occupation
Major professional/
executive
Business/profes
_
sional
Admini s trative/minor
professional
14.3
Clerical/sales
35.7
Blue collar
50.0
TOTAL
100.0
(N)
(14)
Age
20-29
30-39
40-49
50+
TOTAL
(N)
Mean
Median

(16)
33.8
32.0

Taking the information for the sample as a whole
(total N = 78 couples), first it is clear that the breakdown
on religious affiliation is about the same for wives and
husbands.

Roughly 70 percent are Protestant, 20 percent

are Catholic, and the rest report other affiliations or
no religious preference.

(While the husbands and wives as

groups each report about the same breakdown on religion, this
is not to say that for all or almost all the couples both
spouses have the same religious preference.)
One of the more fascinating bits of sample informa
tion is the number and ages of children.

This is one of

only two variables being discussed here for which both
spouses are presumably reporting on "the same thing."

While

for religion, for example, the wife is giving her religion
and the husband h i s , and the two

can quite legitimately

differ, for information on the children the wife and husband
reports should simply be redundant.
not the case.

Interestingly, this is

Among the wives, 14.1 percent reported

having no children, 19.2 percent having at least one child
under six years of age, and 66.7 percent having at least one
child but none under six years old.

The husbands do report

having no children at the same rate as the wives, but two
more husbands than wives report having children who are

couples may, in fact, have been in counseling at the time
of the research (or received counseling in the past), but
were not selected for the research on that basis.
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all at least six years old.

4

I think that the wife's

report on this variable is more likely to be accurate (and
should be used in analyses) since the age shift of a child
from five to six (pre-school to in-school)

is tyoically

of more importance in the wife's life career than the
husband's.

Thus, the wife has more reason to know which

age group the child falls into.

Further information in

cluded in the tables is that the mean number of children
for the sample as a whole is 2.31 (N=77), and for those
couples who have any children the mean is 2.7 (N=67).
Reports by the wives and husbands as to personal
income follow the typical pattern of the wives' income
being skewed heavily toward the no/low income level.

In

addition, the husbands' incomes appear to be somewhat higher
than one would expect if the sample were representative.
The educational and occupational data discussed below con
firm the sample's skewness toward the upper middle class.
The total family income data even more strongly confirm the
upper middle class nature of the sample.

Beyond this, while

only a few discrepancies exist in the wife and husband
reports

(as groups) on family income, it is interesting that

all are in the direction of the husband's reporting higher

^As for the other variables there may be a larger
number of couple discrepancies than is indicated by the
group differences. Such discrepancy information is always
interesting in its own right, but will only be pursued in
this work when specifically needed for substantive analysis.
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income.

It could be that husbands are more subject to a

need to appear successful on this item than tvives, or it
could be that there is a difference in knowledge of family
finances and when this exists the husband is more likely
to be knowledgeable (in some cases, a husband may even be
hiding income from his wife).

I will opt for the latter

explanation, and assume that the higher family income
reports of the husbands are the more accurate (and should
be used in any subsequent analysis).
The educational level of the project participants
is again consistent with the tendency toward an upper middle
class sample, as well as with the location of the project
in a "university town."

Approximately one-third of the

husbands have at least some graduate level education, and
another 30 percent are college graduates.

Thus, almost two-

thirds of the men hold at least college degrees.

Only two

men and two women have less than a high school education.
As expected, the educational attainments of the wives are
lower than for the husbands.

About two-fifths of the women

have some college work, 30 percent are college graduates, and
10 percent have at least some graduate work.
Among the men, the professional occupations are
very heavily represented, reflecting the number of college
professors included in the sample.^

For the wives who gave

5The occupational data are based on Hollingshead's
seven-point Occupational Scale. For this presentation, the
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occupational data (N-45), there is also a significant repre
sentation of at least the middle and lower level professional
occupations, although as expected there is also a larger
proportion in the lower level occupations than for the men.
In terms of work status, almost 90 percent of the men work
full time.

A large percentage of the wives report working

outside the home, almost two-fifths full time and another
one-fourth part time.
The ages of the participats suggest that the sample
is somewhat older than would be expected if representative.
The husbands' mean age is 41.8, and the wives' 39.9; the
age distribution for both groups appears centered in middleage and normally distributed.
The age variable provides a most interesting trans
ition point for making a brief summary comparison between
the clinical and non-clinical couples.

The clinical couples

are clearly much younger than the non-clinical couples,
and this age difference probably goes very far in explaining
other differences between the groups.

The clinical couples

are more likely to have no children or children under six,
report lower personal and family incomes and occupational
levels, are less well educated, and are more likely to include
a full time working wife.

Clearly, a good part of each of

these could be due to the clinical couples' relative

three lowest levels (skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled
manual labor) are collapsed due to the small number of
cases in those categories.

youngness, although some differences

(such as in education)

may also substantially relate to the broader population base
from which the clinical couples are drawn (as opposed to
the university population base of the non-clinical couples).
Finally, it is interesting to speculate on one addi
tional issue.

If there is an actual relationship between

the use of an agency and the ages of couples (and this is
not really established by the data presented here), we may
suggest two different explanations.

One, it may be that

couples in the early stages of the family life cycle face
stresses that older couples have already been through.

Thus,

couples in counseling are young because young couples actually
face great stress.

Or it may be that there is little dif

ference in the degree of stress (although probably in the type)
faced by younger and older couples, but this generation of
younger couples are more willing to seek help for whatever
difficulties they might have.

These two explanations are

not mutually exclusive and are offered as possibilities for
consideration.
To summarize, the overall project sample is heavily
skewed toward the upper middle class, with relatively high
income, educational, and occupational levels.

The sample

would be further skewed in this direction were it not for the
inclusion of the clinical couples.

Thus, in many respects

the clinical couples help make the sample more representative.
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PROCEDURES
The sessions were conducted in two laboratory
settings at the University of New Hampshire.6

Each labora

tory "package" included a room for videotaping and four
additional rooms where each member of a couple (two couples
at a time) could individually complete questionnaire mater
ials.

Most of the sessions took place in the evening.
Each videotaping room contained a small table where

the spouses were asked to sit close together to facilitate
conversation and to allow for videotaping.

Each also

included a portable video camera on a tripod, the control
console for the camera, and a separate audio casette tape
recorder.

While the equipment was fairly extensive, the

units were quite compact.

Couples did not seem especially

concerned about the equipment, except sometimes at the
beginning of the taping.

The seating arrangements and the

couple's preoccupation with completing a joint answer form
during taping may have helped focus the marital partners on
each other and on the task rather than on the equipment.
Session Format
Each couple was guided through the procedure by a
session administrator.

The couple was brought to a room

®The exceptions were the three couples at one of
the agencies, whose sessions took place at the agency.
The
physical setting was similar to the setting at University of
New Hampshire, and the procedures the same.
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where the procedure was briefly described and instructions
were given for filling out questionnaires

(identical except

for husband/wife wording) on background, marital history,
esteem scales, and so forth.

The administrator made it

clear that responses for this part of the session would
not be shown to o n e 1s spouse and would not be used again in
the session.

Spouses completed the questionnaires in

separate rooms, and then were brought together again to
receive instructions for the Inventory of Marital Conflicts
(IMC) task (see Appendix B ) .
The IMC was developed at the University of Minnesota
as a stimulus for marital interaction (Olson and Ryder, 1970)
Each member of a couple reads eighteen brief descriptions of
couples having various kinds of marital conflicts and answers
questions about each case.

In twelve of these stories, two

different perspectives on the situation are presented: the
husband's form provides one perspective and the wife's form
another.

For the other six items, both spouses receive

exactly the same perspective.

This design sets the stage

for disagreement on twelve of the items, and does not induce
disagreement on the other six.
Both spouses received the IMC instructions together.
Then they read the eighteen vignettes and filled out indivi
dual answer forms in separate rooms.

When both were finished

they returned the case descriptions to the session admini
strator and kept their own answer forms for personal
reference.

The couple was brought to the taping room where
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they discussed each vignette, resolved disagreements, and
completed a joint answer form.
taped and tape recorded.

The discussion was video

The couple was told that they had

thirty minutes to discuss all the items and they were
reminded after twenty minutes.

However, couples were allowed

to continue for as long as they needed to finish.

The session

administrator was not in the room during the discussion.
After the IMC discussion, the spouses independently com
pleted the IMC Post Discussion Form concerning their reac
tions to the procedure, as well as a brief set of questions
concerning power relations
Index).

(Blood and Wolfe Decision Power

Finally, the session administrator answered any

questions and debriefed the couple.

The entire session was

generally about two hours long.
Special Features of the IMC Task
As a stimulus for marital interaction in the labora
tory, the IMC has several important features.

First, the

procedure is designed to induce disagreement and thus to
negate the tendency for family members to present a united,
mutually supportive front to observers.
appears to be highly involving.

Second, the task

One indication of involve

ment is that while participants are told in advance that
they will receive different perspectives on the vignettes
(see the IMC instructions in Appendix B ) , couples generally
complete the discussion task as if they were ignorant
of this aspect of the procedure.

Third, the vignettes have
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an unusual degree of realism and relevance, in that they
describe couples having common marital difficulties.

Fourth,

providing different perspectives to the participants on
the same situation adds another element of realism, in that
if the participants were actually dealing with a disagreement
of their own, they would undoubtedly bring different points
of view to the issue.
The IMC has one additional feature which is of
special interest in this particular research.

Most disagree

ment-inducing tasks, such as variants of Strodtbeck's
"revealed differences technique"

(Strodtbeck, 1951), ask

group members to make a single judgment or devise a single
solution to a disagreement.

However, in the IMC procedure,

participants make two judgments about each vignette— one
concerning who is responsible for the problem and the other
concerning how the problem should be solved (see items a
and d on the individual forms and parts A and B on the joint
discussion form in Appendix B ) .

This aspect of the IMC

task is superior to the one-judgment procedures in that two
kinds of joint solution are possible— one in which the resolu
tion represents a unilateral "win" for one member of the
couple, and the other in which the resolution is a compromise
between the initial choices of the two participants.
IMC Items.

The interaction coding for this research

was done for only the twelve conflict or disagreement-inducing
vignettes.

Thus, the six vignettes for which both spouses
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receive the same information were not coded.

This decision

was based on the assumption that the six non-conflict vig
nettes would not usually produce rich material with respect
to the power modes coding system.

To include these six

vignettes would have required a greater use of resources
than seemed justified by their potential contribution to
the study.
Use of Audio Tapes.
of the videotapes.

This research did not make use

Coding was done using the audio tapes

and the transcripts of these tapes simultaneously.

Of

interest here is a study by Murphy and Mendelson (1973)
designed to compare inter-coder reliabilities using video
tapes or transcripts alone.

There was 81.5 percent agreement

when videotapes were used, but only 60.34 percent with trans
cripts alone, using Leary's Interpersonal Checklist (ICL)
coding system.

However, Terrill and Terrill (1965), also

using the ICL, apparently obtained 78 percent agreement using
audio tapes.

Thus, it appears that tapes offer significant

improvement over transcripts alone, but videotape does not
produce much higher agreement than audio tape.

Aside from

the question of inter-rater reliability, use of videotapes
would provide an opportunity to examine non-verbal behavior
relevant to the question of power modes.

At some point it

would be worthwhile to expand a system of coding power modes
to include such behavior; however, this is beyond the scope
of the present study.
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CHAPTER III
RE-THINKING FAMILIAR CONCEPTS
In this Chapter current approaches to the conceptuali
zation and measurement of several familiar concepts in the
marital power field are reviewed and the approach used in
the present study is presented.

For each of the concepts a

number of issues are addressed.

First, the concept is

defined as it is used in this research, and the relation
ship of this definition to other common definitions is
examined.

Such specification is crucial to the study of

marital power relations since there is so much variability
and confusion in the use of terms in the literature.

As

mentioned earlier, this effort at conceptual clarification is
one objective of the project, and will hopefully make a con
tribution in its own right.

Second, the concept is related

to, and distinguished from, other power concepts where
necessary.

These aspects of the analysis take their lead

from a preliminary systematization of power terms developed
by Straus

(1976).

Third, previous approaches to measuring

the concept are examined, and, the measurement of the variable
specifically in this research is presented.

Combining the

discussion of conceptualization and measurement in this way
has the advantage of clarifying the rationale for each measure
as it is considered.
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Before dealing with the specific power variables
included in the research, some discussion of the term "power"
itself is in order.

A great deal of debate has taken place

over the definition and measurement of power.

Turk (1975)

has argued that the confusion is so great as to warrant
eliminating the concept altogether.

However, Olson and

Cromwell take the less drastic stand that power is multi
dimensional and the term "should be employed as a generic
construct, consisting of several different, but related,
concepts and dimensions"

(1975:5).

While Straus is in basic

agreement with this approach, he further suggests that
"'power' should never be used unmodified, except when one
wishes to refer to all the . . . dimensions as a single
package"

(1976:2).
The approach taken here is similar to that of Straus.

All of the power variables have specific modifiers.

No

attempt is made to measure "power" itself, since it is seen
as an umbrella concept for a number of specific dimensions.
However, a global definition of power is offered, as
follows:

Power is the set of variables involved in the

alteration or maintenance of group outcomes by group members.
The main purpose of presenting such a definition is to pro
vide a sensitizer for discussing the specific power variables.
One advantage of this lies in initiating a consistent ter
minology to be used with all the power variables.

In addition,

this initial definition provides the opportunity to consider
at the outset two issues basic to all the power variables.
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These issues are reflected in the phrase "group out
comes."

This phrase suggests, first, an orientation in

which power and power relations are seen as relative to
specific social systems (Rogers, 1974).

Thus, an indivi

dual's "power" in one social system, such as marriage, may
be quite different from his/her power in another.

Moreover,

if power is viewed this way, then it cannot be said that it
is merely a " . . . fixed or stable individual disposition.
Rather, it is a social phenomenon susceptible to the ebb
and flow of the social life in which it is embedded"

(Rogers

1974:1432).
A second implication of defining power in terms of
group outcomes is that this represents a more general defini
tion than is commonly found.

Family researchers have tended

to focus on dyads, and so have often defined power as the
ability to influence the other's behavior.

Turk points out

that defining power in terms of group outcomes and defining
it in terms of the other's behavior both amount to the same
thing when one is dealing with dyads (1975:83).

Since this

research will focus on the marital dyad, either version of
the definition would be appropriate here.

However, aware

ness of the more general definition is important if the
ultimate goal is a theory of power relations which applies
not just to dyads but to larger units as well.
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PERSONAL RESOURCES
Definition. Any capabilities, characteristics,
or goods possessed by an individual which may
be used to facilitate or hinder satisfaction of
needs or provision of benefits (for self or
others).
Other Definitions of Personal Resources
Roger's definition of resources is typical of many
current definitions:

"A resource is any attribute, circum

stance, or possession that increases the ability of its
holder to influence a person or group"

(1974:1425).

Simi

larly, Olson and Cromwell speak of the "resources an indivi
dual possesses which may increase their ability to exercise
control in a given situation"

(1975:5-6).

for resources include "bases of power"

Common synonyms

(originated by French

and Raven, 1959), "power resources" and "types of power."
The definition used here differs from the above in
that power terms are not embedded in it, and it thus avoids
problems of tautology.

To use terms like "power resources,"

and to define resources in terms of their effect on power,
as does Rogers, seems improper in that the assumption of a
causal relationship is built right into the term and its
definition.

It is important to define resources independently

of their relationship to power dimensions, both to avoid the
relatively formal problem of tautology and for more substan
tive reasons.

Combining resources and power in one's defini

tion implies that power dimensions only depend on resources,
although this is clearly not intended by family power
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theorists.

Rather, resource/exchange theorists generally

would agree that "levels of power are determined by the
interaction of resources, dependencies, and alternatives"
(Smith, 1970:862).

Discussions of resources also are

usually qualified by stating that resources provide only a
potential for power, or that possession of resources does not
guarantee that an individual will actually attempt to exer
cise power or be successful in that attempt (SafiliosRothschild, 1970:80; Sprey, 1975:64).

However, even with

such cautions and qualifications, it is inappropriate and
confusing to use as synonyms for personal resources phrases
like "types of power."
Another important definition of resources is
" . . . anything that one partner may make available to the
other, helping the latter satisfy his needs or attain his
goals"

(Blood and Wolfe, 1960:12).

This is similar to the

present approach in not entangling resources and power.
However, the Blood and Wolfe definition differs from ours
in its focus on attributes which make a positive contribu
tion to a person's welfare, and its neglect of the possibility
of using resources to prevent the other from attaining goals.
As Foa and Foa point out (1975:4), the notion of resources
covers both "positive and negative encounters," "mutual
deprivation" as well as "mutual provision," and aggression
as well as supportive behavior.

Further, the Blood and

Wolfe definition includes only those attributes which may
be made available to the other.

It thus fails to recognize
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that resources which are not made available to the other
may still have implications for power in allowing one indi
vidual to remain independent of the demands of the other (see
Blau, 1964).
To summarize, the central features of the present
definition of personal resources are its independence from
power terms, the inclusion of attributes which have implica
tions not only for the other but also for oneself, and the
recognition that resources can be used both to provide
benefits and to prevent them.
Relationship to Power Variables
The purpose of including personal resources in this
study is not to attempt another test of the resource theory
of power.

A full-blown test of the more sophisticated ver

sions of resource/exchange theory would require measures of
dependencies and alternatives
these are not available here.

(as in Smith, 1970), and
Rather, the intent is to

explore relationships between resources and the central
variable in the study, power modes.

Both the general levels

of resources and the kinds of resources held by marital
partners are expected to have some relationship to the types
of power assertions they make.
Previous Measures of Resources
There are two approaches to the measurement of
resources.

The first derives from the "bases of power"

model originated by French and Raven (1959).

For reasons
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outlined below, this approach is the less satisfactory of
the two.

In delineating five potential bases of power,

French and Raven focus on the subjective orientation of a
person (P) toward the relationship with the other (0) .■*"
The five bases of power are then used to outline five types
of power:
(a) reward power, based on P's perception that
0 has the ability to mediate rewards for him;
(b) coercive power, based on P's perception
that 0 has the ability to mediate punishments
for him; (c) legitimate power, based on the
perception by P that 0 has a legitimate right
to prescribe behavior for him; (d) referent power,
based on P's identification with 0; (e) expert
power, based on the perception that 0 has some
special knowledge or expertness (French and
Raven, 1959:263).
One major difficulty with this approach is the ten
dency for resources and several dimensions of power to
become entangled, as in the alternative definitions of
resources discussed earlier.

Straus notes a problem with

the terminology growing out of the bases of power model,
as evidenced by terms like "referent power," and indicates
that such terms confuse power assertions, power modes, and
personal resources.

He suggests that rather than "informa

tional power," for example, terms such as "knowledge" should
be used (Straus, 1976:2).
-^-Apparently the only study in the family power litera
ture which actually approached the measurement of resources
from this subjective orientation model is Smith's (1970) study
of parental influence on adolescents.
Raven et al. (1975)
do use the "bases of power" model in a study of husband-wife
power relations, but they shift the focus to responses of
the other to different kinds of power assertions. This
research is thus more relevant to power modes than personal
resources.

This solution not only eliminates a great deal of
conceptual confusion, but it also opens the door to assessing
resources on a more "objective" basis than the subjective
orientation measures demanded by the original French and
Raven model.

In fact, a second difficulty of the bases of

power model as originally formulated is the neglect of
resources which an individual may possess independently of
the other's orientation toward him/her.

As the definition

used here suggests, resources are not just important in
their availability to the other, but also in their facilita
tion of the holder's independence.

The "objective" resources

possessed by an individual may be just as important as the
other's subjective orientation toward those resources.

Thus,

the actual "expertise" of A is as significant as B's belief
that A has a certain amount of expertise.

It is suggested

here that the objective and the subjective aspects of
resources are distinct, that the two do not always coincide
with one another in a particular relationship, and that
their relationship is an interesting subject of study in
its own right.
Finally, the particular categories of resources
originally outlined by French and Raven also present diffi
culties.

First, in this model authority ("legitimate power")

is included as a resource.

It may not be inherently in

appropriate to view authority in this way.

However, authority

represents a quite different dimension (the normative)

from

the structural dimension which the other resources usually
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enumerated represent.

Further, recent work within resource

theory has consistently treated authority as a separate
variable which mediates the influence of resources on power
dimensions

(as in Rodman's

(1972) "theory of resources in

cultural context") , and indeed as a variable which is itself
influenced by resources

(Allen and Straus, 1975:3).

For

these reasons, authority will be treated here as a separate
variable, even though some would give it the conceptual status
of a resource.

Second, the reward and coercive categories

outlined by French and Raven are certainly very broad.

It

seems preferable to concentrate on the more specific resources
which may make it possible for one to reward or punish another,
rather than to combine these into such broad categories.

2

Far more common in the measurement of resources than
the bases of power model is the approach taken by Blood and
Wolfe (1960) .

This alternative does focus on specific

resources as suggested just above, and it is also consistent
with the disentangling definition of resources presented
here.

The actual resources considered by Blood and Wolfe

and by many subsequent investigators (such as Fox, 1973;
Scanzoni, 1972) consist of characteristics like income,
education, and occupation.

Allen and Straus note that these

types of resources refer to "economic and prestige conferring

This is not to say that French and Raven's categories
are not useful in other respects.
This model is probably
most helpful in examining types of power assertions.
In
fact, French and Raven (1959) offer a very insightful dis
cussion of the implications of using different types of power
assertions for the other's response.
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characteristics" of the spouses, which correspond to "what
Blau (1964:20-22) would call 'extrinsic resources'"

(1975:7).

In addition, resources of a more personal and interpersonal
nature have been considered, and these may be seen as equiva
lent to what Blau calls "intrinsic" resources (Allen and
Straus, 1975:7).

For example, Heer (1963) suggested that

personal attributes like attractiveness and role competence
should be considered as resources.

In a study of resources

and husband-wife violence, Allen and Straus included items
on self-esteem, achievement orientation, sociability, and
anxiety in a measure of resources

(1975:7).

This research

includes measures of both the "extrinsic" and the "intrinsic"
types of resources, and these are discussed in detail in
the following chapter.
ATTRIBUTED POWER
Definition. The attribution to an individual
of the ability to alter group outcomes. More
specifically, reports as to the distribution
of power in a group.
Previous Measurement and Relationship to Other Power
Variables
The concept of attributed power is derived from current
self-report measures which purport to assess the power struc
ture or the relative power of members of a group.

Such

measures seek to find out "who has the power," and thus focus
on the relative amounts of power of husbands and wives, or
the distribution of power (Foss and Straus, 1975:14-17).
These self-report measures range from single-item questions

like "who is the real boss in your family?"

(Turk and Bell,

1975); to the extensively used Blood and Wolfe Decision
Power Index, which asks respondents to indicate who usually
has the final say in a series of family-related decisions;
to predictions of which partner would make a particular
decision during a laboratory task, and retrospective reports
of which partner actually did make the decision (Olson and
Rabunsky, 1972).
It is suggested here that self-report measures of
the marital power distribution are appropriately viewed as
attributional statements.

Attribution may be defined as

the process of imputing or assigning certain properties,
abilities, motivations, etc. to entities (including self
and others) in the environment (after Kelley, 1967) .

In

terms of self-report measures of "power structure" in
marriage we may say that imputations are being made about
the relative abilities of oneself and one's spouse to alter
group outcomes.
Applying some of the insights of attribution theory
to these measures has certain advantages.

For example,

Kelley suggests that it is possible to "identify systematic
discrepancies between the attributions different persons or
different types of persons make" and these differences may be
a function of "differences between actor and observer in
their respective information about possible causes and covariances"

(1973:125).

It is certainly the case that

40

differences have been found between attributions about the
power distribution made by husbands and wives.

Turk and

Bell (1972) found that husbands and wives tend to attribute
greater power to their partners than the partner attributes
to him/herself, and this is consistent with findings by
Heer (1962, 1963) and others.

(In contrast, Olson (1969)

found that husbands tend to overestimate, and wives tend
to underestimate, their own power.)

Attribution theory

suggests, at the very least, that systematic differences
between respondents should be expected and viewed as
theoretically important, rather than merely as irritating
methodological obstacles.
Viewing self-reports of the marital power distri
bution as attributions may also help to clarify other
findings which have often been considered troublesome.

In

particular, a number of researchers have been dismayed
at the extent to which authority is related to self-reports
of the power structure.

For example, in review of a number

of methodological studies, Olson and Cromwell conclude at
one point that "those studies using retrospective selfreport measures of power, of which there are many, are actually
tapping who is perceived as the authority"

(1975:136).

Such

comments imply that correlations between normative and struc
tural measures indicate that the structural measures are
invalid.

We would suggest that self-report measures repre

sent attributions about the distribution of power, and as
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such they are a function not only of the perceived outcomes
of previous power confrontations, but also such other
dimensions as norms about who should "have more power"
(authority) and the personal resources possessed by group
members, as well as differential information available to
the persons making the attributions (as in Kelley, 1973).
POWER DISTRIBUTION NORM
Definition. Expectations/beliefs about the way
power should be distributed in a group.
In a
dyad, the right of A to alter B's behavior.
Authority.
Other Definitions
This is a fairly standard, non-controversial concept.
It may be seen as the normative companion to attributed
power, in that both concepts focus on the distribution of
power among group members.

Whereas the concept of attributed

power refers to attributions about the actual power distri
bution, power distribution norms focus on the question of who
should have more power, or how power should be distributed
in a group (i.e., one variable is ostensibly descriptive
and the other prescriptive).
Norms about the distribution of power are usually
referred to as "power norms" or "norms about power."

The

more specific "power distribution norm" is considered
preferable here in that it makes explicit the notion that
norms about the distribution of power are only one specific
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type of power norm.

There are other dimensions of power

which are subject to normative definition.

In particular,

different types of power assertions may also be studied
on a normative level.

That is, we may examine not only what

kinds of power assertions are made, but also which types
are considered legitimate or illegitimate. (Foss and Straus,
1975:16-17).

The latter issue refers to what may be called

"power mode norms.
Relationship to Other Power Variables
A considerable body of research indicates that norms
about the distribution of power in marriage have important
implications for other dimensions of power.

In a re

examination of research findings from eleven cultures,
Rodman (1972) found not only that power distribution norms
directly affect what we term "attributed power," but also
that the relationship between personal resources and attri
buted power depends upon norms about the power distribution.
Burr (1973) further specified this relationship when he con
cluded that personal resources are related to power attri
butions only when the prescribed or normative distribution
of power is equalitarian.

The present study will be able

to provide additional evidence concerning such relationships.

•^While recent research specifically on norms about
physical aggression between husbands and wives suggests the
importance of this variable (Straus, 1975), data on "power
mode norms" are not available for the present study.

The main reason for including power distribution
norms here, however, is their possible relationship with
power modes or types of power assertions.

Safilios-

Rothschild (1970:80) has suggested that a spouse who lacks
authority (usually the wife) will not make power assertions
which are direct, but will use indirect, "manipulative"
approaches in attempting to influence the other.

On the

other hand, the spouse with the greater authority (the one
whom the power distribution norms favor) may need to make
only mild power assertions unless directly challenged
(1970:80).

Even in the context of a laboratory interaction

task, where the range of available power modes is limited
compared to those in a natural setting, it may be possible
to shed light on such alternative hypotheses.
OUTCOME VARIABLES
The final aspect of power to be considered here
concerns the outcomes of the conflict resolution process,
or the actual choices or decisions made by the participants
in the laboratory situation.

These task outcomes or decisions

have typically been used by researchers as measures of
"achieved power"— the actual success of an actor in altering
group outcomes

(Straus, 1976).

Thus, if the final decision

reached by a couple is the same as the husband's initial
choice, then the husband is given a "win."

Sprey (1972),

among others, has argued that this is a poor measure of
achieved, or successful, power.

This is partly a problem
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due to the time distance between particular acts of power
assertion and the final decision actually made by a couple.
Probably the best way of measuring achieved power would be
through an act-by-act counting of instances of immediate
compliance to a command— similar to the "effective power"
score in SIMFAM (Straus and Tallman, 1971).

Sprey (1972, 1975)

offers a further, and perhaps more important argument against
the use of "win scores" as measures of achieved power, or
success in making power assertions.
family relationships represent an

Such scores assume that

"I win-you lose"

situation,

or indeed a zero-sum game, and according to Sprey, this
assumption about families is unwarranted.
It may be suggested, however, that whether or not
families are analogous to zero-sum game situations is an
empirical question.

Some families may indeed treat situa

tions as zero-sum games even though there is no structural
reason for doing so, while others may not.

In line with

this, one of the possible uses of the IMC task outcomes is
as an indicator of the extent to which the couple is treating
the task as a unilateral "win" situation or as a situation
offering bilateral solution possibilities.

As mentioned

earlier, the IMC task is uniquely suited to shedding light
on this issue, since two choices must be made by the couple
for each vignette.

Thus, one outcome measure is the couple's

tendency toward unilateral or bilateral solutions.

When

both choices made by a couple favor one member of the couple,
this outcome is unilateral.

Bilateral outcomes are those in

T
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which of the two choices made by the couple, one choice
favors one spouse and the other choice favors the other
spouse.

The unilateral-bilateral solution measure in

particular allows an opportunity to explore relationships
between types of outcomes and resources, power distribution
variables, and (most importantly) power modes.
Chapter IV presents the specific measures, basic
descriptive findings, and analyses of interrelationships
for the concepts discussed in this Chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
RESOURCES, THE POWER DISTRIBUTION, AND OUTCOMES
The concepts analyzed in the last chapter, and
the findings presented in this chapter, refer to two of
the three power domains identified by Olson and Cromwell
(1975:5-7).

Personal resources and power distribution

norms represent the "bases of power" domain, and the out
comes or "achieved" power variables are part of the "power
outcomes domain."

While Olson andCromwell

buted power in the outcomes domain,

include attri

I think it can also

be counted— particularly as it is conceptualized here— as
a bases of power (or "potential" power) concept.

The one

domain which is left out so far is "power processes," and
this will be addressed in the later chapters on power
modes or types
Before

of power assertion.
we get to the study of power processes, we

are confined in this chapter to the fairly static analyses
of relationships between power base variables and outcomes
which have dominated previous research.

The obvious ques

tion, then, is "Why still another analysis of these structural
variables— why not move directly to power process concepts?"
There are a number of reasons for pursuing one more
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examination of relationships between personal resources,
power distribution variables, and outcomes.
First of all, it is useful in terms of assessing
the generalizability of the ground-breaking power modes
data, to see how the present findings for the more heavily
researched variables fit those of previous research.

Second,

presenting these relationships is necessary background for
fitting the power modes analysis into the model of marital
power relations in Chapter I .
In their own right, the findings offered in this
chapter are worthwhile.

For one thing, it is only recently

that studies have been done using both self-report and
observational methods

(Cromwell, Klein, and Wieting, 1975;

Olson, 1969; Olson and Rabunsky, 1972; Turk and Bell, 1972).
A side effect of such studies is that they are generally
the only ones which obtain data from both husbands and
wives.

In this chapter, then, we can bring a still rare

multi-method approach, and the perspectives of both marital
partners, to the study of power structure.
In addition, the outcomes variable in this research
provides an opportunity to examine both win-oriented and com
promise behavior by the spouses, and thus a chance to test
some important notions derived from conflict and game theories.
Finally, the need for a processual approach to
marital power does not diminish the importance of under
standing power structure, or the relatively stable distri
bution of power and power-related attributes in a relation
ship.
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CONSTRUCTION OF INDEXES: PERSONAL RESOURCES
In the last chapter, personal resources were defined
as "any capabilities, characteristics, or goods possessed
by an individual which may be used to facilitate or hinder
satisfaction of needs or provision of benefits (for self or
others)."

Further, two kinds of resources were identified

as important in conjugal power relations.

Extrinsic

resources are the "economic and prestige-conferring charac
teristics" of the spouses, while intrinsic resources are the
interpersonal skills and personal qualities which the part
ners bring to the relationship (Allen and Straus, 1979).
By far most of the research on marital power has focused
only on extrinsic resources.

However, much of the theo

retical work has suggested that non-economic resources are
also relevant to marital power (Heer, 1963; SafiliosRothschild, 1970), and in recent empirical work these
variables are important (Safilios-Rothschild, 1976; Straus,
1977).
In this section, the methodology for constructing
indexes of intrinsic and extrinsic resources is described.
The personal resources indexes are the most complex in the
research, so this discussion is rather lengthy.

However,

several of the issues raised are common to the construction
of other indexes, so this presentation does double duty.
In most of the research on personal resources and
marital power, particular resources have been correlated
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one by one with some index of power.

This is useful in

assessing the impact of each resource separately, but is
rather cumbersome.

Further, the single-variable analyses

do not give us a full sense of the extent to which all of
the resource variables, taken together, may help to explain
power relations.

Finally, since the main focus of the

present research is not to test resource theory, a one-byone analysis of resources would take up an inordinate
amount of attention.

Thus, overall indexes of extrinsic

and intrinsic resources are desirable here as concise
summaries.
Method of Standardizing Measures
Most of the variables treated in this chapter consist
of indexes each made up of a number of items or dimensions.
Some method of standardizing both the items and the indexes
was desirable.

The personal resources indexes, for example,

include very disparate items— from a tricotomous classifi
cation of work status, to a seven-point occupational rating
scale, etc.

Since such measures differ markedly in range

and variance, it is necessary to standardize the items to
equalize^ their respective contributions to the composite
index.

•*-It is also possible to differentially weigh items
for an index; however, there were no theoretical reasons
for doing so in the indexes constructed for this research.
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The indexes for "power distribution norms" and
"attributed power" are based on items from the Decision
Power Index (Blood and Wolfe, 1960).

While these items

"were pre-designed to have equal score ranges,

. . . the

mean, variance, and skewness of the items . . . often
differ markedly from each other, again indicating the need
for item standardization"

(Straus and Kumagai, 1978).

Thus,

both the indexes of personal resources and indexes related
to the distribution of power require standardization for the
purpose of ensuring that each item contributes equally to
the total index.
At another level, it is often important to also
standardize the indexes themselves, so as to "express scores
in units that have a known meaning"
1978).

(Straus and Kumagai,

For example, the sum of the raw scores on the

attributed power items (Blood and Wolfe Decision Power
Index) ranges from 5 to 40.

Given this unusual range, the

meaning of a reported score of 20 is not readily apparent.
In situations like this it is helpful to the reader to
express index scores in some standard unit.
A second advantage of standardizing index scores is
that scores for different variables are expressed in the
same units, making for a more ready understanding of dif
ferences and similarities in how the variables in the
research "work."

For the most part, indexes used in this

chapter were constructed by standardizing first the items
and then the index.
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The PZ Score.

The method of standardization chosen

for this research is the PZ score, developed by Straus
(1978; Straus and Kumagai, 1978).

Like the Z score, PZ

scores have the advantages of meeting the assumptions of
necessary statistical procedures.

However, the PZ score

is preferable in being more readily understood than the Z
score.

The PZ score combines the notion of scores being

expressed as "a percentage of the maximum raw score"

(as

in class tests), "with the measurement characteristics of
Z scores and is therefore called a 'PZ' scale"

(Straus,

1978) .
"PZ scores have a range of 0 (Z score of

<_

-2.5)

to 100 (Z score of _> 2.5), with a mean of 50, which is
50 percent of the maximum possible score, and a standard
deviation of 20" (Straus, 1978).

2

Roughly speaking, the

meaning of a PZ score of 70 on the index of attributed power,
would be that relative to the rest of the sample, the res3
pondent received 70 percent of the total possible score.
Relationship to Other Methods of Standardization.
The PZ score is a new method of expressing item and index

_ ^For computing from raw scores, PZ = 50 + (20 +
((X - X)/SD)). From Z scores, PZ = 50 + 20Z. For additional
details on the characteristics of PZ scores and their rela
tionship to Z and other standard scores, see Straus (1978).
A rather neat feature of the PZ score can be illus
trated here.
Twenty PZ points equal 1 SD. Thus, since the
mean of a PZ distribution is 50, a PZ score of 70 is 1
standard deviation above the mean.
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scores in terms of a standard unit.

Evidence for the

relative adequacy of this method is found in a comparison
of eleven methods of index construction (Straus and Kumagai,
1978) .

In this research, PZ scores on four variables

were almost perfectly correlated with other standard
scores for the same variables (such as the Z score), and
correlations between eight variables and an external
criterion variable were essentially the same whether Z
or PZ scores were used.

These findings are of special

relevance here, since two of the four primary variables
studied (SES and decision power of husband) are highly
similar to the personal resources and power distribution
variables in the present research.

Given these findings,

the choice of PZ scores as a method of standardization which
combines the advantages of a Z score with considerably
greater ease of understanding, seems well justified.
EXTRINSIC RESOURCES
Five items relating to economic performance were
used to form an index of extrinsic resources for each
partner.

The individual's education, occupation, and

personal income are three commonly used indicators.^

^Education was measured on a seven-point scale
ranging from less than eighth grade through some work on a
graduate degree.
Income was based on a seven-point scale
ranging from less than $1,000/year to over $25,000/year.
Occupation also was measured on a seven-point scale, based
on Hollingshead1s occupational classification, and ranging
from unskilled workers to "higher executives and major
professionals."
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In addition, the work status of the individual
(working full time outside the home, part time or not
working outside) was included.

This particular variable

was seen as especially important for the women, and a
number of studies have shown the work status of the wife
to be related to the distribution of power (Brown, 1977;
Heer, 1958; Scanzoni, 1970:160).

Although few of the men

in this sample were not employed full time, it seems worth
while to also include work status among the husbands'
resources.

This is because less than full time employment

is a significant deficit in the husband's "arsenal" of
resources.
Finally, the fifth extrinsic resources item was a
self-rating as to one's economic contribution to the marriage.
Each partner rated his/her own economic contribution on a
C
five-point scale.
This item is a desirable addition to

5

The economic contributions item is one of four
experimental items on contributions to the couple's marriage
which posed a special problem in terms of scoring responses.
Each partner rated his own contribution in the economic,
emotional, social, and sexual areas as "much more than it
ought to be," "more than it ought to be," "just about right,"
"less than it ought to be," or "much less than it ought to
b e ."
Given the wording of the responses, it could be
argued that the "just about right" category should receive
the highest numerical score (3), the two adjacent categories
a middle score, regardless of direction (2), and the end
points both receive the lowest score (1). This is because
feeling that one's contribution was much too large could
be seen as equally distressing as feeling that it was much
too small.
On the other hand, it is possible that despite the
wording, respondents were basically ranking themselves on
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the overall index, since it is anchored in the partners'
personal views of appropriate economic contributions.

This

is qualitatively different from the four other extrinsic
resources, where the "absolute" value of the individual's
resources is what counts.
A multidimensional Extrinsic Resources Index (ERI)
was constructed in three steps.
extrinsic items was standardized.

First, each of the five
Next the sum of the

resulting scores was computed, and finally, this sum of
the items was itself standardized so as to be in PZ score
form.

Thus, the resulting PZ'd index has a range of 0 to
/r

100, a mean of 50, and a standard deviation of 20.

an ordinary five-point scale, from making a very small
contribution to making a very large one.
In order to determine which scoring procedure to
use, a "trace-line analysis" was conducted as follows.
There are sound theoretical reasons for believing
that the contributions items are positively correlated with
attributed power.
Therefore, the attributed power index
can be used as an external criterion variable for deter
mining the scoring direction for the contributions ques
tions. The mean attributed power scores for each response
category on the contributions questions were computed.
Since the attributed power scores tended to peak at the
"much more than it ought to be" category, rather than at
the "just about right" category, the contributions items
were scored on a five-point scale (from 1 = much less, to
5 = much more) (the detailed information for the trace-line
analysis can be made available upon request).
®Both the specific items and the index were stan
dardized separately for women and men. Thus, the wives'
scores were standardized in terms of wives only, not in
terms of the entire sample of one hundred fifty-six indivi
duals, and similarly for the husbands.
This means that the
same PZ value does not necessarily mean the same thing for
a man and a woman.
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Internal Consistency of the Extrinsic Resources Index
Table 4.1 gives the product-moment correlation
matrix for each of the five extrinsic resource items and
the multidimensional indexes.

This analysis gives infor

mation as to the internal consistency of the external
resources indexes.

In other words, this indicates whether

the five items "hang together" or are all tapping some aspect
of the same underlying dimension.

As Straus (1977:5)

points out, very high intercorrelations among the items
are not necessarily desirable here.

This is because if the

correlations approach perfection, there is no point in con
structing an index at all since any one item would do as
well.
As the table indicates, not every item is signifi
cantly related to every other item, for either the women
or the men.

However, each item is "tied into" at least one

other item, and thus it seems justifiable to retain all of
the items for the overall indexes.
Patterns for Husbands and Wives.

The three classic

economic variables— income, education, and occupation— are
clearly interrelated for both men and women, and the
pattern does not seem to differ between the groups.

How

ever, there are some interesting differences in how the work
status and self-rating of economic contributions items
operate.

For both husbands and wives, work status is

strongly related to income.

However, only for the wives
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Table 4.1. Correlation Matrix for Five Extrinsic Personal
Resources Measures, and a Multidimensional Index Combining
Them, for Husbands and Wives

Extrinsic
Personal
Resources

EDUC

INC

WKST

OCC

ECON

Husbands
Education (EDUC)

-

Personal Income (INC)

.29

Work Status

.06

.53

.73

.40

.01

-

Economic Contribution
-.03
to Marriage (ECON)

.19

.07

.01

-

Extrinsic Resources
Index (ERI)

.77

.55

.71

.37

(WKST)

Occupation (OCC)

.66

-

-

Wives
Education
Personal Income

-

.22

-

-.02

.62

.60

.30

.00

Economic Contribution
to Marriage
-.11

.31

.36

-.09

Extrinsic Resources
Index

.82

.67

.54

Work Status
Occupation

.52

-

-

.51
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does work status correlate with any other extrinsic
resource item— notably the self-rating of economic con
tribution to the marriage.
For the economic contribution item, the only sig
nificant relationship for the men is with personal income.
Thus, the husbands'

self-rating was positively related to

income but not to any of the other economic items.

The

wives' self-ratings were positively related to both income
and work status.

The small negative correlations between

self rating of economic contribution and education and
occupational level for the women are particularly interest
ing.

It may be that women with relatively high educational

achievement and occupational positions have higher expecta
tions for their own economic contributions to the marriage
and thus rate themselves more harshly than other women.
This may especially be the case if one notes the possibility
that women are structurally barred from actually achieving
the level of occupational functioning which a high level
of educational attainment, as well as personal standards,
may lead them to expect for themselves.
To summarize in terms of the criterion of internal
consistency, the five extrinsic resources items appear
sufficiently interrelated to warrant combining them into
a single index.

This is especially the case for the three

standard items— income, occupation, and education.

The

work status and self-rating of economic contribution items
appear more important for the wives than for the husbands.
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External Criterion Item Analysis
Another way of assessing the adequacy of the
extrinsic resources index is to do an "external criterion
item analysis"

(Straus, 1964:354).

This analysis has to

do with the validity of the indexes, while the internal
consistency analysis above relates to reliability.
The criterion variable is the attributed power index.
Both the "resource theory" of conjugal power and previous
research predict certain relationships between it (as the
Blood and Wolfe Decision Power Index), and most of the
items m

the extrinsic resources index.

7

Ordinarily, an external criterion analysis would be
used with a large pool of items as an empirical "weeding
out" device in index construction.

However, here there are

a small number of items and good theoretical reasons for
including each of them.

Thus, the external criterion analysis

becomes not so much a selection process, as a means of
finding out if the items are "working" in this research in
expected ways.
Table 4.2 gives the product-moment correlations
between the five extrinsic resources items as well as the

^Using the attributed power index as the external
criterion does not rule out later discussing the correla
tions of the resulting extrinsic indexes with attributed
power.
This is because the latter discussion is not intended
as a "test" of the resource theory, but as an overall
summary of the resources and attributed power relationship.
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indexes, and attributed power, for both husbands and wives.
Roughly speaking, the items operate as expected, with
some exceptions.

For the husbands, with the exception of

education, each item shows at least a moderate correlation
with attributed power.

The correlation between the index

as a whole and attributed power is fairly strong, and higher
than for any single item.

These findings are generally

consistent with previous findings of relationships between
husband's absolute resources and attributed power (Allen
and Straus, 1979, presently in press; Blood and Wolfe, 1960).
The picture for the wives is quite different:
there are no relationships between the wives' personal ex
trinsic resources and attributed power.
not inconsistent with previous findings.

However, this is
For example, Allen

and Straus (1979) found hardly any relationship between
O

wife's resources and power (see also Price-Bonham, 1976).
The one relationship for the wives is a moderate
one between the self-rating of economic contribution and
attributed power, and is not in the expected direction.
In other words, the higher the wife's rating of her own
economic contribution to the marriage the higher the relative
power she attributes to her husband.

One possible explanation

O

In that research, the expected negative relationship
between wives extrinsic resources and level of husband's
power was found only for working class wives.
Since the
present sample includes only ten working class couples, this
is an important finding. More on this when the relation
ships between resources and power distribution variables are
examined in their own right.
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relates to the fact that the self rating item could be
scored highly by women with very low levels of the other
extrinsic resources.

Thus, I could rate my contribution

as very high even if I were not working, bringing in income,
etc., if I have a traditional view of the division of labor
in the family.

Further, if I believe that as a wife I am

not expected to bring in economic goods and my husband is,
I may also subscribe to a traditional husband-oriented
distribution of power.
In summary, based on the internal consistency
analysis, and the fact that the external criterion analysis
"worked" at least moderately well for the husbands, the com
bination of the five extrinsic resource items into overall
indexes is considered appropriate here.
INTRINSIC RESOURCES
Two measures relating to social and emotional
attributes were used to form an index of intrinsic resources
for each partner.

The first is a ten-item measure of self

esteem, in which the respondent is asked to indicate on a
four-point scale how strongly she agrees/disagrees with
statements like "I feel that I have a number of good qual
ities" or "All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a
failure."

The rationale for including self esteem as an

interpersonal resource in marriage is two-fold.

One, a

person with high self esteem may possess leadership.
a person with high self esteem is less likely to be

Two,
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Table 4.2. Correlations of Five Extrinsic Resources and
a Multidimensional Index Combining the Five Items, with
an Index of Attributed Power, for Husbands and Wives

Extrinsic
Resource

Correlation with HusbandOriented Attributed Power Score
Husbands
Wives

Education

•

O
o

.01

Personal Income

.33

-.05

Work Status

.25

.01

Occupation

.18

-.02

Economic Contribution
to Marriage

.16

.17

Extrinsic Resources
Index

.36

.03
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the sort of emotional drain on the partner which may
hinder the satisfaction of the partner's needs

(see defini

tion of resources above).
The second measure of intrinsic resources is a
three-item self rating of one's social, emotional and
sexual contributions to the marriage.

(These are parallel

to the economic contribution item used in the ERI.)

A

sample item is "In term of our social life, my contribution
as a husband is . . . (much more than it ought to be, more
than it ought, just about right, less than it ought to be,
much less than it ought to be)".

These items appear to be

a fairly direct assessment of the partners' views of the
personal, social, and sexual resources they bring to the
relationship.
Intrinsic Resources Index
A two-dimensional Intrinsic Resources Index (IRI)
was constructed in a manner similar to that for the extrinsic
index (ERI).

First, each of the self-esteem and contribu

tions items was standardized.

Next, the sums of the resulting

esteem scores and contributions scores were computed, and
these two sums were themselves standardized in PZ score
form.

Thus, at this point, two standardized indexes—

Self Esteem (SE) and Marital Contributions
constructed.

(MC)— had been

Next the scores on these two indexes were

summed and the resulting score was standardized in PZ form.
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The resulting Intrinsic Resources Index, in PZ form,
ranges from 0 to 100, has a mean of 50, and a standard
deviation of 20.
Internal Consistency.

The two intrinsic resources

measures are interrelated for the husbands
not for the wives (r = .09).

(r = .27), but

Thus, the rather curious

finding for the women is that positive self esteem does
not appear to be positively related to their ratings of
contributions to the marriage.

However, the moderate

correlation found for the husbands seems to justify com
bining the two into an overall index.
External Criterion Item Analysis.

Table 4.3 gives

the product-moment correlations between the two intrinsic
resources measures and the overall index, and an index of
attributed power.

While for the men there is little rela

tionship between intrinsic resources and attributed power,
for the wives there is a moderate correlation in the expected
direction between marital contributions, at least, and
reported power.

Thus, the higher the wives' ratings of

their own intrinsic contributions to the marriage, the
lower the level of power they attribute to their husbands.
Self esteem does not seem related to power even for the
wives, despite strong theoretical reasons for such a
relationship.
While this analysis is in one way disappointing, in
another it is not.

When the external criterion analyses
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Table 4.3. Correlation of Two Intrinsic Resources
Measures and a Multidimensional Index Combining Them,
with an Index of Attributed Power, for Husbands and
Wives

Intrinsic
Resource

Husbands

Wives

•
O

Self Esteem

Correlation with HusbandOriented Attributed Power Score

-.03

Marital Contributions

.10

-.25

Intrinsic Resources
Index

.15

-.19
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for both the extrinsic and intrinsic resources indexes are
taken together, there is a pattern of different resources
relating to attributed power for men and women which is
compatible with previous research findings.

Extrinsic

resources appear more significant for the husbands, while
intrinsic seem somewhat more important for the wives, in
relation to attributed power.

Since these relationships are

explored here for measurement purposes only, further spec
ification of the findings awaits the more substantive dis
cussion to follow.
As in the analysis for extrinsic resources, the
theoretical reasoning and the pattern of relationships seems
to warrant using the two-dimensional intrinsic resource
index.
A final note on the resources index construction.
Originally my plan was to construct an overall or total
resources index.

However, since the extrinsic and intrinsic

resources operate so differently for the wives and the
husbands, it would be inappropriate to combine the two
types into a single index.

Such a combination would most

likely obscure important findings rather than help uncover
them.
RELATIVE RESOURCES
The thrust of the resource theory of marital power
is that it is the relative resources of the partners which
affects the distribution of power.

While my primary purpose
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is not testing this theory, the relationships to be examined
here are subsumed by the theory. Thus, indexes of relative
resources were constructed to allow exploring the relation
ships actually posited by resource theory.
The relative resources measures are formed on the
basis of the proportion which the husband contributes to
the total amount of a resource possessed by a couple.

The

formula then is the amount of the husband's resource,
divided by the sum of the husband's and wife's resources.
(Precedents for this procedure are Price-Bonham, 1976:631;
Straus, 1978).

The range for any item is from 0 to 100.

A score of zero means the husband contributes none of a
resource, and the wife contributes all of it.

A score of 100

means all of that resource is contributed by the husband,
and a score of 50 means each contributes the resource
equally, or the resource is held in equal amounts by each
spouse.
These measures are most clearly exemplified by the
personal income item.

The proportion of the couple's

total income which the husband contributes is easily under
stood.

If the couple's total income is $20,000 and the

husband's personal income is $15,000 then the relative
income score is 75.
Conceptualizing the notion of relative resource
measures is somewhat more difficult with the intrinsic
resources.

For example, the meaning of a relative resources
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score of 75 for self esteem is less readily understood than
for income.

It is hard to think of summing the self esteem

scores of two individuals and then viewing the sum as the
total esteem of the couple.

However, if it is realized

that the relative score simply is a way of conveniently
summarizing who has a higher level of a particular attri
bute, then the score makes some sense.

Thus, a score of 50

on the relative self esteem means each partner has about
the same level of confidence; a score of 25 means the wife
has much higher self esteem than the husband, and so forth.
There are two quirks of relative scores that need
to be kept in mind.

First of all, it is possible for couples

who have vastly different absolute levels of resources to
receive the same relative score.

That is, a couple in which

the wife earns $20,000 and the husband $30,000

(for a total

of $50,000) would receive the same relative income score
(namely 60), as a couple in which the wife earns $4,000
and the husband $6,000 (for a total of $10,000).

The other

side of this, however, is that the same absolute difference
between partners quite appropriately has very different
implications for the relative score, depending on the base.
Thus, a $10,000 difference gives a relative score of 60
when the total is $50,000, but the relative score is 83 when
the base is $12,000.
Secondly, in instances where each partner has zero
of a resource, then the relative score is 50.

This is
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certainly strange in terms of the absolute value of the
resource, but makes sense in representing the equality of
their positions relative to one another.
Indexes of Relative Resources
Two relative resources indexes were constructed—
one for intrinsic and one for extrinsic resources.

For

each index, each of the component items was converted to
relative form.

Then each relative item was converted into

PZ scores and the resulting items were summed.
figure was itself transformed into PZ form.

The resulting

The resulting

indexes have a range of 0 to 100, mean of 50, and standard
deviation of 20.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 give information as to the internal
consistency and external validity of the relative indexes.
The internal consistency results are similar to those
for the absolute resource indexes.
However, for the analysis using the attributed power
index as the external criterion, the relative resources
indexes appear to be less adequate than the absolute ver
sions.

There is only one statistically significant rela

tionship (between the wife's report of

he power distribution

and the relative intrinsic marital contributions score), and
this is only a moderate correlation.

Thus, contrary to

expectations based on the resource theory of marital power,
the absolute levels of the resources held by the partners
seem more important than their relative resources.

These
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Table 4.4.
Correlation Matrix for Relative Personal
Resources Items and Indexes, for Extrinsic and Intrinsic
Resources

Relative
Personal
Resources

REDUC

RINC

RWKST

ROCC

RECON

Extrinsic Resources
Relative Education
(R-EDUC)

_

Relative Income (R-INC)
Relative Work Status
(R-WKST)

.19

-

-.02

.57

Relative Occupation
(R-OCC)

.18

.13

.04

Relative Economic Contri
bution to Marriage
(R-ECON)

.05

.38

.39

-.02

Relative Extrinsic Re
sources Index (R-ERI)

.49

.78

.74

.41

-

R-SE

-

.64
R-MC

Intrinsic Resources
Relative Self Esteem (R-SE)

-

Relative Marital Contributions
(R-MC)

.28

Relative Intrinsic Resources
Index (R-IRI)

.81

-

.77
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Table 4.5. Correlations of Relative Personal Resources
Items and Indexes, with Husband-Oriented Attributed Power
Scores, for Wives and Husbands

Relative
Personal
Resources
Items

Correlation with HusbandOriented Attributed Power Score
Husband

Wife

-.09
.06
.04
.05
.05

-.03
.09
-.06
-.16
-.09

.09

-.09

-.04
-.03

.07
.20

Extrinsic Resources
R-EDUC
R-INC
R-WKST
R-OCC
R-ECON
R-ERI
Intrinsic Resources
R-SE
R-MC
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relationships will be explored more fully in the sections
to follow.
RESOURCES OF WIVES AND HUSBANDS
The interrelationships among the intrinsic and
extrinsic resources of the partners demonstrate some inter
esting differences in how resources relate to marriage for
men and women.
Table 4.6 gives the product-moment correlations
between the resources of the wives and the husbands.
the ERI

For

(Extrinsic Resources Index), there is no correlation,

but this lack of relationship obscures some strong relation
ships for the individual items.

For example, the partners'

education and occupational level are highly correlated.
However, there are very slight negative relationships for
income and self-ratings of economic contribution, and a
moderate negative correlation for work status.

Thus, the

positive and negative correlations for the partners' ex
trinsic resource items cancel each other out and produce
no correlation for the index as a whole.
There is a slight negative relationship for the IRI
(Intrinsic Resources Index), such that the higher the wife's
intrinsic resources,the lower the husband's.

When the self

esteem and contributions indexes themselves are looked at,
though, we find moderate contradictory relationships.

The

partners' self esteem scores are positively related, but
their marital contributions are negatively related.

This
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Table 4.6.
Intercorrelations of Personal Resources of
Husbands and Wives

Extrinsic
EDUC - education

.52

INC - income

-.07

WKST - work status

-.22

OCC - occupation

.37

ECON - economic contribution to the
marriage
ERI - Extrinsic Resources

Index

-.08
.05

Intrinsic
SE - self esteem

.19

MC - marital contributions
IRI - Intrinsic Resources

-.19
Index

-.10
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may be a function of the wording of the contributions
items, which asked for a weighing of one person's input
against the other's.

If I see myself as doing more than I

should have to, my husband will see himself as doing less
and our responses will be negatively correlated (even though
consistent).
The most interesting findings on the links between
husbands' and wives' resources are given in Table 4.7.

For

the husbands, there is a moderately strong correlation
between extrinsic and intrinsic resources.

Following

Scanzoni's (1970) lead of seeing the husband's "articula
tion" with the economic system as the base point from which
more intrinsic rewards are derived, we can posit a causal
order in which extrinsic resources are temporally prior to
intrinsic ones.

Then, we can say that as the husband's

"economic and prestige-conferring" resources (ERI) increase,
his self esteem and rating of his interpersonal contribu
tions to the marriage (IRI) also increase.
Among the wives, this connection is not nearly so
strong.

There is only a slight positive relationship

between her extrinsic resources and her intrinsic resources,
indicating that the wives' sense of self and perception of
what they bring to marriage are not very closely tied to
their performance in the economic sphere.
When the husband's extrinsic resources are corre
lated with the wife's intrinsic resources there is only
a small relationship.

This is contrary to the implications
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Table 4.7.
Intercorrelation Matrix for Intrinsic and
Extrinsic Personal Resources of Husbands and Wives

Type of
Resource

Husband
Extrinsic Intrinsic

Wife
Extrinsic Intrinsic

Husband
Extrinsic
Intrinsic

.34

Wife
Extrinsic

.05

-.16

Intrinsic

.15

-.10

.13
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of Scanzoni's work, which suggests that the husband's
extrinsic resources should increase the rewards experienced
by the wife in marriage, and she in exchange will make a
greater intrinsic contribution to the marriage
have a higher sense of self esteem).
model

(as well as

In fact, Scanzoni's

(1970) actually implies that the husband's extrinsic

resources are of greater importance in this regard than
those of the wife.
Finally, there is the intriguing finding that the
wife's extrinsic resources are negatively related to the
husband's intrinsic resources.

As the wife's economic

input increases, the husband's sense of self and of input
interpersonally to the marriage is lowered.

The dynamic

for this may be that wives of men who do not give much
interpersonally to the marriage seek satisfaction outside
of the marriage, through work.

Or, it may be that husbands

of wives who are extrinsically successful experience a loss
of self respect as a result of their wives' success.

Such

a negative self definition might be induced by the wife's
definition, or it might be self-inflicted.

These relationships were also re-examined separately
for working class and middle class couples.
There were only
slight differences, except that for the working class wives
(N = only 10) extrinsic and intrinsic resources were a little
more highly correlated, and the husband's intrinsic resources
showed some positive relationship to both types of resources
for the wives.
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REPORTS FROM THE FRONT: ATTRIBUTED POWER AND
POWER DISTRIBUTION NORMS
This section introduces the two self-report
measures of the power distribution— power distribution
norms and attributed power.

Attributed power was defined

in Chapter III as "the attribution to an individual of the
ability to alter group outcomes— more specifically, reports
as to the distribution of power in a group."

In other words,

attributed power consists of the reports made by individuals
on their perceptions of the distribution of power.

These

reports may be self-reports by members of the group (i.e.,
the husband and wife, in this study), or observations by
third parties

(such as children).

Such reports on the power

distribution, which we are calling attributed power, are
what is most frequently referred to simply as power.
Power distribution norms were defined in Chapter III
as "expectations/beliefs about the way power should be dis
tributed in a group.
B's behavior.

In a dyad, the right of A to alter

Authority."

This concept is parallel to

attributed power, but on a normative plane.

Attributed

power refers to perceptions of the way power really is
distributed, while power distribution norms refer to beliefs
about how power should be distributed.

Another way to think

of this is that one is prescriptive or normative, and the
other is descriptive.
Like attributed power, power distribution norms
are reports made by individuals.

However, the latter
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appear much less likely to be measured through the reports
of third parties.
Measuring the Power Distribution Variables
For both attributed power and power distribution
norms, indexes were based on the eight-item standard version
of the Blood and Wolfe Decision Power Index.

In the attri

buted power (AP) mode, respondents indicated who usually has
the final say in a series of family-related decisions.

In

the power distribution norm (PDN) version, respondents
indicated who they think should have the final say on the
same set of decisions.
The Decision Power Index (DPI) has been heavily used
and heavily criticized as a representative of self-report
measures of decision making.

It has been much more often

used as a descriptive measure (AP), and the objections are
to its use for this purpose.

A major criticism is that

such measures are highly subject to social desirability
responses--i.e., are confounded with authority (SafiliosRothschild, 1970).

This objection would seem most telling

when the measure is taken as intended to assess the "real"
power structure, rather than perceptions/attributions about
the distribution of power.

Further, in the context of this

particular research, participants responded to the AP and
PDN versions "back-to-back," and perhaps the explicit

78

normative wording of the PDN items provided a contrast for
them with the more descriptive (AP) i t e m s . ^
The second kind of criticism of the DPI relates to
the content of the items themsevles.

One variation on

this is to argue that the items themselves are not a
representative sample of the kinds of decisions made in
families, and thus a biased view of the power distribution
is obtained.

In particular, a disproportionate number of

household-related decisions which are likely to be made by
wives are included, and this gives a very unfortunate over
estimation of the number of equalitarian and wife-dominated
couples.
I believe that this objection may well be warranted.
For descriptive purposes, the DPI items probably under
estimate the husband's power in marriage particularly in
terms of the extent to which husbands make broad decisions
which affect the very conditions of the wife's existence.
This kind of decision-making is not likely to be reciprocal
on the part of the wife in determining the husband's life
course (see for example Johnson, 1975) .

This descriptive

inaccuracy is important especially from a feminist perspec
tive on male-female equality.

However, when we turn to

■^It could be, on the other hand, that the back-toback placement elicits a desire to show consistency between
normative and descriptive items. This can ultimately be
determined through further methodological research.
How
ever, the fact that the AP-PDN correlations reported later
are only moderate argues against the view that responses
were subject to a consistency need.
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the job of explaining variations in the relative distri
bution of power, descriptive accuracy is less important.
A final criticism of the DPI items is that the
decision areas included are not necessarily equally important
to different respondents, and weighing items by importance,
or using only items which are previously identified by
participants as important, is necessary (Heer, 1963;
Safilios-Rothschild, 1970).

However, at least one research

directly on this issue suggests that there are no significant
advantages of a weighted version of the DPI, although further
research on the issue was recommended (Price-Bonham, 1976).
On the other side of the ledger, there are several
advantages of using the DPI as the basis for the reports
on the distribution of power in this research.

Most impor

tant, it has been extensively used, and this provides con
tinuity with a large proportion of the existing literature.
Second, there is considerable evidence of the construct
validity of the index (Allen and Straus, 1979).

Finally,

the test-retest reliability— something like the durability
of response— is quite high (Price-Bonham, 1976:631).
Index Construction
For each of the two indexes referring to the distri
bution of power— AP and PDN— the component items were first
standardized in PZ form.

Then the sum of the PZ'd items

was computed and itself transformed into PZ form.

Thus,
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each index ranges from 0 to 100, has a mean of 50, and a
standard deviation of 20.
Husband-Wife Consistency.

Table 4.8 gives the

correlations between husbands' and wives' reports for PDN
and AP, for the sample as a whole, and for middle class
and working class subsets .

^

The lack of consistency for

all but one relationship is striking.

Only for middle class

couples reporting on attributed power is there even a
moderate, positive relationship.
Prescriptions and Descriptions; Relationships
Figure 4.1 gives the correlation between power dis
tribution norms and attributed power.

The upper arrow in

dicates the relationship between the husband's report of PDN
and his report of AP, for the sample as a whole, and the
middle and working class sub-samples.

The lower arrow

gives the relationship between the wife's report of PDN
and her report of AP.
There are strong, positive correlations for all but
the working class wives.

Thus, for the sample as a whole,

the stronger the prescription for a distribution of power

1o

To obtain the middle and working class sub-samples
used throughout the research, the total sample was dichoto
mized based on the husband's occupational rating.
Those with
unskilled through skilled blue collar occupations were clas
sified as working class. Those with clerical/sales through
professional occupations as middle class (see Allen and Straus,
1979). Two cautions: one, the husband's occupation alone was
used so as to ensure inclusion of as many cases as possible,
although admittedly this represents a sexual bias (Steinmetz
and Straus, 1973). Two, this division of the sample results
in only ten cases in the working class category.
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Table 4.8. Correlations between Husbands1 and Wives1
Reports of Power Distribution Norms and Attributed Power

Husband-Wife Correlation
AP

.01

.26

-.0 6

-.0 5

Working Class
Total

i

Middle Class

o
o

PDN

•

Sample

.09
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Husband1s
Norms

Attributed
Power*

Norms

^
Wife1s
Norms

0

^

*The husband's correlations are between his norms and his
report of attributed power.
The wife's correlations are
between her norms and her reports of attributed power.
In subsequent similar figures, the same holds— each
partner's score on one variable is related to his/her
own score on the dependent variable.

Figure 4.1. Correlations between Power Distribution Norms
and Attributed Power, for Wives and Husbands
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favoring the husband, the greater the amount of power
actually attributed to the husband.

This is an especially

strong relationship for working class husbands.
one reversal in the findings is for their wives.

However, the
Working

class wives show a small, negative correlation between PDN
and AP, such that the greater their belief in the husband's
authority, the less they actually attribute power to him.
RESOURCES AND THE POWER DISTRIBUTION
The resource theory of conjugal power relations
predicts that the greater the relative resources possessed
by a partner, the greater that person's "say" in the rela
tionship.

In this section, self-reports of the distribution

of power, both normative and actual, will be linked to
personal resources.

The model presented in Chapter I

suggests that personal resources have both a direct effect
on attributed power and power distribution norms, and an
indirect effect on attributed power, by way of power dis
tribution norms.
Figure 4.2 gives the correlations between absolute
relative extrinsic resources and power distribution norms,
for the sample as a whole and for the middle and working
class subsamples.

The absolute level of extrinsic resources

does not seem to affect norms about power, except slightly
in the working class group.

Even here, the relationship

is the reverse of that expected for the wives:

the higher

their resources the greater their adherence to male-dominant
norms.
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Husband

"Absolute
Extrinsic
Resources

Power
Distribution
Norms

Wife

Husband

Relative
Extrinsic
Resources
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Figure 4.2. Correlations between Extrinsic Resources and
Power Distribution Norms
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When the relative resources are considered, the
findings are much stronger and are consistent with resource
theory.

For the men especially, the greater their extrin

sic resources relative to those of their wives, the more
they adhere to male-dominant norms.
little class difference in this.

There seems to be

For the middle class

women, relative extrinsic resources seem unimportant.

How

ever, again we find an unexpected reversal for the working
class women: the higher their husbands' relative resources,
the less these women give the men authority in the relation
ship.
In sum, relative extrinsic resources make more of
a difference in power distribution norms than do absolute
levels of these resources.

Further, the relative extrinsic

resources are mostly related to power distribution norms
for men.

The reversal of expected findings for working

class women holds both in terms of the absolute level of
their own resources, and in terms of relative resources.
It is hard to put much confidence in this finding
given the sample size and its inconsistency with previous
research (Brown, 1977).

Still, one explanation could be

that working class wives who are doing relatively well are
violating their husbands'

(and others') expectations,

and so they hold especially strongly to a male dominant
ideology in an effort to soften the impact of this violation.
This could especially be the case in the early stages of

86

the wife's success before she is firmly established.

Support

for this notion is available in a macro-level analysis of
wife employment and education and decision-making pres
criptions, in which it was found that there is a fourteenyear lag between an increase in these two independent var
iables, and an effect of increasing shared decision-making
prescriptions (Brown, 1977).
The intrinsic resources are much more important for
the women than for the men (see Figure 4.3).

The absolute

index of intrinsic resources is not related to the husbands
normative definitions about power, but there is a small
negative relationship for the wives.

This finding is

stronger for the middle class women, but is reversed for
working class wives.
Based on the relative intrinsic resources index,
there is again no relationship for the men, except for a
small one in the working class.

For middle class wives,

the greater the husband's relative intrinsic resources the
higher the male dominant ideology.

However, in the working

class, the higher the relative intrinsic resources of the
husbands, the less their wives subscribe to a male-oriented
distribution of power.

Thus, not only are the findings

the opposite of those expected, but they are in conflict
with the ideas of the working class men.
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Power Distribution Norms
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Attributed Power and Resources
Figure 4.4 gives the correlations between extrinsic
resources and attributed power.

There is a moderate corre

lation, regardless of class, between the absolute level of
the husband's resources and his attribution of greater power
to himself.

For the middle class wives, there is a small,

unexpected association between their own resources and
husband-favorable attributions, while the working class
women attribute less power to their husbands as their own
resources increase.
Interestingly, the relative index of extrinsic
resources is not related to husband's attributed power.
Thus, it seems to be the actual level of extrinsic resources
in itself which affects attributed power for the men.

Among

working class wives, the greater their husbands' relative
resources, the more they attribute power to the husbands,
and this is consistent with the "absolute" findings.

How

ever, for middle class women, the higher the husbands
resources relative to their own, the less they attribute
power to the husband.

This is also consistent with the

absolute findings, but not with resource theory.
Figure 4.5 gives the correlations between intrinsic
resources and attributed power.

For the men, there is a

surprisingly strong relationship in the working class only
between the absolute IRI and AP.

For the relative version

of the index, however, the more interpersonal resources
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Figure 4.4. Correlations between Extrinsic Resources and
Attributed Power
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working class men have relative to their wives, the less
they attribute power to themselves.
For middle class women, the higher their IRI, the
lower the attributed power score for the husband.
is reversed for working class women.

This

Finally, the relative

interpersonal skills of the spouses is not linked to wives'
power attributions.
Overall, it seems that for the men extrinsic resources
are more strongly associated with attributed power than with
power distribution norms.

This suggests that the ideology

of male dominance is somewhat more resistant to changes
in resource levels than is the (reported) actual distribu
tion of power.

Also, intrinsic resources tend to make less

difference than extrinsic ones among the men.

The relative

indexes are a consistently more important variable than the
absolute ones only in the relationship between extrinsic
resources and power distribution norms.
The picture is more murky for the women, since there
are more reversals in expected findings.

Generally, the

ERI is most strongly related to PDN in the working class,
but in the "wrong" direction.

Across classes, intrinsic

resources seem more consistent in their importance.
THE END RESULTS:

OUTCOMES

The variables and relationships discussed so far
are all based on self-reports.

These yield important

information about power in marriage.

Still, at some point
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I am moved to say:

"Now I want to know what happens when

it comes right down to facing real disagreements and con
flicts."

Family researchers have expended a fair amount

of energy on this issue, mostly in the form of the question,
"Who won?"
Unilateral and Bilateral Outcomes
The Inventory of Marital Conflict (IMC) task asks
participants to make a pair of judgments about each vignette.
For this research, three outcomes measures were derived
from these pairs of judgments.

If both choices favor the

husband's point of view, the husband is given a unilateral
"win."

If both decisions favor the wife, the wife is given

a unilateral win.

If one judgment favors one partner and

the other choice favors the other, this is counted as a
compromise or bilateral solution.
To give an example from an actual vignette (see
Figure 4.6), one case involves a conflict over the car
breaking down on a weekend trip, after the husband— on
short notice— asks the wife to have the spark plugs checked.
The crucial issues are whether she followed through on
asking for the necessary repairs, or whether the garage
did a poor job, and whether the husband's angry reaction was
justified.

The participants must (1) choose which spouse

is primarily responsible for the conflict, and (2) decide
whether "Linda should thoroughly carry out her responsibili
ties once she has accepted them" or "Steve is being
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unreasonable in blaming his wife for the work not getting
done."

A husband-unilateral outcome would result if the

couple decides that the wife is to blame and Linda should
carry out her responsibilities.

The other two choices in

combination would be scored as a wife-unilateral outcome.
However, if the couple either (1) blames the wife but
thinks the husband should be more understanding, or (2)
blames the husband but thinks the wife should be more res
ponsible, then this is scored as a bilateral outcome.
To obtain the three measures, the number of each
type of outcome is simply summed.

There are twelve conflict-

inducing cases, so the combined total of the three outcomes
is 12.

Each particular measure has a theoretical range of

0 to 12, although the upper extreme is unlikely to occur.
For example, for a wife-unilateral score to be 12, there
must be no husband-unilateral nor bilateral outcomes for
the couple.
Marital Relations as a "Zero-Sum Game."

The most

startling findings for the outcomes measures are also the
simplest.

Table 4.9 gives basic descriptive information

on the three variables.

Most striking is the low number of

bilateral outcomes— an average of 1.9 per couple.

Twenty-

seven percent of the couples come up with no compromise
solutions at all, and only about one-fifth devised at
least four bilateral decisions.
The low number of compromise outcomes produced by
these couples is relevant to Sprey's

(1972, 1975) claim
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Husband’s Version
"Linda and Steve plan to take a weekend trip by car. While
Linda is driving Steve to work on Friday morning, Steve hears a "pinging"
noise and realizes that the spark plugs should be changed along with
other minor adjustments.
Since they plan to leave Friday evening and
Steve has to work, he has to ask his wife to take the car to the garage.
Linda complains about the other preparations she says she has to make
for them and their two children but says she will have time to take
the car to the garage, and agrees to do so. Later on the trip, Steve
hears the "pinging" noise and realizes the spark plugs have not been
changed.
It turns out that Linda took the car to the garage but did
not bother to mention the spark plugs. Linda says that if Steve doesn't
like the way she does things he can do them himself. Steve points
out that he was unable to take the car to the garage and that when she
agrees to do something she should do it."
a.

Who is primarily responsible for the problem? (husband,
wife)
Should Linda thoroughly carry out her responsibilities
once she has accepted them?
(yes, no)

b.

Wife's Version
"Linda and Steve plan to take a weekend trip by car. While
Linda is driving Steve to work on Friday morning, Steve decides that
the spark plugs need changing and that other minor adjustments should
be made. He tells his wife to get the work done in time for them to
leave that evening. Linda also has all the other preparations to
manage for them and their two children but she manages to get the car
to the garage and asks for a tuneup. On the trip, Steve hears a
"pinging" noise, discovers that the spark plugs are the same ones
he had been using, and blames his wife for the spark plugs not being
changed. Linda feels that if he is going to be so picky about how
things are going to be done, he should assume some responsibility for
doing them himself. Steve tells her he was too busy."
a.
b.

Who is primarily responsible for the problem? (husband,
wife)
Is Steve being unreasonable in blaming his wife for the
work not getting done? (yes, no)

Joint Form
a.
b.

Figure 4.6.

Who is primarily responsible for the problem? (husband,
wife)
Should Linda thoroughly carry out her responsibilities,
or
Is Steve being unreasonable in blaming his wife?

Sample Vignette, Inventory of Marital Conflicts (IMC)
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Table 4.9.
Measures

Descriptive Statistics for Three Outcomes

Outcome Measure
H-Unilateral

W-Unilateral

Mean

4.22

5.5

1.92

SD

1.807

1.959

1.793

Median

4.42

5.62

1.45

Mode

5.0

4.0

0

0(1) - 10(2)

0(21) - 7(j

Statistic

Range (N)

0(2) - 8(2)

Bilateral
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that families are not analogous to zero-sum games.

If Sprey

is correct, then research based on simple "win scores" is
seriously flawed, since such scores assume an "I win-you
lose" situation.
Sprey's position, unfortunately, amounts to substitut
ing one assumption for another, rather than treating the
issue as an "empirical question."

In other words, in place

of the assumption that families are like zero-sum games,
Sprey makes the counter assumption that they are not— i.e.,
that they are like mixed-motive games in which both (all)
group members can at least partially win or lose at the same
time.
Sprey's assumption may be based on the fact that in
families there is no structural reason for "I win-you lose"
behavior, as there is in a formal zero-sum game.

Yet, as

I argued in Chapter III, group members may treat a situation
as if it were structurally zero-sum, even though it is not.
My interpretation of the low number of bilateral solutions
by the couples is that this is exactly what happened in
this research.
Before concluding that the research couples were
treating the task as a zero-sum game "voluntarily," we need
to rule out the possibility that the task induced such
behavior, at a rate higher than what we would expect in
"real life."

I think this can be done.

There are three aspects of the task which might
induce unilateral solutions

(treating the task as a zero-sum
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game).

One, each partner comes to the joint discussion

with a unilateral position and since this is already set
it may be resistant to change.

There is variation, however,

in how firm these positions are, as there would be in every
day life.

The link with everyday life is further underscored

when we remember that at home the partners often must resolve
matters on which they have initial disagreements (or prior
unilateral positions).

In other words, conflicts of interest

and disagreements on which group members must come together
from initially divergent positions are a normal part of
family life (Foss, 1979; Sprey, 1975), which are well
modeled by this aspect of the task.
The second element of the task which might induce
I win-you lose behavior is the instructions themselves.
However, there seems to be nothing here that suggests to the
couples that they should make unilaterally-consistent pairs
of judgments.
The third possibility is that the couples are not
operating on a zero-sum basis, but are just trying to be
logically consistent, or rational, in their choices for
each vignette.

For example, to say that Linda is to blame

for the conflict concerning the car breakdown, and then to
say that Steve should still have been more understanding—
just doesn't "make sense."
Or does it?

In fact, many of the couples were able

to make just such choices, and to do so in a way which

98

seemed entirely logical to them.

One approach is to decide

that it was Linda1s responsibility to have the car checked
properly, and she did give incomplete information to the
mechanic, so she really is responsible for the problem—
at least in the sense of providing the initial conflict
issue.

However, Steve’s resulting rage is far out of

proportion to the offense, and therefore he should change
his wa y s .
Another entirely rational bilateral approach occurred
among couples who became aware that they simply had different
perspectives or information on a vignette.

Given no basis

for choosing one person's information over the other's, they
might rather arbitrarily choose to "blame Linda, but make
Steven more understanding," or vice versa.

This makes

eminent good sense in the context of the task.

Thus, there

is nothing inherently irrational about making bilateral
choices in the IMC task.
Having ruled out these three elements as possible
artificial incentives for zero-sum behavior, it seems safe
to conclude that the marital partners in this research,
generally speaking, are trying to win outright, rather than
to arrive at mutually satisfactory solutions in which each
must give up something but also gains something.

Further

evidence on the analogy between families and zero-sum
games is found in the power modes findings in later chapters.
Unilateral "Wins."

Table 4.9 also gives the basic

descriptive statistics for husband-unilateral and wife-
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unilateral outcomes.

On the average, the number of wife-

unilateral solutions is higher than the number of husbandunilateral outcomes.

As with the attributed power index,

we are not justified in concluding from this that the couples
are wife-dominant or equalitarian.

This is because it is

hard to judge whether the items themselves (the vignettes)
are exactly "fair."

What is most important is determining

what factors account for variation in the three outcomes
measures.
Outcomes and the Distribution of Power
The model presented in Chapter I suggests that several
important factors in explaining variations in outcomes
should be attributed power, power distribution norms, and
personal resources.

We start by looking at the two power

distribution variables.

Table 4.10 gives the product-moment

correlations for these relationships.
The husband's view of the normative distribution has
only a small positive relationship to husband-unilateral
outcomes and a corresponding small negative correlation
with wife-unilateral outcomes.

There is no relationship

between bilateral outcomes and either the husband's or the
wife's prescriptions.

Also, as expected, the more the

wife believes decisions should be made by the husband, the
fewer wife-unilateral outcomes.
Husband's attributed power is more strongly related
to husband-unilateral decisions

(as well as negatively to
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Table 4.10. Correlations between Power Distribution
Variables and Outcomes, for Husbands and Wives

Power Distribution Norms
Husband

Wife

.14

.06

Wife-Unilateral

-.09

-.20

Bilateral

-.03

.03

Outcomes
Husband-Unilateral

Attributed Power

•

o
o

Bilateral

-.19

.10
CD

Wife-Unilateral

.22

i
o

Husband-Unilateral

Wife's Report

•

Husband's Report

.16
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wife-unilateral ones) while for the wives attributed power
is a weaker factor than prescriptive power.

Again, bilateral

outcomes do not relate to husband's attributed power.
However, for the wives, the more husband-oriented their
attributions, the higher the number of bilateral solutions.
Outcomes and Personal Resources
Table 4.11 gives the product-moment correlations for
personal resources and outcomes.

What is most interesting

here is the relatively greater importance of the intrinsic
rather than the extrinsic resources.

None of the correla

tions between extrinsic resources and outcomes are large
enough to be given much weight.
The greater the husband's intrinsic resources, the
lower the number of wife-unilateral outcomes.

The corres

ponding increase in the other outcomes is for bilateral
more than husband-unilateral choices.

Among the wives

there is the unexpected finding that the higher their intrin
sic resources, the lower the number of wife-unilateral out
comes, and— correspondingly— the higher the number of husbandunilateral ones.

Finally, as the husband's intrinsic

resources relative to the wife's increase, there is a very
small drop in the husband-unilateral outcomes.
TO
,
-LJWhen each of the five extrinsic resources were exam
ined separately, the results were no different, except that hus
band's income was related negatively to the number of husbandunilateral outcomes and positively to the number of bilateral
outcomes. Also, the work status of the wife showed a small
negative relationship with bilateral outcomes, but her occupa
tional level a small negative relationship to wife-unilateral
outcomes.
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Table 4.11. Correlations between Personal Resources and
Outcomes, for Husbands and Wives

Resources
Outcomes

Husband

Wife

Relative

A. Extrinsic Resources
-.09

.02

-.12

Wife-unilateral

-.06

o
o

-.06

.03

-.03

•
H1
to

in

.25

-.13

-.25

-.25

.02

.11

-.04

o

Bilateral

•

Husband-unilateral

B. Intrinsic Resources

00

•

Bilateral

•

Wife-unilateral

o

Husband-unilateral
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Overall, it appears that as the husband contributes
more interpersonally to the relationship, the likelihood
of compromise solutions— and perhaps of a more negotiationoriented, give-and-take process— increases.

However, wives

with high levels of interpersonal resources do not "win"
more or compromise more, but actually "lose" more often.
Perhaps these are women who see their proper contribution
to the relationship as interpersonal, and who define this
rather traditionally as at least partly an ability to be
cooperative and supportive to men in decision-making processes.
This would be something like the wife as complement model
of marriage described by Scanzoni

(1972:37-39), or even the

model of women in the family prescribed by popular books
such as The Total Woman (Morgan, 1973).
CONCLUSION
All of the concepts analyzed in this chapter can
actually be viewed as "distributional" variables.

Each

reflects how a power-related attribute is distributed in a
group.

Figure 4.7 illustrates several notions about how

these distributional elements relate to one another through
an hypothetical power event.

First, each variable can be

seen as a single "slice-of-life," or one frame in an on-going
moving picture.

Second, each overlaps with the others, but

also partially does not overlap.

Thus, the picture of the

power distribution given in each frame is somewhat different,
but also somewhat the same.

Third, and related to the last
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point, while each frame can be partially explained by the
previous one(s), it is reasonable to expect each to be
partially explained by additional, disparate elements.
The additional explanatory factors which are important
are not always the same for each group member.

In the

present case, what each marital partner brings to the moving
picture may differentially affect the images.
The earliest frame in the process, personal resources,
was divided into extrinsic and intrinsic attributes of the
marital partners.

The extrinsic resources seem to have a

greater impact on later variables for the men than for
the women, while the intrinsic assets are especially important
for the women.
Of the two explicitly distributional variables, power
distribution norms— the ideological component— seems less
subject to changes in personal resources than attributed
power— the descriptive component.

In other words, the

normative frame seems relatively more independent of personal
resources, and thus gives a picture

of the power distri

bution which is less congruent with the one given by
resources.

Concomitantly, the attributed power distribution

overlaps somewhat more with the distribution of resources.
One special finding with the "achieved power"
variables is that the couples in this research do seem to
be treating the task as a zero-sum game, contrary to the
analogy of the family with a mixed motive game (Sprey, 1972).
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Figure 4.7. Changes in the Distribution of Power through
a Power "Event"

106

As a result, there are few bilateral or compromise outcomes
for the couples.
unilaterally wins.

For the most part one person or the other
The question of the distribution of

those wins is a matter of achieved power, or power outcomes.
Here, the intrinsic resources of the partners are a more
powerful explanatory factor than extrinsic ones.

Further,

attributed power seems to affect outcomes more for men,
while power distribution norms affect them more for women.
Still, there is a big gap in the moving picture
between the resources and normative and descriptive percep
tions of the power distribution, and outcomes in a conflict
situation.

A large part of that gap is the interaction

process through which married partners produce group out
comes .

CHAPTER V
THE CONCEPT OF POWER MODES
This Chapter and the next, are devoted to the
central concept in the research:

power modes or types of

power assertion used by marital partners.

The format of

the presentation is similar to that used in Chapter III
in examining other important dimensions of power.
Chapter, power modes are first defined.

In this

Then, relationships

with other dimensions of power, existing measures relevant
to the concept, and considerations important to the
development of a system of coding power modes in marital
interaction, are examined.

Chapter VI presents the Marital

Power Assertion Coding System (MPACS) developed specifically
for this research, and includes basic descriptive analysis
of the system, and analysis of inter-code relations.
DEFINING POWER MODES
Power modes is defined as "the specific type of
act carried out as a power assertion"

(Straus, 1976:1).

A synonym for power modes which is used frequently is "types
of power assertion."

Straus has defined power assertions

as "attempts which A makes to control the behavior of the
other.

Synonyms are 'influence attempts' and 'control
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attempts'"

(1976:1).

Within the framework of the present

terminology, power assertions are "attempts to alter group
outcomes (or the other's behavior, in a dyad)."
The term "power modes" itself is essentially new to
the study of husband-wife power relations, although there
is some precedent for the concept.

Sprey has repeatedly called

for the study of process, strategy, bargaining, and more
specifically "powering" in the field of family power (1972:
236).

Burr had suggested that it is "important to dis

tinguish between the distribution of power and the different
methods that are used in controlling.

For example, attempts

to control can be made verbally or nonverbally, overtly
or covertly, and with physical threats or without them"
(1973:189).

Another source for this concept and a direct

influence on the research [proposed] here, is the distinc
tion made by Foss and Straus (1975) between measures of
the distribution of power and measures of "powering tech
niques. "
Relationship to Other Variables
Power modes are the central focus of the research,
and a major concern and contribution is the development of
a system of coding marital interaction in the laboratory
in terms of power modes.

However, relationships between

power modes, the other power variables, and personal
resources, will also be explored.

Figure 1 in Chapter I,

roughly indicates the relationships to be examined.

Since
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the research is exploratory and designed to generate hypo
theses, it is inappropriate to present specific prepositions
to be tested.

Even if this were desirable, it would prove

very difficult.

First, while some leads as to expected

relationships can be found in the literature, they are not
systematic and do not suggest consistent sets of expecta
tions.

For example, Safilios-Rothschild suggests that the

spouse with the greater personal resources and/or greater
attributed power will not need to use direct, overt power
modes

(1970:80).

However, in a laboratory setting which

confronts spouses with new issues not previously settled,
that may not be the case.

Further, even in a non-laboratory

setting, the spouse with greater resources or attributed
power has little to lose by using overt power modes, and
therefore may not be less likely to use them.
An additional difficulty in unearthing specific pro
positions at the outset of the study is that the few systematic
discussions of marital power modes in relation to other
variables tend to include a different or broader range of
power modes than are available in the present study.

For

example, the degree of husband-wife violence (which may be
conceptualized as an extreme type of power assertion) as
measured through the Conflict Tactics Scales, is negatively
related to the resources possessed by the spouse, and this
relationship is further specified when power distribution
norms, attributed power, and social class are considered
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(Allen and Straus, 1979).

While such findings provide

leads for the present study, and will be considered in
interpreting findings, they do not provide clear guides for
advancing specific hypotheses concerning the "finer" power
modes observable in a laboratory setting.
DEVELOPING A MEASURE OF POWER MODES
While there have been a number of systems developed
for coding marital interaction, none has been specifically
designed to focus on types of power assertions made by
intimates.

One possibility for the present study would

have been to use an existing system and concentrate analysis
on categories which seem relevant to power modes.

One such

system is that designed by Olson and Ryder for use with the
Inventory of Marital Conflicts (IMC) task used in the present
research.

The authors note that this is a "purely descrip

tive, non-theoretically based coding system," and suggest that
"an investigator always has the option of selecting codes
from the IFC system which seem most appropriate for use in
a given research project"

(1973:1).

However, two character

istics of this particular coding system make it inappro
priate for our purpose.

First, a large number of the cate

gories are designed to distinguish between interaction over
the IMC task itself and other, more personalized interaction—
a distinction which is not of particular interest here.
Second, the system appears to be procedural and formatoriented, rather than content-oriented.

This characteristic
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means that it would be very difficult to extract categories
which clearly reflect types of power assertions.

Thus,

compared to existing coding systems, it seemed preferable
to develop a new coding system which would explicitly
reflect our interest in power modes.
A rare typology of power modes, based on responses
to an open-ended question in a survey research, which might
have been adapted for use in coding laboratory interaction,
was developed by Safilios-Rothschild (1969) .

However,

adaptation of this typology did not seem advantageous for
two reasons.

First, like Straus' Conflict Tactics Scales

mentioned above, this typology covers a broader range of
techniques than is likely to occur in a laboratory
setting.

Second, like the Olson and Ryder IMC coding system,

the Safilios-Rothschild typology does not seem to have the
kind of theoretical base necessary for our purposes.

For

example, a major division of the typology is between verbal
and non-verbal techniques, a distinction which is clearly
not relevant in the present context.

Thus, this typology,

like the IMC coding system, was bypassed in favor of
developing a new system tailormade for coding marital power
assertions in the laboratory.
Identifying the Range of Behavior to Be Considered
The first step in developing a system for coding
marital interaction in terms of power modes is to specify
the range of behavior to be included.

At one extreme,
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anything that anyone does can be viewed as a power assertion
Hawley has argued that "every social act is a power equation
and every social system is an organization of power"
423).

(1963:

In the sense that every social act may be positively

or negatively reinforcing of another's behavior, or as Turk
(1975:85) puts it, "all the actions of every individual in
the choice situation have some impact on the outcome,"
then indeed any behavior could be seen as a power assertion.
While this is intuitively reasonable, it does not
seem to be viable for research purposes.

In this view,

power assertions are apparently equivalent to causal in
fluences.

Thus, any behavior which has a causal influence

on the other is a power assertion.1

In a very strict sense,

we would have to find out whether a behavior did in fact
have a causal influence

(or was "effective" or "successful")

before we could classify it as a power assertion.

And, we

should probably have to do this for each couple individually
for what is reinforcing within the context of one relation
ship may not be in another.

Not only would such a task

approach the dimensions of a "life's work," but it also
shifts attention away from attempts to alter or maintain the
other's behavior, which may or may not be effective, to
successful power assertions ("achieved power") which is an
entirely different dimension.

1If so, why not also include non-human causal in
fluences as power assertions?
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In a sense, the definition of power assertions as
attempts to alter group outcomes necessarily implies some
assessment or attribution of intent.

We are interested in

whether the actor is trying to alter the other's behavior.
If a husband were on his way out the door and he brushed
against the on-off button on the TV set and turned it off,
we would probably count this as an accident.

But if the

husband were arguing with his wife over what program to
watch and finally just changed the channel to his program,
we would attribute intentionality to his action and count
it as a power assertion.

Similarly, when an actor is offering

persuasive arguments for his/her position (or against the
other's position), we assume that the actor is making a power
assertion, or is attempting to change or influence the behavior
of the other.

There is no doubt that it is very difficult

at times to assess intent.

Certainly this involves making

attributions which may sometimes be mistaken.

Since there

is no external, unambiguous criterion available for assessing
intent, the final test of the success of the coding system
is interrater reliability.
Ultimately the appropriate range of behavior for a
power modes coding system, can only be more precisely defined
when the more specific types of power assertion are delineated.
Few existing measures of husband-wife power in any way
classify modes of powering used by spouses
Straus, 1975).

(Foss and

However, many observation systems which have
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been used to study the distribution of marital power use the
occurrence of power assertions as an indirect way of
measuring the distribution of power (i.e., the actual control
of the other's behavior).

Two basic approaches have been

taken— one is "content-free" and the other is "contentbased. "
Content-Free Approaches.

Content-free approaches dis

regard the content of the behavior, and focus on its existence
or form.

For example, Strodtbeck (1951, 1954) and Farina

(1960) have used as measures of power who talks the most,
and who most often initiates discussion.

Leighton et al.

(19 71) have used the number of interruptions and the number
of simultaneous speeches.
of interruptions.
of behavior:

Farina (1960) also used the number

Mishler and Waxier (1968) use two types

"attention control strategies"

(who speaks to

whom, statement length, etc.) and "person control strategies"
(interruptions and questions).

Cromwell and Olson (1975)

have criticized many of these measures as being essentially
a-theoretical and conceptually unsophisticated.

Further

problems in terms of the present project are the very limited
range of behavior which they include and the fact that they
do not suggest any typology of power modes.
Content-Based Approaches.

Several approaches are

content-based in that the determination of whether an act
represents power is based on its content.

Two fairly narrow

approaches are Caputo's (1963) measure using the number of
instrumental (task-oriented) acts which are directive, and
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the Riskin and Faunce (1970) measure of the number of "behave
yourself requests" and "requests for commitment."

Both of

these have the disadvantage of including only the most
directive and obvious strategies, and excluding more subtle
tactics like attempts at persuasion.

Henkel's (1963)

somewhat broader measure is the total number of instrumental
(rather than expressive) acts, based on Bales' Interaction
Process Analysis coding system (1950).

In this system,

instrumental acts include giving and requesting suggestions
or directions, opinions, and information.

While this measure

has the advantage of offering a neat typology, it appears to
lack content validity in that it includes behaviors which
seem at best remotely related to power assertions (as in
asking for information) and excludes actions which seem
clearly relevant (such as rejection, antagonism, and defending
or asserting self, which are classified as expressive be
haviors) .

Counting all instrumental acts as power-relevant

and all expressive acts as non-power-related is inappropriate.
One additional approach classifies power acts as
"any direction, instruction, suggestion, or request intended
to control or modify the behavior of another member of the
family"

(Straus and Tallman, 1971:392).

Cromwell et al.

(1975) adopt the same criterion, and specify that any
behavior which is not coded as a power act is coded
"sociable act" and these include "nondirective, non-goaloriented, supportive, and climate setting types of state
ments (1975:156).
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Using this criterion, Cromwell et al.

(1975) found

that in a discussion task 15 percent of a family's total
activity was power activity, and in a more physical, game
task (SIMFAM), 31 percent was power activity.

While this

measure of power acts is broader than many others, both the
behaviors which are not included as power acts, and the
relatively low percentage of activity classified as power
assertions, suggest that this measure also focuses on the
most obvious power assertions and excludes more subtle ones.
On the other hand, this measure is most consistent with the
conception of power assertions as attempts to modify group
outcomes.
While the approaches discussed thus far offer some
criteria for classifying acts as power assertions, they do
not suggest typologies of power assertions or distinctions
among power modes.

Perhaps some of the best leads for

developing a power modes typology come from the parentchild literature.

As Foss and Straus (1975) point out, in

parent-child measures of power the emphasis is not on the
distribution of power, but on power modes— specifically, the
types of power assertions which parents make in attempting
to "get their children to do something."
HOFFMAN'S QUALIFIED AND UNQUALIFIED POWER ASSERTIONS
In looking at parental power modes, Hoffman (1963)
makes an important distinction between qualified and
unqualified power assertion techniques.

Unqualified power
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assertions include direct commands, threats, and depriva
tions as well as physical force, and no explanations or
justifications are offered by the parent.

Qualified power

assertions are influence techniques which are qualified by
explanation and various types of persuasive appeals.

This

distinction is an important one in the coding system for
husband-wife power assertions developed for this research.
In a later analysis, Hoffman (1970) offers a somewhat
different model.

Here he classifies parental influence

techniques into power assertive and non-power assertive
techniques.

Power assertive techniques include "physical

punishment, deprivation of material objects or privileges,
the direct application of force, or the threat of any of
these . . . The parent seeks to control the child by capital
izing on his physical power or control over material
resources"

(1970:285).

This category appears to be equiva

lent to unqualified power assertions in the first model.
Non-power assertive techniques are divided into "lovewithdrawal" and "induction."

Love-withdrawal means that

"the parent simply gives direct but non-physical expression
to his anger or disapproval of the child . . . Examples
are ignoring the child, turning one's back to him, refusing
to speak or listen to him, explicitly stating a dislike
for the child, and isolating or threatening to leave him"
(1970:285).

Induction techniques are those in which the

parent "gives explanations or reasons for requiring the
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child to change his behavior"

(1970:286).

Thus, induction

in this model is equivalent to "qualified power assertion"
in the first.

While Hoffman seems to ultimately view per

suasive appeals as non-power assertive techniques, we prefer
the view that they represent qualified power assertions.
Power assertions were defined above as any attempt to alter
group outcomes, and persuasive appeals, or induction tech
niques, clearly fit this definition, even though they are
aimed at obtaining the change "voluntarily."
The distinction between qualified and unqualified
power assertions is used as a broad framework for the power
modes coding system developed for this research.

The next

Chapter provides a detailed presentation of the coding
system itself, as well as the basic findings from initial
use of the coding system in the present project.
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CHAPTER VI
THE MARITAL POWER ASSERTION CODING SYSTEM (MPACS)
In this chapter, the power modes coding system and
basic descriptive findings derived from it are presented.
First, there is a summary of the final system with the
discussion focusing on the broad categories within which
the specific codes fit.

Then, the process of developing

the system and the fairly technical aspects of the system
itself and the coding procedures are described.

Finally,

descriptive findings are given, including code frequencies,
inter-code correlations, and relationships between the
power assertions of wives and husbands.
OVERVIEW OF THE CODING SYSTEM
Two of the three major divisions of the coding
system— unqualified and qualified power assertions— are
based on Hoffman's (1963) analysis, as described in the
last chapter.

The third division— bilateral power asser

tions— is based on an assumption that an important part of
power processes in marriages, as in other groups, is not
only unilateral, win-oriented behavior, but also bargaining,
negotiation, and trading of positions.

Figure 6.1 lists

the specific MPACS codes in the context of the major
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divisions of the system.

The full MPACS package is pre

sented in Appendix B.
Unqualified Power Assertions
In the last chapter, power modes were defined as
"the specific type of act carried out as a power assertion,"
or "attempts to alter group outcomes."

Unqualified power

assertions are unilateral attempts to alter group outcomes,
in which no effort is made to provide other group members
with a rationale for one's position.

These assertions may be

blunt, directive, and relatively coercive in the sense that
no effort is made to obtain compliance "voluntarily."

In

addition, these communications are relatively unadorned.
They tend to be short, choppy phrases like "that was stupid;"
"No, he didn't;" "Yes, he did;" "Don't do that."
Included in this broad category are seven specific
behaviors.

Rejecting/attacking involves direct negative

statements which are personally critical.
given in angry or ridiculing tones.

These are usually

I count them as the

most extreme of power modes represented in this system, as
they are instances of verbal aggression, or verbal expressions
which are intended to injure the other (Foss, 1979).
The command code is the only one in the system
defined solely in terms of formal grammatical structure.
Any statement which is a formal command or directive is
included.

Do anyway attempts are especially important in

paralleling other variables in the research, since they
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I.

Unqualified Power Assertions
01
02
03
04
05
06
07

II.

Reject/attack other
Command
"Do anyway" attempt
Surrender under protest
Reiteration
Unqualified disagreement/refusal
Unqualified partisan assertion

Qualified Power Assertions
A.

(UPA)

(QPA)

Consequence Identification
10 Promise
11 Threat

B.

Qualified Partisan Assertions
20 Qualified partisan assertions and persuasion
attempts

C.

Definitional Assertions
30
31
32
33
34

III.

Task/procedure definition
Situation definition (vignettes)
Personal definition
Other's position definition
Progress definition

Bilateral Power Assertions

(BPA)

40 Explicit position trade
41 Other compromise/bilateral solution
42 Role division solution
Other
49 Other power assertion/related behavior (SPECIFY)
50 Self-depreciation/deference
98 Non-power assertions

Figure 6.1. Summary of Marital Power Assertion Coding
System Categories
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are unilateral attempts to impose one's position despite
opposition.

In the IMC context, this is usually a situation

where one partner goes ahead and writes in his own response
against the objections of the other.

It can almost be seen

as the prototype of all unqualified power assertions— and
not surprisingly is often responded to with verbal aggres
sion.
Surrender under protest is a rather unusual code
developed in the process of listening to tapes.

This is a

one-sided capitulation in which the message is actually not
"I give in," but almost the opposite.

This is a power

assertion in that it is a final attempt to either "guilttrip" or threaten the other for "browbeating" behavior.

In

fact, surrender under protest seems to occur when the actor
thinks the other is being coercive, and it represents a
giving notice or threat of withdrawal or attack if the
coerciveness continues.

There is usually either hostility

or exaggerated indifference in the voice-tone.
The last three codes in this category are parallel
to one another.
position.

Reiteration is flat repetition of one's

Unqualified disagreement/refusal includes flat

disagreements such as "No, I won't," or "It didn't say that."
Unqualified partisan assertions are flat statements of posi
tion like "I had the wife on mine."

All are unelaborated

statements in which the actor is making no attempt to persuade
or qualify or obtain voluntary compliance or agreement.

Qualified Power Assertions
Like the unqualified power assertions, qualified
power assertions are also unilateral in the sense that the
communication is one-sided.

The actor is operating with a

view toward the other person— not herself— changing.

How

ever, here the actor is attempting to provide some induce
ment or incentive for the other to alter behavior.

There

are three subtypes of QPA which represent different degrees
of subtlety in the inducements for changes offered by the
actor.

All are still attempts to obtain "voluntary"

compliance rather than to coerce the other.
Consequence Identification.

The most direct kind of

QPA is consequence identification, in which the actor explititly promises rewards or threatens punishments in ex
change (or as inducements)
change.

for behavioral/positional

These are very clear statements of the form "If you

do . . ., then I will . . . ."

Promises are offers of

rewards for desired behavior, and threats are statements of
the retaliation or punishment which will result from un
desired behavior.

The reward or punishment may be either

material or expressive.
These behaviors are the most explicit out-croppings
of underlying relational structures based on exchange.
Since the exchange base of intimate relationships is thought
to be less readily acknowledged than that of other social
relationships, we can expect consequence identifications
to be relatively infrequent.
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In this research, there were no instances of
promises, and only five instances of threats being made
in the entire sample.

I would expect the frequency of both

to be quite a bit lower in a laboratory than in a natural
setting, if only because the cues for the full range of
exchange items available at home are not available in the
laboratory.

One is likely to only think of offering or

threatening emotional and positional items.

I would also

expect threats to far outnumber promises in the home setting
if only because explicit exchanges may not be considered
very legitimate in families, and by the time one is making
them one is probably in a state of anger.

The area in which

promises are most likely to occur is in the division of
household duties, and one would expect this to be more
common among couples who are questioning traditional family
roles.
Qualified Partisan Assertion.

The second type of QPA

is parallel to one of the UPA codes— unqualified partisan
assertion.

Qualified partisan assertions are elaborated

statements of one's own position, where there is an attempt
to persuade or convince the other.

They are persuasive

arguments based on the use of such things as logic, analogies,
hypothetical appeals, and appeals for empathic understanding.
The actor is not just stating a position, but also providing
a rationale for it.

The partner is being offered some

"good reason" for compliance.
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Definitional Assertion.

These are the most subtle

QPA's, and perhaps the most difficult to justify as power
assertive behaviors.

Here the actor is presenting his

definition of some aspect of the situation, and thus laying
the groundwork for behavior change by the other. If one
actor can get the other to accept his view of the "facts of
the case," he is closer to obtaining a position change.
Further, if the partner does change her position, she has
been given an opportunity to rationalize the change as a
function of a new understanding of "the facts," rather than
"giving in" or losing the argument.
The justification of definitional assertions as
power assertions rests on two points.

One, what is "informa

tion" at all in a given interaction sequence is questionable.
The speaker may be elaborating, distorting, attributing
motives or meaning, making generalizations, or drawing con
clusions.

As the IMC task itself models, two persons'

perceptions of the "facts" may be quite different.

Thus,

whose version is adopted for group use is an important
determinant of group outcomes.
Second, the control of information has been recognized
as an important personal resource--part of the bases of power
domain (French and Raven, 1959; Raven, Centers, and
Rodrigues, 1977; Smith, 1970).

Indeed, the access to

"information" which seems relevant to the resource domain
and the actual control of information relevant to the power
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outcomes domain, seem to have a natural parallel in attempts
to control information in the power processes domain.
There are five types of definitional assertion
identified in MPACS.

Task/procedure definitions refer to the

nature of the task itself and how it can be done.

Situation

definitions are attempts to supply the facts of the case (in
this research, mainly what went on in the vignettes).
Personal definitions are characterizations of self, spouse,
their relationship, friends, relatives, etc.

Other's posi

tion definition is an attempt to define or feedback to the
other her own position.

Ostensibly this is just a helpful

checking out procedure, but it can also be used to "lead"
the other or make his position look absurd, simplistic, etc.
Finally, progress definition is a summary statement as to the
couple's progress on the task, or a laying out of alternative
positions and approaches.

Generally, it provides a broader

perspective on the discussion itself.
Bilateral Power Assertions
These are explicit suggestions or offers for both
partners to partially change their positions simultaneously.
The expectation is that partial concessions will be recipro
cated in kind.

Thus, both actors win something and lose

something, but neither totally experiences either "the
thrill of victory or the agony of defeat."

The behavior

involves making contracts, bargaining, negotiating, trading.
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The most direct BPA is an explicit position trade.
In the context of the IMC task, this means offering to give
in on one of the choices so you can have your way on the
other:

"I'll agree on blaming Steve, if you'll say the wife

on the second part.11 Another explicit trade, which can
also occur on

other than IMC tasks, is to exchange

item for another, as in "I'll give you

one

this one, if I can

have the next."
Other compromise/bilateral solution includes any
explicit compromise offer, other than direct trade-offs of
position.

One possibility is to broadly suggest compromising.

Another is to "agree to disagree" and just pick choices out
of expediency.

Another is to suggest an arbitrary/external

decision rule such as flipping a coin.
Role division solution is actually a special case
of the preceding code, in which the decision rule being
invoked is a pre-existing division of labor.

The actor is

genuinely saying that there is a general rule which can be
used to develop a solution, and that is whose area of res
ponsibility the issue falls in.
item is in my

One is saying "when the

area, my views will take precedence,

inyour

area you will have more say."
Miscellaneous Codes
The other power assertive behavior category was
included at the outset, but became less and less used as
MPACS was revised and necessary codes added.
a few incidents counted here.

There are only

12.8

Self-depreciation/deference is not a power assertion
behavior, but is included as a parallel to "Reject/attack
other."

It seemed theoretically interesting also in that

submissive, victim-like behavior has been seen as inviting
attack (Gelles, 1972:155-6).
All other statements not covered by MPACS categories
were tallied as non-power assertions.

Many of these were

statements of agreement, support, or conceding to the
other.
PROCEDURES
The preceding discussion dealt with the final version
of MPACS used in the research.

This section indicates how

the coding system was developed, and describes the actual
procedures used in coding.
A Trial and Error Process
It seems that the only way to develop a new coding
system is to try it out.

The only thing for it is to set

up some categories, attempt to code some materials with
them, see how they work, and then go back to the drawing
board.

The process is repeated until one is satisfied that

it works reasonably well— that the codes reflect one's
theoretical concerns, they are as clear as possible, and
there is a minimum of overlap.

Refining the codes and

making their descriptions more precise may go on through the
coding itself— and in fact could go on indefinitely.
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In devising the MPACS package, the above process was
followed.

Starting with the broad divisions partly based on

Hoffman's qualified/unqualified power assertion distinction,
a number of more specific codes were filled in.

Many of these

were actually adapted from existing systems, such as the
Inventory of Marital Conflicts System (Olson and Ryder,
1973) .

These were tried on transcripts for two or three

couples, then reworked, some discarded, some added.

The

same transcripts were recoded, and additional transcripts
covered, until another problem was reached.
was restructured again.

Then the system

By the time ten transcripts could

be coded with it, the system was ready for use.
Coding Procedures
Each couples' IMC discussion had been taped, and
the coding was done on the transcript while listening to
the tape.

Two of the tapes were of such poor quality that

they could not be coded, so the sample size for the power
modes data is 76— 62 noncounseling and 14 counseling
couples.
Two-thirds of the transcripts were coded by the
investigator, and one-third by an MA student in sociology.
For the first few efforts by the assistant coder, the
transcripts were double-coded.

Then, we went over the

codings together as a training exercise, and as time went on
to ensure that our uses of the categories were consistent.
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While resources were not available to double-code
all cases and run full reliability assessments, some steps
were taken to minimize intercoder discrepancies and drift
over time.

First, each coder reviewed the MPACS summary

before each session to be sure that infrequently used cate
gories would be kept in mind.

Second, about every fifth

transcript, a portion of the discussion was double-coded.
Then the two coders went over the section together, resolving
differences, reviewing categories, and discussing
with particular items.

problems

In this way, a common understanding

of MPACS was maintained.
BASIC MPACS FINDINGS
The concluding part of this chapter provides basic
descriptive findings, some of which are mainly of method
ological interest and some more substantive.

First, the

intercorrelations of the codes are discussed, in order to
gain an understanding of the internal workings of the system.
Then the code frequencies are given.

Finally, the degree

and nature of husband-wife similarities and differences are
considered.
Internal Relationships
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 give the product-moment correla
tion matrixes for MPACS categories, for husbands and wives
respectively.1

In assessing how the system works internally,

1A full, code-by-code version of these tables is
in Appendix D.
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we are primarily concerned with questions of validity.
One thing to look for is that codes which are clustered
together in the system for conceptual reasons— such as the
"definitional assertions"— do in fact correlate with one
another, and generally more highly than with other cate
gories.

Generally speaking, the system seems adequate in

this respect.

For example, rejecting/attacking is most

highly correlated with three codes from its own group
command, reiteration, and unqualified disagreement.

(UPA's)—
This

holds for both men and women.
Another consideration for the validity of the system
is whether particular codes are highly related to other
theoretically linked categories

(construct validity), and

unrelated to categories which are theoretically unconnected
(discriminant validity).

To use reject/attack other as an

example again, this code was expected to show very little
relationships to the BPA codes.

The degree of ego involve

ment and emotion, and aggression, accompanying attack behavior
seems incompatible with the sense of perspective and ration
ality which go with bilateral power assertions.

For both

men and women, there are no relationships between these
variables.
Clearly the MPACS package does not meet these
internal criteria for validity without exception.

Also,

the system seems to work somewhat differently for men and
women.

However, in general the codes seem to cluster both

conceptually and empirically, and there are no glaring anomalies.
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Table 6.1.

Correlation Matrix for Power Modes of Husbands

Power Mode
Unqualified power
assertions (UPA)

UPA

QPART

DA

BPA

SD

-

Qualified partisan
assertions (QPART)

.36

Definitional asser
tions (DA)

.46

.56

Bilateral power
assertions (BPA)

.05

-.03

.06

Self-depreciation
(SD)

.01

-.06

-.04

-.01

Non-power asser
tions (NPA)

.46

.13

.38

.18

-

-

.05

NPA
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Table 6.2.

Correlation Matrix for Power Modes of Wives

Power Mode
Unqualified power
assertions (UPA)

UPA

QPART

DA

BPA

SD

—

Qualified power
assertions (QPART)

.43

-

Definitional asser
tions (DA)

.40

.55

Bilateral power
assertions (BPA)

.27

.20

.04

Self-depreciation
(SD)

.22

-.02

.07

.01

-

Non-power asser
tions (NPA)

.29

.00

.30

.06

.09

-

-

NPA
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MPACS Scores of Husbands and Wives
Table 6.3 gives the mean scores of the husbands and
wives on each of the power modes categories, as well as the
product-moment correlations between the partners' scores.
The third column in the table indicates whether the husbands
had a higher or lower mean score than the wives.
Looking at the mean scores, we uncover perhaps the
most significant finding in the table— that there is little
difference between the men and women in how frequently, on
the average, they exhibit each behavior.
Previous Research.

One of the problems with research

on sex differences in communication is that there tends to
be an overly defensive approach to women's communication
patterns.

The focus is often one which ignores the strengths

of female communication, and instead seeks to rather apolo
getically explain why women aren't more like men (Thorne
and Henley, 19 75).
Another difficulty with sex differences research,
however, is that it overemphasizes the differences, and thus
gives a vastly inaccurate underestimate of the extent to
which human communication is the same, whether emitted by
women or men.

In line with this, when we seek differences

between men and women, we tend to overlook the extent to
which findings of sex difference are highly mixed and incon
sistent (Thorne, 1978).
Nevertheless, when studies do show sex differences
in language, they suggest that women use a weaker, more
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Table 6.3. Mean Power Modes Scores of Husbands and Wives,
and Correlations between Husbands' and Wives' Scores

Power Mode

Mean
---------------Husbands Wives

Unqualified Power Assertions
Reject/attack
Command
"Do anyway"
Surrender in protest
Reiteration
Unqualified disagreement
Unqualified partisan asser
tion

Correlation
between
Husband
*
and Wife

1.88
2.38
.30
.76
11.63
4.88

2.08
1.88
.12
.64
10.74
4.38

+
+
+
+
+

.48
.22
.12
.17
.90
.67

18.01

16.42

+

.70

.03

0
+

-

Qualified Power Assertions
Consequence identification:
Promise
.04
Threat
Qualified partisan assertions :
Qualified partisan asser
16.42
tion
Definitional assertions:
5.49
Task definition
17.71
Situation definition
Personal definition
7.16
Other's position definitioi . 1.72
Progress definition
1.91

18.29

-

-

4.96
17.58
7.88
1.78
1.91

+
+

.22
.43

.08
.18

+
+
0

Other
Other power-related behavior
.03
.58
Self-depreciation
19.17
Non-power assertion

.05
.86
19.00

Bilateral Power Assertions
Explicit position trade
Other bilateral solution
Role division solution

-

0

+

.59
.56
.77
.72
.16
.16
-.02
.14

-.02
.65
.72

*The symbols in the third column indicate the direction of
difference between wives' and husbands' scores. A "+"
means the husbands' score is higher, a "-" means the hus
bands' is lower, and a "0" means there is no difference.
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hesitant style.

In reviewing research employing a number

of content and form variables, Walum concludes that women's
speech suggests "someone who lacks confidence, is uncertain
of her own feelings, seeks approval from others, cannot make
up her mind, and lacks an opinion of her own"

(1977:29).

In contrast, men are constrained to indicate "seriousness
of purpose, hard hittingness, and decisiveness, whether they
feel that way or not," and it is difficult for them to
express any feeling except anger (1977:30).
In another analysis of male/female speech, the con
clusion is that:
1.

Women's speech tends to be more personcentered and concerned with interpersonal
matters.
It is apt to deal with the speaker's
own and other's feelings.
It is more polite,
more indirect, and uses the method of impli
cation.
It employs qualifiers and other
softening devices to avoid imposing belief,
agreement, or obedience on others through
overly strong statements, questions or
commands.

2.

Men's speech tends to be more centered
around external things and is more apt to
involve straight factual communication.
It
is more literal, direct, and to the point.
It employs stronger statements and forms
that tend to press compliance, agreement,
or belief on the listener (Eakins and
Eakins, 1978:49).

Given these previous research findings, we would expect
men to use the more direct U P A 's and the threat category
more than women.

Women are expected to use qualified

partisan assertions, personal and other's positions defini
tion, and self-depreciation more often.
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Difference and Similarity.

While the differences

actually indicated in Table 6.3 are small, they are almost
all in the expected direction.

Women do use qualified

assertions, personal definition (but not other's position
definition), and self-depreciation more than men.

Men use

all the UPA's more frequently, except for reject/attack.
Women have a slight edge here.

In addition, men more often

define the task, and are slightly more likely to engage in
bilateral power assertions.
The consistency with which these findings of sex
difference meet expectations clearly warrants attention.
However, it is still important to recognize the small size
of the differences, and thus the degree of similarity in
the women1s and m e n 's patterns.
One possibility that cannot be overlooked is that
the laboratory task induces an artificially high degree of
similarity in behavior.

One, in a two-person task it is

difficult for one person to engage in much less sheer
behavior than the other.

In this research, the mean total

number of coded behaviors for the men was 131.07, and 129.77
for the women, showing little difference.

Thus, there seems

to be a conversation-based limit to how discrepant the
behaviors can be.

This does not explain, though, why there

is such similarity category by category.

A second, more

plausible consideration, is that the formal nature of the
task and the even treatment of the partners in the instruc
tions and by the session administrator, gave many of the
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women clear permission to operate on an equal footing with
their spouses.

That is a permission that many women would

not have in their more informal private encounters with
men and without which they would not be as active and
direct.

I would suggest, then, that if there is a laboratory/

natural setting discrepancy here, it is in the direction of
the women being more like men in their behavior than they
would be in everyday life.
Relationships Between Husbands' and Wives' Scores.
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 give the product-moment correlations
between husbands' and wives' scores.

Here we can see how

closely the behavior of one partner resembles that of the
other.

The relationships are very strong except for bilateral

power assertions.

The largest coefficient is for unqualified

power assertions.

For reiteration, expecially, the number

of reiterative statements made by one spouse is closely
related to the number made by the other.

The experience of

actually listening to tapes and coding transcripts really
brings this finding to life.

Very frequently the partners

become enmeshed in a rhythmic sequence of interaction, con
sisting of a series of alternating repetitions.

The phrasing

was something like "Yes, he did," "No, he didn't," repeated
for two to four cycles, and then snapped out of by one of
the partners.
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Table 6.4.
and Wives

Intercorrelations of Power Modes of Husbands

Power Modes of Wives
QPART
CA
BPA
SD

Power Modes
of Husbands

UPA

Unqualified power
assertions (UPA)

.90

.44

.50

.21

.18

.41

Qualified partisan
assertions (OPART)

.38

.59

.53

.22 -.12

.17

Definitional
assertions

.43

.40

.73

.01

.04

.50

.11

.01

.00

.07

.01

.06

-.00

-.11

.00

-.02

.65

.10

.43

.19

.35

.27

.19

.72

(DA)

Bilateral power
assertions (BPA)
Self-depreciation
(SD)
Non-power
assertions

(NPA)

NPA
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Basic Frequencies and the Laboratory-Field Continuum
The final issue to be addressed in this chapter
concerns the ways in which the MPACS system as applied to
a laboratory task may or may not reflect behavior in natural
settings.

There are a number of power modes which we would

expect to be more frequent and more important at home.
First, there is aggressive behavior which is repre
sented in MPACS only through the reject/attack code.

This

code covers only verbal aggression, and in the laboratory
only the milder forms of it.

Thus, physical aggression—

the ultimate power mode particularly of men (Goode, 1971)—
is left out.
I would expect "do anyway" attempts to be more
important— have a big impact— at home, even if they are not
more frequent.

"Surrender in protest," is only one special

kind of withdrawal.

A laboratory task does not allow the

two partners to withdraw or offer the same variety of with
drawal forms as can be used in the home.

As a strategy in

confrontation processes, then, withdrawal is probably very
important for married couples in everyday life (Foss,
1979) .
Finally, the use of threats and promises should be
much higher in everyday life, at least among some social
groups.

Particularly in couples who have negotiated over

the household division of labor (and are there any who have
not, at least on a few items?), we can expect fairly

frequent exchanges of promises and threats.

Probably

younger, more modern, and more career-oriented couples
operate less in terms of normative beliefs in a traditional
division of labor, and thus negotiate the order more exten
sively and use such power modes more often.
In this chapter, the descriptive outlines of the
MPACS system have been addressed both conceptually and
empirically.

Particular attention has been given to dis

crepancies and similarities between husbands and wives and
between the laboratory and the home setting.

The following

chapter places power modes into the power processes model,
by relating it to the other power-related variables.
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CHAPTER VII
POWER MODES:

LINKS WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF POWER

This Chapter provides the initial examination of
links between other, more familiar, power variables and the
newly developed power modes concept.

Figure 1 in the first

Chapter is a guide to the relationships to be explored.
Developing the MPACS system for codifying types of
power assertions is a first step toward the ultimate goal of
devising a more dynamic model of power processes in marriage.
The objective of this Chapter is to provide some initial
inquiry into relationships between aspects of the power struc
ture and power processes.
Although no specific hypotheses concerning these rela
tionships have been formulated, a general issue can be
suggested as a loose guide to these analyses.

In her

important article assessing the state of family power studies
as of 1970, Safilios-Rothschild suggested in passing some
competing ideas about power structure variables and types of
power assertions.

On the one hand, a spouse who lacks

authority may not make power assertions which are direct, but
will use indirect, "manipulative" approaches in attempting
to alter group outcomes.

On the other hand, the spouse with

greater authority may need to make only mild power assertions

143

unless directly challenged (1970:80).
We may broaden the issue to include additional
aspects of the power structure, besides power distribution
norms (authority).

Thus, the general issue becomes whether

those with a stronger position structurally (as in personal
resources, attributed power, and norms) use a strong, direc
tive, or a weak', persuasive or indirect style.

Concomitantly,

we may ask whether those with a weak structural position resort
to manipulation and indirect approaches, or whether they
openly challenge the other.
POWER MODES AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER
Table 7.1 gives the product-moment correlations
between each partner1s power modes and his/her report of the
distribution of power (attributed power).

The correlations

are for the sample as a whole, and for the middle and
working class subsamples.
Looking at the total sample, there are no really
strong relationships.

However, there is the finding that

almost all the relationships that do exist are negative.
That is, the more a husband attributes power to himself,
the less likely he is to behave in any of the ways included
in the table.

Similarly, the more a wife attributes power

to her husband, the less likely she is to use four of the
types of behavior included.

When the MPACS codes are

examined one by one, there are only slight differences, and
only among the wives.
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Table 7.1. Correlations between Attributed Power and Power
Modes, for Husbands and Wives and by Class

Correlation be
tween Husband's
Report and
Husband's Power
Modes
Power Mode

Total

Correlation be 
tween Wife's
Report and
W i f e 's Power
Modes

MC

WC

MC

WC

Total

Unqualified power
assertion (UPA)

-.11

-.40

-.13

-.02

.34

-.01

Qualified partisan
assertion (QPART)

-.12

.08

-.16

-.06 -.49

-.13

Definitional asser
tion (DA)

-.12

.00

-.12

-.25

.01

-.21

Bilateral power
assertion (BPA)

-.07

.34

-.12

.14

nc

.10

Self-depreciation
(SD)

-.32

.57

-.19

-.17 -.28

-.19

Non-power asser
tion (NPA)

-.15

-.66

-.09

.13 -.36

.06
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The clearest way to interpret these consistently
negative relationships is that as the distribution of power
increasingly favors the husband, the sheer amount of behavior
emitted by the couple decreases.

Somehow, it must be that

couples with a husband-oriented power distribution get
through the task more quickly.
One way to explain this is that when entering a task
with an already husband-favoring power balance, wives do not
push as hard for their own positions.

As the wives display

less counter-husband behavior, the husbands have to expend
less energy maintaining their own positions.
partners actually engage in less behavior.

Thus, both
In a natural

setting in more extreme instances of this, many wives
might actually not even put forward their disagreements in
the first place.

Once the husband's preference is known,

in a husband-oriented relationship, the group outcome is
known.

Even in the conflict-inducing IMC task, in a few

cases a wife asked her husband what he put on his answer
sheet, and once having heard his response, proceeded to
agree with him without ever having disclosed her own
initially divergent position.
To show that the quicker completion of the task
among couples with a husband-oriented power distribution
is due to the wives pushing less hard for their own
positions, we would have to show that the husbands actually
win more arguments.

This seems to be the case.

As reported

in Chapter IV, as husband-attributed power goes up, the
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number of husband-unilateral outcomes increases.

This is

suggestive, then, of an interactional link between reported
power and outcomes.
Middle and Working Class Couples
The broad finding of negative relationships between
attributed power and the power modes categories holds for
the middle class couples taken separately.

The husband's

lower use of self-depreciation is especially strong.

Further,

the two positive correlations— for wives' use of bilateral
power assertions and non-power assertions— are intensified
a little.

Interestingly, a higher frequency of behavior

by the wives in these two categories is consistent with the
above discussion of why couples with a husband-dominant
power distribution generally emit fewer behaviors throughout
the task.
For the working class couples, there are some
interesting reversals, not necessarily in the expected
direction.

(The very small sample size warrants a strong

caution as the working class couples are discussed.)

Working

class men who attribute greater power to themselves use
fewer unqualified power assertions and more bilateral
power assertions.

Further, they make fewer non-power

assertions but more self-depreciating statements.

Taken

together, these findings suggest that despite seeing them
selves on paper as more powerful, these men do not use a
particularly assertive style in face-to-face encounters with
their wives.
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Working class wives who attribute greater power to
their husbands tend to use more unqualified power assertions
and fewer qualified power assertions.

Further, these women

make fewer self-depreciating statements and non-power
assertions.

For these wives, then, a belief that the power

distribution favors their husbands seems to be no barrier
to challenging, assertive behavior.
Are the working class husbands inflating their selfreports on attributed power for social desirability reasons,
and then unable to "come through" in the reality of faceto-face encounters?

Apparently not, since the mean AP

score for middle class husbands (52.56) is actually higher
than that for working class husbands

(40.00).

Moreover,

working class wives actually attribute much greater power
(X - 53.70) to their husbands than their husbands do them
selves .

This means the working class husbands may be under

reporting their own power (AP).
Why are the working class wives more assertive and
the husbands less assertive than their AP scores, and
previous theoretical and empirical work, would suggest?
One possibility is that the IMC task elicits atypical
behavior from these couples.

Backed by a session administra

tor who seems to be treating the couple in an egalitarian
fashion, the wives may be more assertive than normally.

And

given situational expectations for egalitarian behavior, the
husbands may be more tentative than usual.
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Power Distribution Norms and Power Modes
Faced with some puzzling findings in relation to
attributed power, we turn now to an examination of power
distribution norms and their relationship to power modes.
The product-moment correlations between norms and power
modes, for husbands and wives and by class, are given in
Table 7.2.

Here again there are only small relationships,

but they are generally more in the expected direction than
for attributed power.
For the men, as husband-dominant norms increase,
non-power assertions decrease and self-depreciation decreases
slightly.

The more the wives hold norms favoring husband

dominance, the more non-power assertions and the fewer
unqualified and qualified power assertions they make.

They

also make fewer self-depreciating statements.
The Influence of Social Class.

Among middle class

husbands, the findings for the sample as a whole are inten
sified.

As husband-dominant norms increase, non-power

assertions, self-depreciation, and bilateral power assertions
decrease, while qualified partisan assertions increase
slightly.

These husbands seem to be maintaining their

position through persuasive argument.
Working class husbands with strong husband-dominant
norms use fewer non-power assertions and unqualified power
assertions.

They make more self-depreciating statements,

and slightly more definitional assertions.

These are

similar to, though not as strong as, the findings for AP.
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Table 7.2. Correlations between Power Distribution Norms
and Power Modes, for Husbands and Wives and by Class

Correlation be
tween Husband's
Norms and
Husband1s Power
Modes
Power Mode

MC

WC

-.10

-.17

-.07

Qualified partisan
assertion (QPART)

.12

-.06

Definitional asser
tion (DA)

.03

Bilateral power
assertion (BPA)

Unqualified power
assertion (UPA)

Total

Correlation be
tween Wife's
Norms and
Wife's Power
Modes
MC

WC

Total

-.16 -.76

-.20

.10

-.23

.02

-.22

.14

.07

-.01

.14

.00

-.19

.05

-.08

.01

nc

.03

Self-depreciation
(SD)

-.19

.28

-.13

-.24 -.02

-.19

Non-power asser
tion (NAP)

-.25

-.38

-.22

.27 -.26

.23
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Thus, working class men who hold husband-dominant norms,
and those who attribute more actual power to themselves,
seem to use a less assertive, more tentative interaction
style.
Middle class wives tend to repeat the whole sample
findings— more non-power assertions, and fewer unqualified
and qualified power assertions and self-depreciations, as
husband-dominant norms are stronger.
For the working class wives, there is a particularly
strong negative relationship between husband-oriented norms
and unqualified power assertions.

These women are less

inclined, then, to directly challenge their husbands'
views.
Relating the Two Power Distribution Variables
Table 7.3 presents the mean attributed power and
power distribution norms scores for the husbands and wives,
by social class.

In the middle class, for both men and

women, the mean AP and PDN scores are about the same.

For

working class couples, there are some discrepancies which
may be relevant to the unexpected styles which they adopted
in the IMC task.
The working class men hold as strongly to husbanddominant norms as the middle class men, yet they attribute
much less actual power to themselves.

Holding these norms

but seeing oneself as not actually having the corresponding
"power" may produce a more hesitant style.
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Table 7.3. Mean Attributed Power and Power Distribution
Scores of Husbands and Wives, by Class

Class

Power
Distribution
Variable

Middle
(N=60)

Working
(N=10)

Total
Sample
(N=76)

Attributed Power
Husband's report

52.56

40.00

50.03

49.17

53.70

50.03

49.75

50.40

49.84

51.13

44.60

50.16

Wife's report
Power Distribution
Norms
Husband's report
Wife's report
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In contrast, the working class wives seem to think
their husbands have more power than they should, and therefore
may be openly challenging.

However, when they do think

their husbands should have more say, they use the relatively
direct unqualified power assertions less often.
PERSONAL RESOURCES AND POWER MODES
Extrinsic Personal Resources
Table 7.4 gives the product-moment correlations
between extrinsic personal resources and power modes, for
husbands and wives and by class.

For the husbands, there is

a slight negative relationship between extrinsic resources
and unqualified power assertions, and a slight positive
relationship with non-power assertions.
the women:

The same holds for

as their own extrinsic resources increase, they

are slightly less likely to use unqualified power assertions
and more likely to use non-power assertions.

In addition,

wives with greater extrinsic resources are slightly more
likely to use bilateral power assertions.
These findings are basically replicated or intensified
in the middle class subsample (with the exception of the
relationship with husbands' use of non-power assertions).
Thus, as extrinsic resources increase, the most direct
power modes are used less often and more non-power asser
tions are made.
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Table 7.4. Correlationsi between Extrinsic Personal Resources and Power Modes, for Husbands and Wives and by
Class

Correlation be
tween Husband's
ERI, Husband1s
Power Modes

Correlation between W i f e 1s
ERI, Wife's
Power Modes

Power Mode

MC

Unqualified power
assertion (UPA)

WC

Total

MC

WC

Total

.27

-.22

-.16

-.11

-.50

- .13

Qualified partisan
assertion (QPART)

.05

.38

-.06

.03

-.06

.10

Definitional asser
tion (DA)

.08

.22

.07

.11

-.16

.08

Bilateral power
assertion (BPA)

.07

.23

-.04

.20

nc

.18

Self-depreciation
(SD)

.08

.09

.02

-.06

-.27

- .04

Non-power asser
tion (NPA)

.01

-.13

.11

.17

.27

.18
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Among working class men, as extrinsic resources
increase, there is the same decrease in unqualified power
assertions.
slightly.

However, non-power assertions also decrease
The slack is then taken up by definite increases

in qualified partisan assertions, definitional assertions,
and bilateral assertions.
Working class wives with high extrinsic resources
show an intensification of the general pattern of fewer
unqualified power assertions and more non-power assertions.
In addition, they are less likely to make self-depreciating
statements.
As a whole, the findings on extrinsic resources and
power modes support the idea that those with greater re
sources are less direct and tend to make milder power asser
tions.

Those with lesser resources are not more indirect or

manipulative, as might be expected, but more direct.

This

suggests that those with more extrinsic resources may need
to make only mild power assertions unless directly challenged,
and those with fewer extrinsic resources may need to directly
challenge in order to be heard.
Intrinsic Personal Resources
The relationships between power modes and intrinsic
resources are somewhat different from those for extrinsic
resources.

Table 7.5 gives the product-moment correlations

between intrinsic personal resources and power modes, for
husbands and wives and by class.
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Table 7.5. Correlations between Intrinsic Personal Resources and Power Modes, for Husbands and Wives and by
Class

Correlation be
tween Husband's
IRI, Husband1s
Power Modes
WC

Qualified partisan
assertion (QPART)

.09

-.01

.01

.45

-.48

.35

Definitional asser
tion (DA)

-.12

-.30

-.14

.28

-.12

.18

Bilateral power
assertion (BPA)

-.01

.02

nc

.04

Self-depreciation
(SD)

.02

.17

.14

.19

-.17

.03

-.47

.02

Non-power asser
tion (NPA)

-.21

»

•

•
0
o

-.74

1
•
o

.16

-.02

0

VO

Total

1
•
o
u>

WC

o
to

MC

i

Total

1

Unqualified power
assertion (UPA)

MC

i

Power Mode

Correlation be
tween Wife's
IRI, Wife's
Power Modes

-.66

.08
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Among the men, as intrinsic resources increase, the
number of definitional assertions and non-power assertions
decrease somewhat.

For the women, increased intrinsic

resources are strongly related to qualified partisan asser
tions and moderately related to definitional assertions
and self-depreciation.

Thus, the women rely more on persua

sive argument and are rather self-effacing as their inter
personal resources increase.

For the middle class subsample,

these findings are somewhat stronger.
Working class men with high intrinsic resources
are much less likely to make unqualified power assertions
and non-power assertions, and somewhat less likely to use
definitional assertions.

Working class women whose intrinsic

resources are high use far fewer unqualified power assertions,
qualified partisan assertions, and non-power assertions.
An interesting observation is that for working class
men and women almost all the relationships are negative.
Thus, as intrinsic resources increase, these couples are
less active in general.

In contrast, middle class women

seem to increase all kinds of activity as their intrinsic
resources increase.
In contrast to the ERI relationships, as IRI increases
the use of non-power assertions decreases.

A similarity,

however, is that as either kind of resource increases un
qualified power assertions decrease, although more sharply
for IRI than for ERI.

It seems that those with greater
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personal resources of either kind use a more persuasive
than directive style.
Relative Personal Resources
Table 7.6 gives the product-moment correlations
between relative extrinsic and intrinsic resources and the
power modes of husbands and wives, by class.
For the husbands' use of power modes, the relative
strength of their extrinsic resources compared to their
wives seems to make little difference.

There is only one

slight positive association with self-depreciation.

Middle

class men with high relative ERI use fewer non-power asser
tions and slightly fewer bilateral power assertions.

Most

interesting, for the working class men relative ERI are
positively related to all the power modes.

Thus, working

class men with high R-ERI seem to increase their activity
level as a whole in the task.
For relative intrinsic resources among the husbands
there is a slight negative association with all the power
modes.

Here, then, relatively greater intrinsic resources

bring a somewhat lower general activity level.

Among middle

class men in particular, there are fewer definitional
assertions and non-power assertions as R-IRI increases.
Working class men with high R-IRI are less likely to use
bilateral power assertions and self-depreciation.

Such men

may be less threatened by a verbal task if they have good
interpersonal skills.
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Table 7.6. Correlations between Relative Personal Resources
and Power Modes of Husbands and Wives, for Extrinsic and
Intrinsic Resources and by Class

Correlation with
Relative ERI
MC

WC

-.09

.53

Qualified partisan
assertion (QPART)

.08

Definitional asser
tion (DA)

Total

Correlation with
Relative IRI
MC

WC

-.05

-.08

.09

-.13

.21

-.03

-.11

.16

-.13

.06

.35

.09

-.21

.08

-.17

-.13

.30

-.08

-.07 -.51

-.12

Self-depreciation
(SD)

.10

.37

.13

.01 -.42

-.02

Non-power
assertion (NPA)

-.22

.48

-.02

-.21

.01

-.16

Wives
Unqualified power.
assertion (UPA)

-.00

.64

.05

-.08

.65

-.06

Qualified partisan
assertion (QPART)

-.10

.33

-.16

-.34 -.02

-.34

Definitional asser
tion (DA)

-.19

.29

-.11

-.28 -.41

-.25

Bilateral power
assertion (BPA)

-.08

nc

.02

-.10

nc

-.09

Self-depreciation
(SD)

-.10

.31

.04

-.15

.04

-.15

Non-power
assertion (NPA)

-.10

-.18

-.05

-.15 -.05

-.15

Power Mode

Total

Husbands
Unqualified power
assertion (UPA)

Bilateral power
assertion
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As their husbands' relative extrinsic resources
increase, women tend to use slightly fewer qualified partisan
assertions and definitional assertions.

Among middle class

wives, the husbands' greater R-ERI actually brings lower
frequencies for all the behaviors.

Working class wives use

more of each of the power modes, except non-power assertions.
They are especially likely to use more unqualified power
assertions.
For relative intrinsic resources, as husbands' R-IRI
goes up, the women use fewer of all the power modes, but
especially fewer qualified partisan assertions and defini
tional assertions.

The findings are almost exactly the

same among middle class women only.

Working class women are

especially likely to use fewer definitional assertions, and
much more likely to use unqualified power assertions as
husbands' R-IRI increases.
In some instances, the findings for relative resources
give us important information not obtained when the "absolute"
resources indexes are used.

For the middle class men, both

absolute and relative resources seem to have about the same
impact on power modes.

For working class men, relative

resources are really different from absolute in their
associations with power modes.

For example, when the R-ERI

is used there are increases in all behaviors, but with the
absolute ERI unqualified power assertions are lower rather
than higher.

For intrinsic resources, the unqualified and

non-power assertions are much lower when the absolute level
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of resources is examined.

But these relationships disappear

and negative relationships between bilateral power assertions
and self-depreciation develop as we use the R-IRI.
For the women, results with the absolute and relative
versions of the ERI are fairly similar.

The same is true

for intrinsic resources, with the exception that among working
class wives their own absolute intrinsic resources are
negatively related to qualified and non-power assertions.
When the R-IRI is used, these relationships disappear and
we find that as husbands' relative resources increase, these
women use fewer definitional assertions.
The finding with the absolute indexes that lower
resources do not necessarily produce an indirect, covert
style is generally upheld when relative resources are con
sidered.

Particularly for working class wives, as their

husbands' relative extrinsic and intrinsic resources
increase, the most direct power modes— unqualified power
assertions— are more likely to be used.

Further, this is

consistent with the findings based on self-reports of the
power distribution.
THE CASE OF VERBAL AGGRESSION
One of the unqualified power assertions— "reject/
attack other"— is perhaps the most extreme behavior of the
couples in the IMC task.

It is an instance of verbal

aggression, and examining even this relatively mild kind
of aggressive behavior in families can help shed light on
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more general issues surrounding violence in intimate groups.
Further, there is a rapidly growing literature relating
other dimensions of power to family aggression in natural
settings, and this provides good continuity with the present
study.

Finally, verbal aggression is a good focus for

examining the general issue of whether more direct or more
indirect power modes are used as levels of the other power
variables increase.

For these reasons, I will pause here for

a special look at verbal aggression.
Allen and Straus have developed and tested what they
term the "Ultimate Resource" theory of violence (1979).
Violence is seen as a resource, and is used only when a
person "lacks other resources to serve as a basis of power"
(1979).

Given the small sample size especially for the

working class subsample in this research, it is not possible
to fully replicate the multivariate analyses necessary to
test this theory.

However, the analyses which can reasonably

be carried out offer some strong parallels to the findings
by Allen and Straus.
Table 7.7 gives the product-moment correlations
between scores on the various power variables and verbal
aggression (VA) of husbands and wives, by class.
For husband's attributed power and verbal aggres
sion, there is a small negative correlation which becomes
moderate in size in the middle class.

Allen and Straus

found no relationships here, and indicate that that is con
sistent with "Ultimate Resource Theory" in that greater
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Table 7.7. Correlations between Scores on Power Variables
and Verbal Aggression of Husbands and Wives, by Class

Correlation with
Use of Verbal Aggression
Power
Variable

MC

Husbands
WC Total

MC

Wives
WC Total

Attributed power
(AP)

-.28

-.14

-.17

-.07

-.38

-.05

Power Distribution
Norm (PDN)

-.15

-.09

-.13

-.16

-.46

-.17

Extrinsic Re
sources (ERI)

-.36

-.50

-.16

-.17

-.34

-.20

Intrinsic Re
sources (IRI)

.12

-.45

.12

.14

-.86

-.00

Relative Extrinsic
Resources (R-REI)

-.05

.38

.06

.07

.48

.11

Relative Intrinsic
Resources (R-IRI)

.12

.05

.13

-.01

.25

.05
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"power" per se is not related to VA unless there is also a
concurrent lack of other resources.

Thus, as long as these

relationships are not positive, the theory is not questioned.
That the association found is actually negative for middle
class men may be a result of their having more than enough
other resources to validate their position.

The theory is

again supported for the women— there is generally no
relationship, except that working class women who attribute
greater power to their husbands tend to use less VA.
A measure of power distribution norms is not avail
able in the Allen and Straus study, but in this research
there are slight negative correlations between PDN and
husband's VA.

There is also a slight negative relationship

between wives' husband-dominant norms and wives' VA, which
becomes moderately large among working class women.
Thus, working class women, especially, who believe in their
husbands' right to decide things, use less VA.
Resources and Verbal Aggression
Consistent with the Allen and Straus study, for
both men and women the greater one's extrinsic resources,
the lower one's use of VA.

These are generally strong

negative relationships, especially in the working class.
Allen and Straus included intrinsic resources in their
research but did not examine them separately from extrinsic
resources.

In the present study, the strong negative

association between resources and VA is replicated for the
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IRI only in the working class— and there is an extremely
strong negative relationship for working class women.
However, there is a very slight positive relation
ship between the IRI and VA for both men and women in the
middle class.

The link may be too small to warrant specu

lation, but one idea is interesting to consider.

Straus

has argued that catharsis models legitimize aggression as
something that needs a full expression (1974).

Middle class

couples may adopt expressive violence more than instrumental
(Allen and Straus, 1979).

I would argue that this may be

because of greater exposure to catharsis-oriented writings
in the popular and semi-professional literature.

Those who

attend to "professional advice" on family relations may
also have greater intrinsic personal resources.

Thus, the

(small) link between the IRI and VA for middle class couples
may be by way of exposure to a certain kind of advice on
marriage.
The findings for relative resources and VA are
particularly interesting.

Allen and Straus found that

" . . . the extent to which a husband's resources exceed
those of his wife has little or no relation to violence by
either spouse"

(1979).

The present findings for the ERI

bear this out only for the middle class.

For the working

class, as husband's extrinsic resources outweigh those of
his wife, both husband and wife use more VA.
on R-IRI are very small in magnitude.)

(The findings

Thus, the absolute
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level of resources in the working class seems to have the
most important dampening effect on VA.
In general, these findings are consistent with the
Ultimate Resource Theory developed by Allen and Straus.
They do not, however, replicate the fuller test offered in
the earlier research.
In terms of the general issue for this chapter, the
findings on verbal aggression support the idea that those
with a better position "structurally" need not use direct—
even aggressive— means of affecting group outcomes.
POWER MODES AND OUTCOMES
The final link to be examined is that between power
modes and outcomes.

Do the kinds of power assertions made

by marital partners make a difference in the nature of the
outcomes?

Tables 7.8 and 7.9 give the product-moment

correlations between power modes and three kinds of outcomes,
by class.

The first table is for husbands' use of power

modes, and the second for the wives' power modes.
The pattern of findings seems less clear than for the
other power variables.

For the sample as a whole, as the

husbands use more unqualified power assertions and qualified
partisan assertions, the number of wife-unilateral outcomes
decreases and the number of bilateral outcomes increases.
This is replicated in the middle class subsample.

In the

working class, the more UPA's and QPART's by the husbands,
the fewer husband-unilateral and the more wife-unilateral
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Table 7.8. Correlations between Husbands' Power Modes and
Three Types of Outcomes, by Class

Outcome

UPA

Power Modes of Husbands
BPA
SD
QPART
DA

NPA

Husband-unilateral
Middle Class
Working Class
Total

.05
-.48
.01

.07
-.57
.00

-.10
-.66
.04

-.14
.32
-.18

.02
.21
.02

-.11
-.33
-.18

Wife-unilateral
Middle Class
Working Class
Total

-.30
.43
-.27

-.25
.37
-.16

-.11
-.56
-.02

.10
-.33
.10

00 H ^
OHO
• • •
1

-.14
.20
.14

Bilateral
Middle Class
Working Class
Total

.23
.17
.25

.22
.57
.20

-.03
.28
.02

-.01
.00
.05

-.05
-.29
-.03

.09
.38
.19
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Table 7.9. Correlations between Wives' Power Modes and
Three Types of Outcomes, by Class

Outcome

UPA

Power Modes of Wives
QPART
DA
BPA
SD

NPA

Husband-unilateral
Middle Class
Working Class
Total

-.01
-.37
-.07

.10
-.60
.04

.12
-.40
.01

-.16
nc
-.16

-.05
.37
-.06

.09
-.53
-.01

Wife-unilateral
Middle Class
Working Class
Total

-.27
.24
-.21

-.19
.62
-.10

-.13
.33
-.04

-.07
nc
-.09

-.06
-.38
-.11

-.12
.47
.10

Bilateral
Middle Class
Working Class
Total

.25
.38
.26

.15
.00
.12

.03
.20
.04

.32
nc
.34

.06
.00
.11

-.04
.18
.03
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and bilateral outcomes.

Definitional assertions by husbands

do not affect outcomes much, except in the working class
where they are negatively related to husband-unilateral and
wife-unilateral outcomes.
Interestingly, bilateral power assertions by hus
bands are not related to bilateral outcomes.

Further, in the

working class, the more BPA's by the husbands, the more
husband-unilateral and the fewer wife-unilateral outcomes.
Self-depreciation on the part of husbands is also
not an important determinant of outcomes.

However, one

curious finding is that as working class husbands make more
SD statements, the number of husband-unilateral outcomes
increases and bilateral outcomes decrease.
Finally, non-power assertions of husbands show a
slight negative relationship to husband-unilateral outcomes
and a slight positive relationship to wife-unilateral and
bilateral outcomes.
Overall, there is not a relationship between the
husbands' power modes activity and their obtaining increased
unilateral "wins."

Rather, for the middle class there seems

to be a lessening of wife "wins" and an increase in bilateral
outcomes.

The findings for the working class suggest that

increased powering activity by the men actually results in
fewer husband wins.
solutions

However, when these men offer bilateral

(BPA) or use self-depreciation, they win more.

One can speculate that BPA's and SD's are somehow taken as
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a show of good faith (or perhaps as real discouragement)
which prompts working class wives to respond with submission.
Wives' Power Modes
For the middle class wives, and the wives as a
whole, there is a pattern which is the mirror image to that
for the men.

Wives' use of UPA's and QPART's actually

produces fewer wife outcomes and more bilateral outcomes.
The one contrast with the findings for men's power modes,
is that wives' use of bilateral power assertions is
positively related to the number of bilateral outcomes.
The pattern for the working class women also mirrors
that of working class men.

This is actually the only group

in the research whose increased use of various power modes
actually produces more wins for themselves.

Self-deprecia

tion results in fewer wife wins and more husband wins.
Putting the working class wives and husbands together, it seems
that a "strong" approach by the wives pays off for them, but
a "weak" approach by the men results in more wins for them.
Verbal Aggression and Outcomes
Looking specifically at verbally aggressive behavior
(see Table 7.10) we find that middle class husbands' verbal
aggression is negatively related to wife wins and positively
related to bilateral outcomes.

When working class men use

verbal aggression, there are fewer bilateral outcomes.
Actually, the wives' use of verbal aggression seems
to have a bigger impact on outcomes.

When middle class
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Table 7.10. Correlations between Verbal Aggression of
Husbands and Wives and Three Types of Outcomes, by Class

Verbal Aggression
Outcome

Husbands

Wives

Husband-unilateral
Middle Class
Working Class
Total

-.01
-.02
-.04

-.12
-.50
-.17

Wife-unilateral
Middle Class
Working Class
Total

-.19
.14
-.16

-.08
.53
,01

Bilateral
Middle Class
Working Class
Total

.19
-.30
.19

.20
-.05
.19
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wives are verbally aggressive, there are slightly fewer
husband wins and more bilateral outcomes.

Working class

wives using verbal aggression obtain much greater wins, at
the expense of their husbands.
Overall, for the men and the middle class women,
aggression may produce more bilateral solutions, but little
in the way of purely personal gain.

However, for working

class women verbal aggression seems to be a fairly effective
tactic in obtaining unilateral wins.
CONCLUSION
The general issue posed at the beginning of the
chapter was whether those with a stronger position struc
turally and normatively use a relatively strong, direct style
or are more indirect in their approach.

In general, it was

found that those with fewer resources and not favored by
norms or power attributions use the more direct power
modes.
When verbal aggression is examined separately,
similar findings result.

Those with a better position

structurally do not need to use the most direct— verbally
aggressive— power modes.
The final issue addressed in how the use of different
power modes affects the outcomes of a confrontation.

The

findings here seem compatible with those for the power
distribution and power modes findings.

For husbands and

middle class wives— those in a more favorable position,
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structurally— the most direct power modes are used less
and do not really seem very effective anyway.

The working

class wives, who may be seen as the most structurally dis
advantaged group, are the most direct and their directness
seems to be effective in producing more wife-unilateral
wins.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
This research was designed to explore the types of
power assertions used by married couples.

This question of

how husbands and wives go about "powering" has largely been
neglected by family researchers.

Instead, attention has

been focused almost exclusively on explaining variations in
the distribution of power in marriages.

I have argued that

the incorporation of power modes into a model of power can
lead to a much more complete understanding of marital power
relations, and ultimately to a more dynamic, processoriented approach to confrontation and change in families.
OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH
The combined observation and self-report study was
carried out with a sample of seventy-eight married couples,
some of whom were in marital counseling.

Each member of a

couple completed a questionnaire and then the couple
participated in the Inventory of Marital Conflict (IMC)
task (Olson and Ryder, 1970).

This is a highly-involving

conflict resolution task which offers a great deal of
realism in inducing disagreement between the marital
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partners.

A comprehensive system of coding the power modes

used by the couples was developed for this research.
Limitations and Strengths
In reviewing the research it is appropriate to con
sider some of its strengths and limitations.

Particularly

in the area of sample selection and characteristics, some
cautions are necessary.
First, several of the couples were referred to the
project by local marriage counselors.

The rest were sel

ected through a random sampling procedure which produced a
response rate of less than half— a low response, but one
which is by no means atypical of laboratory researches
which demand much time of the subjects.

Therefore, the

group of couples included in this research is not repre
sentative of any definable population and generalizations
are largely unjustified.
Second, while the actual social characteristics of
the couples, such as age, education, children, etc., are
fairly broad in range, overall the sample is heavily middle
class and professional.

The couples in counseling are

generally younger and of lower social class standing than
the others, so they help make the sample more broad than it
would be otherwise.

Some of the most interesting findings

involve middle and working class comparisons, yet because
of the small number of working class couples, these findings
must be viewed as mainly providing a basis for further
hypothesis-development and research.
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The focus of the research on interaction in the
laboratory over a researcher-defined task is both a limita
tion and a strength.

The degree of control over "extraneous"

variables is clearly an advantage.

Yet, obviously the

present task and laboratory setting preclude investigating
some important aspects of marital power processes in natural
settings.

These will be discussed more below.

There are two major strengths of the research design
itself.

One is the inclusion of both marital partners.

The other is the multi-method approach, which includes
self-reports on several aspects of power, direct observa
tion of behavior, and a rather unique assessment of the
task outcomes.

This still uncommon combination of methods

and viewpoints in a single research allows a "triangulation"
both by method and by person to yield special insight into
marital power relations.
Finally, two additional contributions of the project
should be mentioned. One is the clarification of major
power concepts presented in Chapter III.

The other is the

contribution to measurement in the field of the Marital
Power Assertion Coding System.
SOME SELECTED FINDINGS
Most of the findings for the research have been
reviewed in each chapter.

Rather than resummarize them

here, I would like to highlight some of the findings in
terms of important issues which have cropped up throughout
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the research and which have implications for different
bodies of theory and research.
Husbands and Wives
In an important analysis of modern marriage, Bernard
(1973) has discussed the ways in which husbands' and wives'
experiences of marriage are essentially different.

In

many instances, the findings for this research underscore
Bernard's analysis.

On two important self-report measures—

attributed power and power distribution norms— there is not
a great deal of congruence between the husbands' and wives'
reports or beliefs.

When personal resources are related to

attributed power, different kinds of resources are
important for the two partners.

Further, the effect of

resources on task outcomes seems to be different for men
and women.

For example, when husbands have high intrinsic

resources there are more bilateral solutions for a couple.
However, when wives' intrinsic resources are high, the
wives simply tend to outright lose more decisions.
Turning to the types of power assertions used by
marital partners, while there are strong correlations
between the behavior of the wives and husbands, there are
also some differences.

When there are differences, they are

generally in the direction of the women using a "weaker"
less confident style.

Finally, there are differences between

men and women in how the power distribution variables relate
to outcomes.

For example, working class men who use very
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direct power modes do not seem to gain much in outcomes,
but working class women who are direct win more.
Taken together, these findings suggest that the
question of how power processes in marriage differ and are
the same for men and women needs to be addressed much more
systematically.

That there are significant differences is

clear.
Personal Resources
The relative resource theory of power has dominated
investigations of family power.

While testing this theory

was not a goal of this research, many relevant relation
ships have, in fact, been considered.
Probably the most significant contribution of the
research in this area is the overall finding that the
type of resource makes a difference in the relationship to
other power variables.

Only a few previous researchers

(such as Allen and Straus, 1979; Safilios-Rothschild, 1976;
Smith, 1970) have systematically considered both extrinsic,
or economic and status resources, and intrinsic or inter
personal resources.
There are differences in how the two types of
resources operate.

In this research, extrinsic resources

influenced the attributed power scores of the husbands, but
not the wives.

Intrinsic resources had a greater influence

on wives' reports.
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In addition, extrinsic resources were a relatively
unimportant factor in the task outcomes.

The level of

intrinsic resources was more significant, for both men
and women.
These findings suggest that different kinds of
resources relate to power differently for men and women.
Also, different resources affect power differently at
different points in the process and depending on the
dimension of power being considered.
Marriage and Zero-Sum Games
The finding that the couples in this research
devised very few bilateral solutions to the task has already
been discussed in relation to marriage as a zero-sum or nonzero-sum game.

I have argued that it is inappropriate to

replace the assumption that marriage is a zero-sum game with
the counter assumption that it is not.

Both the small number

of bilateral outcomes and the types of power modes used by
the partners suggest that much of the time they were
operating at least as if the situation were a zero-sum
game.

At this point, I would like to raise a broader

issue relating to conditions under which intimate relation
ships are likely to operate as zero-sum games.
It is only possible for all group members to share
in "winning"

(a non-zero-sum outcome) when there is, in fact,

"enough to go around."

Conversely, a group situation is

objectively a zero-sum structure when there is, in fact,
not enough to go around.

We then need to ask, what is it
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that is sought after in marriages, and is there enough
to go around?
We may divide valued ends in families into instru
mental and expressive, or extrinsic and intrinsic rewards.
Steiner (1976:131-137, 352-361) makes a convincing case
that in intimate family relationships, there is actually no
structural reason for there not to be expressive rewards
for everyone.

There is no objective scarcity of expres

sions of liking and caring.

Yet many, if not most, families

operate as if there were such a scarcity, and it is only
with great difficulty that some families are able to break
out of this scarcity-based "stroke economy."
When we turn to instrumental rewards, there is a
much clearer objective basis for structured zero-sum behavior
In a society in which economic goods are distributed un
equally and on a principle of scarcity, there obviously
are many families in which there really is not enough
economically to go around, and many more who lack basic
economic security.

Having to operate within a framework of

economic scarcity may in turn produce objective and subjec
tive conditions which make it hard to freely exchange
expressive rewards (evidence for this may be found in
Scanzoni1s (1970) work on economic position and intrinsic
aspects of married life).

Even if the objective economic

scarcity does not produce objective expressive scarcity,
it may produce a generalized style which is based on the
belief that there are not enough of such rewards to go around
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Thus, the findings of this study related to Sprey's
(1972) comments on families as non-zero-sum games, are
indirectly suggestive of some broader issues about economies
and families.

The objective and subjective determinants

of zero-sum behavior cannot be adequately assessed without
reference to the larger economy in which they are embedded.
POWER MODES AND GOVERNANCE IN FAMILIES
One of the frustrating aspects of carrying out this
research has been the gnawing sense that only one level of
power processes is being tapped.

I would like to close by

discussing the level at which the power modes system operates,
and its significance within the broader context of marital
power relations.
Broderick (1975) has offered a fascinating analysis
of what he terms "governance of families."

He argues that

"all families face the problem of making decisions about
the allocation of shared resources," and that the "process
of resolving conflicting interests (essentially the process
of governance)

involves the issue of power in several

important ways"

(1975:117).

Governance in families is then divided into three
levels.

(1)

"Zero-sum power confrontations" involve

"unilateral imposition" or attempts to gain one's ends
without "serious consideration of the opposing view"
(1975:118).

These are rather similar to the unqualified
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power assertions, consequence identification, and perhaps
some of the qualified power assertions in the MPACS system.
(2)

Governance through rules involves developing and

referring to rules which group members see as fair.

There

are different types of rules, such as those which directly
allocate resources (as in setting personal allowances),
those which define who gets to decide contested issues in
certain areas

(authority rules), or rules about how nego

tiations may fairly be carried out (1975;120-121).

MPACS

includes some of this sort of governance, insofar as couples
refer to such rules in making qualified power assertions,
and also in some of the bilateral power assertions.

Gen

erally, however, among the couples in this research any
reference to supposedly previously established rules
seemed to meet with a contest over the rule itself— back
to the zero-sum power confrontation level.

(3)

Governance

through "principled interaction" rests on the internalization
of a moral precept for guiding conflict resolution, shared
by all family members.

Such a precept might be placing

group needs before individual needs (1975:121-122).
does not really cover this sort of governance.

MPACS

Little

principled interaction appeared among the research couples,
in any event.

It may be that in a group with only two

members, it is hard to conceive of conflicts as group issues
rather than as personal confrontations.

However, in large

families the difference between doing something "for the
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good of the group" and simply giving into another individual,
may be more readily felt by group members.
Broderick's distinctions between governance levels
address some important issues in studying family power.
For example, clearly not all instances of needing to
allocate scarce resources are openly negotiated in families,
the way the IMC vignettes must each be confronted by the
research couples.

For many issues a person is assigned to

make decisions (authority rule), or a rule is set in advance
to cover such situations, or both.
Second, Broderick's typology raises some important
connections between family governance and the study of
deviant behavior.

One important question is under what

conditions rules are shared or imposed by a group member,
and if they are shared, how these shared rules emerge out
of the day-to-day interaction in the group.

Further, we may

ask who breaks the family's rules, who enforces them, and
under what conditions they will be broken and enforced.
Finally, how and under what conditions are family rules
and shared moral precepts questioned and renegotiated?
Figure 8 is suggestive of how Broderick's levels
of governance in families may be integrated with other
aspects of power.

I have added two additional governance

options— withdrawal/avoidance and covert resistance/
sabotage.

I think both are important options not covered

by the other levels.

These two might be placed with power
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modes, in that they are unilateral actions.

Yet, the cir

cumstances under which they are used and their implications
for the group are probably so different as to warrant
separate status.

For example, sabotage might be used by

the weaker partner in an extremely unequal relationship,
where the other essentially governs capriciously (i.e.,
without consistent reference to even self-imposed rules),
and where an open approach at the power modes level would
meet with a severe, even life-threatening response.
Each of the variables relating to the distribution
of power can be related to the governance options, perhaps
in different ways.

Thus, different kinds of resources

may have a different impact on the several levels of
governance.

The inclusion of governance norms indicates

the possibility that whatever option is chosen, there is
always the possibility that the option itself will be
contested.
The power modes themselves may well be the most
important of the governance options.

Broderick (1975)

suggests that the proportion of conflicting interests
settled by each form of governance will vary by family.
I would add that they will also vary over the course of
the family life cycle.

For instance, early in a marriage

the number of conflicts settled through reference to estab
lished rules or moral precepts will be lower than later in
the group history.

In another case, as the first child in

a family reaches successive stages of maturity, a shift

i--L
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RELATED TO THE
DISTRIBUTION
OF POWER
1. Personal
resources
2. Power dis
tribution
norms
3. Attributed
power

Figure 8.
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/
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OUTCOMES
1. Unilateral/
bilateral
2. Disputed/
resolved

Power Distribution and Governance Options
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will probably occur from rule-bound to power modes-based
governance, as the application of existing rules is rejected
by the child.

Power modes have a special importance both

because of their frequent use in resolving substantive
issues, and because of the likelihood that they will come
into play whenever the legitimacy of any of the other
governance options is questioned.
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PERSONAL RESOURCES
Extrinsic Personal Resources
Education. (Q10 in original questionnaire)
How much education have you completed?
1 - Less than seven years of school
2 - Junior high school (grades 7-9)
3 - Partial high school (10th or 11th grade, but
not graduation from high school)
4 - High school graduation
5 - Partial college training (completion of at
least one year, but not full college course)
6 - Standard college or university program (completed
a college or university course leading to a
recognized college degree)
7 - Graduate professional training
Personal Income. (Q18 in original questionnaire)
Which of the following categories indicates your
personal income in the past year?
0
1
2
3
4
5

-

less than $1,000
$1,000-$l,999
$2,000-$3,999
$4,000-$5,999
$6,000-$7,999
$8, 000-$9 ,999

Work Status.
Work status
1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8
9

-

$10,000-$14,999
$15,000-$19,999
$20,000-$24,999
$25,000 and over

(Q20B10 in original questionnaire)

- full time
- part time
- student
- housewife
- unemployed, looking
for a job

6 - unemployed, not looking
for a job
7 - disabled
8 - retired

Occupation. (Q20C10 in original questionnaire)
Open-ended responses coded on a 7-point scale using
Hollingshead1s occupational classification, and
ranging from unskilled workers to "higher executives
and major professionals."
Economic Contribution to Marriage. (Qll.l in original
questionnaire)
In terms of our economic life, my contribution as a
(wife/husband) is:

194
much
more
just
less
much

more than it ought to be
than it ought to be
about right
than it ought to be
less than it ought to be

Intrinsic Personal Resources
Marital Contributions. (Qll.2 to 11.4 in original
questionniare)
In terms of our social life, my contribution as a
(wife/husband) is:
much
more
just
less
much

more than it ought to be
than it ought to be
about right
than it ought to be
less than it ought to be

In terms of our emotional life, my contribution as a
(wife/husband) is:
much
more
just
less
much

more than it ought to be
than it ought to be
about right
than it ought to be
less than it ought to be

In terms of our sexual life, my contribution as a
(wife/husband) is:
much
more
just
less
much

more than it ought to be
than it ought to be
about right
than it ought to be
less than it ought to be

Self Esteem. (Q8.1 to 8.10 in original questionnaire)
For each of the following statements, circle one of
the 4 possible responses.
I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an
equal plane with others.
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
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All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
I am able to do things as well as most other people.
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
I take a positive attitude toward myself.
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
I wish I could have more respect for myself.
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
I certainly feel useless at times.
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
At times I think I am no good at all.
Strongly agree
Agree
Disagree
Strongly disagree
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ATTRIBUTED POWER AND POWER DISTRIBUTION NORMS
Power
Distribution
Norms____
Who SHOULD
have the
final say*
A.

What car tobuy.............

12

B.

Whether or not to buy
some life insurance.......

1

What house or apartment to
take.......................

12

C.
D.

What job you should take...

E.

Whether or not your wife
should go to work or quit
work.......................

F.

G.

H.
I.

Attributed
Power
Who REALLY
has the
final say*

3 45

1 2 3 4 5

2 3 45

1 2 3 4 5

3 45

1 2 3 4 5

12 3 45

1 2 3 4 5

2 3 45

1 2 3 4 5

1

What job your wife should
take (If your wife doesn't
have a paid job now, ans
wer in terms of who should,
and then who would decide
this if she took such a
job)....................... 1 2

3 45

1

23 4 5

How much money your
family can afford to spend
per week on food........... 1

2 3 45

1

23 4 5

What doctor to have when
someone is sick............ 1

2 3 45

1

23 4 5

Where to go on a vacation.. 1 2

3 45

1

23 4 5

*Circle a
1
2
3
4
5

number using these categories:
- the wife only
- the wife more
- husband and wife exactly the same
- the husband more
- the husband only

APPENDIX B
INVENTORY OF MARITAL CONFLICT (IMC)
FORMS AND INSTRUCTIONS
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INTRODUCTION TO IMC PROCEDURE
Tonight, you will be involved in a procedure centering
around your joint discussion of some real cases where couples
are having various types of marital conflicts. These case
descriptions have been incorporated into what we call the
"Inventory of Marital Conflict" or the IMC.
After collecting information from about 2,000 couples
like yourselves, we have found certain things that have fre
quently caused disagreements or conflicts.
We have provided
brief case descriptions of couples having some of these con
flicts.
Your task is to read each of these case descriptions
and decide which spouse is primarily responsible for the
conflict.
It is very important to us that you take this task
seriously because your recommendations will be combined with
others so that couples with these problems might be helped.
In some cases you may have experienced the conflict yourselves.
In others you may know friends who have had similar problems.
In all the cases, these are serious problems for some couples.
As j.:.:. any conflict situation, there are two points of
view presented in these case descriptions.
In some of the
cases, one of you will learn about the conflict from the point
of view of the husband.
The other person will learn the wife's
point of view regarding the same situation.
In each case,
however, both of you will be given the same essential facts.
It is very important that for every case you decide
who is at fault in the conflict even though this might be
difficult at times. You should not indicate that both are
to blame or leave any question blank.
I am now going to take you to separate rooms so that
you can read and evaluate these cases. After you have finished
filling out the Inventory of Marital Conflict, bring these
materials out to me. Later we will bring you and your spouse
to a room where you can jointly discuss these case descriptions.
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I N V E N T O R Y O F M A R I T A L C O N F L I C T S (IMC)
C A SE D ES C R IP T IO N S

1. Bob and Frank are good friends. Janis, Bob’s wife, likes Frank but
jj becoming increasingly annoyed with his unannounced and
excessively long visits to their apartm ent, especially a t mealtimes.
She has suggested to Bob that he ask Frank to please phone before
visiting, but her husband feels this would be insulting to his friend.
Janis suggests that she m ight ask Frank to please phone before
visiting, but this only makes h er husband angry. A fter accusing his
wife of interfering with his friendship, he refuses to discuss the
matter further.

2. Cora doesn’t really enjoy sexual relations. When she was first
married she would avoid love making by telling her husband it was
painfiiL More recently she has pretended to be tired when her
husband has approached her. Now she has resorted to retiring
earlier than her husband. Cora believes sex is an unpleasant subject
that one does n o t discuss unless absolutely necessary, and she
becomes furious when Jack insists they should talk about this
problem.

3. When Don finally gets home from work he takes o ff his jacket, tie
and shoes, and makes himself comfortable with a can o f beer. After
dinner Don has a little more energy, so he goes back and puts away
the various articles o f clothing he has taken off. One day Francine
tells Don he is sloppy and lazy and demands th a t he not leave
clothes lying around, even for a short period o f tim e. Two days
later, Don forgets to do as his wife had demanded, and she angrily
repeats her complaint. An argument develops.

4. Nina has been looking for a pair o f shoes to wear w ith her favorite
dress. Upon finding a pair o f shoes o n sale, Nina ju st cannot resist
and purchases them. Later that evening she shows her new purchase
to Peter. He remembers th at she already has many pairs of shoes
and asks about the necessity o f such a purchase a t this tim e. Nina
beoomes outraged and accuses him o f being cheap and incon
siderate.

5, Mark and Elaine have both been working since their marriage in
order to live at a level which they feel to be comfortable.
Occasionally, Elaine becomes depressed because she wants to have
a child but knows th at on Mark’s salary alone this would be
extremely difficult. Elaine’s em otions get the best o f her and she
accuses Mark o f not being aggressive enough, Implying th at he is an
inadequate provider. Mark was advised not to go to college because
of scholastic difficulties and has done as well as could reasonably
be expected, but his wife continually compares him unfavorably to
his college-educated friends. Mark’s self-esteem is injured and an
argument begins.

6. A conflict has arisen between Jack and Colleen following a party
with friends. During the party, Jack talked to another woman,
resulting in his wife becoming very angry. Following the party,
Colleen angrily accuses Jack o f intentionally ignoring her for the
entire evening and becomes argumentative.

7. Betty and Phil have been having m arital difficulties for the past
year. One o f the problems has been Betty’s extravagance. Now
Betty insists o n immediately seeking costly professional counseling.
Phil points o u t th a t there simply is no money to pay for such an
expensive venture until they can cut down their expenses some
place else. Betty will n o t hear of waiting until m oney is available,
and many arguments arise in the weeks to come.

8. Jim routinely arrives hom e from w ork a t 5:00 PM and enjoys his
dinner soon after his arrival. Susan has been a full-time housewife
since the birth o f their first child one year ago b u t still leaves her
domestic chores undone. Jim has asked Susan if she would have the
house clean and dinner prepared when he returns home. Upon
arriving hom e, Jim again finds the ironing board with a pile of
clothes in the living room , a dining table that has not been set, and
his wife sitting on the sofa reading a magazine. Upon viewing the
situation Jim appears discouraged, whereupon Susan accuses him
o f always finding fault with her and angrily storm s into the
kitchen.

9. I t’s Friday evening and the Carter family have a dinner engage
m ent, which had been m ade the previous week. Frank comes home
a half hour early so he can be sure to be ready on tim e. He
showers, shaves and is dressed and ready to leave on tim e. But
when it is tim e to go, Mary is still in the bathroom combing her
hair and putting on makeup. Since Mary almost always makes them
late this way, Frank becomes upset. Mary retorts that she isn’t very
concerned about being late since they always get where they are
going sooner or later.

10. Linda and Steve plan to take a weekend trip by car. While Linda is
driving Steve to work o n Friday morning, Steve hears a "pinging”
noise and realizes that the spark plugs should be changed along
with other minor adjustm ents. Since they plan to leave Friday
evening and Steve has to w ork, he has to ask his wife to take the
car to the garage. Linda complains about the other preparations she
says she has to make for them and their two children b u t says she
will have tim e to take the car to the garage, and agrees to do so.
Later on the trip, Steve hears the “ pinging” noise and realizes the
spark plugs have not been changed. I t turns out th a t Linda took
the car to the garage b u t did n o t bother to mention the spark
plugs. Linda says th at if Steve doesn’t like the way she does things
he can do them himself. Steve points out th a t he was unable to
take the car to the garage and th at when she agrees to do
something she should do it.

11. When Charlotte and Richard were living with Charlotte’s family, a
lo t o f ill will developed between Richard and his in-laws. Charlotte
told her parents ju st about everything that happened, and when
Richard told her to stop, his mother-in-law said she was hurt and
told Charlotte to keep Richard in his place. Richard and Charlotte
now have their own hom e, but the situation continues. Richard
will rarely visit his in-laws, b u t whenever he is not around Charlotte
is on the phone with her m other, passing on information and
receiving advice. When Richard tells Charlotte again that she should
stop telling things to her m other, Charlotte becomes enraged.
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p . Each night Larry promises Judy th a t he will throw the garbage out
" after they finish dinner. Invariably, Larry forgets and leaves the
kitchen without doing what he has prom ised. Judy has felt th at the
:«
best thing to do is to throw the garbage away by herself and has
been doing this later in the evening. When he notices this, Larry
becomes angry with Judy, stating th at this is his job. As Larry
’
continues to follow his old habits, Judy begins to do the chore
herself, only to be angrily criticized by her husband.
I:

13. At parties that Bob and Nancy attend, Nancy spends most o f her
time with the men present and obviously enjoys being with them.
Bob is very concerned and has tried to tell Nancy that her behavior
is interpreted as flirtatious and could lead to a romantic involve
ment with another man. Nancy denies this, b u t Bob knows from
his own experience th at this type o f thing does frequently happen
and feels that she is being inconsiderate o f his feelings by n o t giving
up this behavior.
14. When Jerry comes home from work in the evening he is tired and
likes to relax over a pleasant meaL After dinner he prefers to be
alone with his wife. However, Betty does n o t understand Jerry’s
unwillingness to go o u t after a hard day’s work, and she is after
him to go out partying in the evenings. She tells Jerry he is a lazy
do-nothing.

16. Tom is very concerned about his wife’s smoking habits. Betty is a
very heavy smoker and has a severe cough. Although Tom used to
be a heavy smoker himself, he has now quit completely, so he is
convinced that Betty could at least cut down. He has told her in
detail about the health hazards involved in smoking and he has
asked her to stop or a t least cut dow n, if not for lierself then
because o f her love for him . Betty’s usual reaction has been to get
sarcastic. She says she is trying but doesn’t change. As a result
there has been a series of arguments.

17. Chuck is a football fan who likes to watch the pro games on
Sunday afternoons. His wife Betty is upset at this, so she plans a
series o f activities for them together on Sundays and tells him he
will have to give up the football games. Chuck feels th a t this is an
unreasonable demand. He points o u t th a t he works all week and
should be entitled to a couple o f hours o f relaxation watching TV
on Sunday. He reminds her th a t she watches many hours o f soap
operas during the week when he is a t w ork. Chuck also reminds
Betty th a t the other wives they know do not get so upset just
because their husbands watch football. Betty, however, continues
to be annoyed and insists that he stop watcliing games.

18. John has been o u t o f college for three years and is able to provide a
modest b u t adequate income for himself and his wife, Jean. They
have been planning a vacation, which Jean has been enthusiastically
anticipating. John has always been a stereo enthusiast and
presently feels th a t he wants to improve his stereo by buying new
speakers. I f John proceeds with his plan, the vacation they have
planned would be impossible. John states th at he is the bread
winner in the family and deserves a luxury. He insists th a t as the
man in the family, he should make the decision.

H IS. Dick and Diane have been married for three years. Dick likes his
f;'
job and is anxious to get ahead. F or the past year he has been
voluntarily spending a great deal o f extra tim e a t his work. Diane
:
has repeatedly accused Dick o f caring more about his job than he
cares for her. Dick explains th a t his career is im portant to .both of
them and that it is necessary for him to w ork additional hours if he
expects to get prom oted. Diane refuses to listen to Dick’s
explanations and unreasonably demands th a t he substantially cut
‘
down his hours o f over-time work.
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DATE

I N V E N T O R Y O F M A R I T A L C O N F L I C T S (I M C )

ANSWER SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS:

Item

SEX:

C O U P L E NO

r~~i m a l e

□

FEMALE

P le a se read each c a s e description and answ er questions _a,_b,_c and_d for each c a se .
C heck th e appropriate box in each column and do not leave any questions unanswered. ■

(0)

(b)

(c)

Who i s prim arily
resp o n sib le lor
the problem?

Have you had a
sim ila r problem?

H ave y ou known
other c o u p le s
who h a v e sim ilar
problem s?

Check One

Check One

(d)

Check One

No.
HUSBAND

W IFE

YES

NO

Y ES

NO

4

Should Bob ask Frank to phone before
visiting?
Is Cora being reasonable in refusing to d isc u ss
their sexual problems?
Should Don be able to relax th is way before
dinner?
Is it reasonable for P e ter to question the n ecessity of N ina's purchase?

IjY e s
1No
“ ■Yes
“ No
□ Y es
□ No

5

Is E laine justified in accusing Mark of being
an inadequate provider?

1 j Y es
(“H No

6

Should Jack be permitted to talk to another
j"~f Y es
woman at a party without Collen becoming upset? [ ! No

7

Is Phil justified in worrying about starting
counseling without being able to afford it?

r ~ l Y es
No

Should Susan be reading a magazine when her
household duties are not completed and dinner
is not prepared?

|~ 1 Y es
( J No

9

Should Mary make a greater effort to be ready
on time?

riY c s
“ No

10

Should Linda thoroughly carry out her respon
sib ilitie s once she has accepted them?

□

Yes

“

No

11

Is Richard justified in becomming upset with
C harlotte discussing m atters with her mother?
Is Larry neglecting his resp o n sib ilities by not
carrying out the garbage?

1
2
3

. 8

12

Y es
No

! Y es
I No
□

13

Should Nancy realize that her behavior can be
interpreted by other men as flirtatious and could
unintentionally lead to further involvements?

14

After working hard all day should Jerry be allow ed [
to spend a quiet evening at home with his wife?

15

Should Dick continue to devote the time that he
knows is necessary to obtain advancement in
h is career?

t.

Yes
No
1Yes
No
Y es
No

16

Should Tom feel he has the right to concern
him self with his wife’s health?

17

Should Chuck be able to watch football on
□
Sunday afternoon?
Is it John’s prerogative to decide how the family □
money will be spent?
““

18

Yes

“ iN o

[_ ! Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
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When you have completed th is answer sheet, return th is and the c a se descriptions to the research a ssista n t in the
lobby before completing the other material.
•JO-8 A n s w e r S h » e » (H )

INVENTORY O F MARITAL C O N FL IC T S (IMC)
CASE D ESC R IPTIO N S

1, Bob and Frank are good friends. Janis, Bob’s wife, likes Frank but
is becoming increasingly annoyed with his unannounced and
excessively long visits to their apartm ent, usually at mealtimes. She
has suggested to Bob that he ask Frank to please phone before
visiting, but her husband feels this would be insulting to his friend.
Janis suggests that she might ask Frank to please phone before
visiting, but this only makes her husband angry. After accusing his
wife of interfering with his friendship, he refuses to discuss the
matter further.

2. Cora doesn’t really enjoy sexual relations. When she was first
married she would avoid love making by telling her husband it was
painful. More recently she has pretended to be tired when her
husband has approached her. Now she has resorted to retiring
earlier than her husband. Cora believes sex is an unpleasant subject
that one does not discuss unless absolutely necessary, and she
becomes furious when Jack insists they should talk about this
problem.

3. When Don finally arrives home from work he immediately sits
down and makes himself comfortable with a can o f beer and
scatters his jacket, tie and shoes on the furniture and/or floor,
where they stay until some time after dinner. After putting up with
this sloppiness for a while, Francine asks Don to stop tossing his
clothes around the apartm ent, even if he does eventually pick them
up. Two days later, Don repeats his usual performance as if
Francine had said nothing. When she mentions it again, an
argument develops.

4. Nina has been shopping around carefully for some time to find a
pair of shoes she can afford that will go with her favorite dress. She
finally finds a satisfactory pair of shoes and is happy to discover
that they are on sale. She purchases the shoes and takes them home
to show her husband, Peter. He does not care whether or not the
shoes are satisfactory. He doubts that they are necessary at all and
fails to understand their importance to her or how much trouble
she has gone to in order to save money.

5. Mark and Elaine have both been working since their marriage in
order to live at a level which they feel to be comfortable.
Occasionally, Elaine becomes depressed because she wants to have
a child but knows that on Mark’s salary alone this would be
extremely difficult. Elaine’s em otions get the best o f her, and she
accuses Mark of not being aggressive enough, implying that he is an
inadequate provider. Mark was advised not to go to college because
of scholastic difficulties and has done as well as could reasonably
be expected, but his wife continually compares him unfavorably to
his college-educated friends. Mark’s self esteem is injured and an
argument begins.

6. A conflict has arisen between Jack and Colleen following a party
with friends. During the party, Jack becomes involved with another
woman and ignores his wife. Colleen feels hurt and attem pts to
discuss her feelings o f being neglected but feels like she is not
understood.

7. Betty and Phil have been having marital difficulties for the past
year. Betty is no longer reassured by having her husband minimize
her unhappiness and wants to seek professional counseling. Phil, on
the other hand, insists on holding off indefinitely before spending
money on counseling. He says she is far too extravagant. In the
weeks to come, many arguments arise because o f their differing
opinions.

8. Jim routinely arrives home from work a t 5:00 PM and enjoys his
dinner soon after his arrival. Susan has been a full-time housewife
since the birth of their first child one year ago but still leaves her
domestic chores undone. Jim has asked Susan if she would have the
house clean and dinner prepared when he returns hom e. Upon
arriving home, Jim again finds the ironing board with a pile o f
clothes in the living room, a dining table that has not been set, and
his wife sitting on the sofa reading a magazine. Upon viewing the
situation Jim appears discouraged, whereupon Susan accuses him
o f always finding fault with her and angrily storms into the
kitchen.

9. I t’s Friday evening, and the Carter family has a dinner engagement,
which had been made the previous week. Frank surprises his wife
by getting home from work a half hour early and uses the
bathroom continuously until it is alm ost time to leave. Since it
takes Mary more than the few minutes Frank has left her to wash,
comb her hair, and put on her m akeup, it becomes obvious that
they will be late for their appointm ent. Frank raises his voice and
accuses her o f always making them late. Mary tries to calm Frank
down by saying that being a little late is not all that serious, but
Frank just becomes more enraged and an argument develops.

10. Linda and Steve plan to take a weekend trip by car. While Linda is
driving Steve to work on Friday morning, Steve decides that the
spark plugs need changing and that other minor adjustments should
be made. He tells his wife to get the work done in time for them to
leave that evening. Linda also has all the other preparations to
manage for them and their two children but she manages to get the
car to the garage and asks for a tuneup. On the trip, Steve hears a
“ pinging” noise, discovers that the spark plugs are the same ones he
had been using, and blames his wife for the spark plugs not being
changed. Linda feels that if he is going to be so picky about how
things are going to be done, he should assume some responsibility
for doing them himself. Steve tells her he was too busy.

11. When Charlotte and Richard were living with Charlotte’s family, a
lo t o f ill will developed between Richard and his in-laws. Richard
told Ids wife to stop talking so much with members of her family.
When Charlotte’s m other found out how Richard felt, she was hurt
and said she thought Richard was o u t of place to make such a
demand. Richard and Charlotte now have their own home but the
situation continues. Richard will rarely visit his inlaws, so
Charlotte’s only regular contact with them is by phone. Charlotte
usually speaks only to her m other and only phones her m other
when her husband is not around, but Richard is still not satisfied.
Richard insists that Charlotte stop speaking with her mother.

Please Continue on Reverse Side

MH-20-B (W)
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12 Each night Laity promises Ju d y th at lie will th ro w the garbage out
after they finish dinner. Invariably, L arry forgets and leaves the
kitchen without doing w hat he has prom ised. Ju d y has fe lt th a t the
best tiling to do is to throw the garbage aw ay b y herself and has
been doing this later in the evening. When he notices this, Larry
becomes angry w ith Judy, stating th a t this is his jo b . As Larry
continues to follow his old habits, Ju d y begins to do the chore
herself, only to be angrily criticized b y her husband.

13. At parties Nancy prefers the company of men to the other women
and spends much of the evening with them because she finds them
intellectually stimulating and shares many of their interest. Nancy
finds at parties that the women’s conversations are limited to
housekeeping, cliildren, etc. Nancy is upset by Bob’s accusations
that her behavior may lead to involvement in an | affair or, at the
very least, misinterpretation o f her behavior by other people,
which would cause gossip. She is deeply hurt by his lack o f trust
since she is a devoted wife and would not consider an involvement
with another man.
14. Jerry regularly comes home froin work, eats, and sits down in front
of the television screen for the entire evening. Betty is cooped up
in the house all day and feels th at she will go crazy if she can’t get
out and have some sort o f contact with other human beings. Jerry
refuses to go out and so there is a disagreement between Betty and
Jerry.
15. Dick and Diar.e have been married for three years. Dick likes his
job and is anxious to get ahead. For the past year he has been
voluntarily spending a great deal of time at his work. Diane feels
. that their marital relationship is deteriorating due to the lack of
time tiiey are able to spend together. She attem pts to explain to
Dick that financial success will be meaningless if their marriage is
destroyed in the process. Dick cooly tells his wife that her response
is so immature that it is pointless to discuss the subject further.

MH-20-3 (W)
2-69
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16. Tom claims to be worried about B etty’s health because she s m o k e s
so m uch and has a cough. He gives her endless detailed lectures
about health hazards and is always demanding that she stop or nut
down. Betty realizes Uiat she smokes too m uch and is trying to cut
down, but Tom’s continued badgering is no help. Tom apparently
feels that, because he stopped smoking w ithout any difficulty,
everybody else should quit too and should have no ttoublc doing
so. He seems unable to understand that it is difficult for her to
change her smoking habits and he says that if she really loved him
she would quit. B etty has tried to control herself and not gel angry
at Tom ’s continuous comments, but Tom goes right on lecturing to
her ar.d eventually there are a series o f arguments.
17. Chuck is an ardent sport fan who spends every Sunday afternoon
glued to the television screen watching football. His wife B etty is
getting tired o f being left by herself every Sunday, so she asks him
to give up this p art o f his football watching and plans some Sunday
activities for them together. Chuck not only refuses to give up any
football, hut lie launches in to a whole series o r aigum cnts to
defend hirnself. He tells B etty that no one clse’s wife is as
unreasonable as she is. He accuses her o f spending her time
watching soap operas while he is at work. He also tells her that
since he work's hard he should be able to w atch football games if lie
wishes. Betty is upset by his attitude but continues to want him to
spend Sunday w ith her.
IS. John has been out o f college for three years and is able, to provide a
modest but adequate income for himself and his wife, Jean. They
have been planning a vacation, w hich Jean lias been enthusiastically
anticipating. Jo h n has always been a stereo enthusiast arid
presently feels th a t he wants to improve liis steieo by buying new
speakers. If John proceeds w ith his plan, the vacation they have
planned would b e impossible. John states that he is the bread
winner..
dso-rww.V'lu-xirry: Ho insists-that as the
man in the family, he should m ake the decision.
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NAME

C O U R T S H I P A ND M A R R IA G E STUDY
DATE

INVENTORY O F M A R I T A L C O N F L I C T S (IMC)

ANSWER SH E E T
INSTRUCTIONS:

Check One
HUSBAND

[ j Male

1 i Female

P le a se read each c a se description and answer questions a b , £ a n d cl for each c a se.
Check the appropriate box in each column and do not leave any questions unanswered.

(°)
Who is primarily
responsible for
the problem?
Item
No.

SEX:

C O U P L E NO

WIFE

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

(b)

(c)

Have you had a
sim ilar problem?

Have you known
other couples
who have similar
problems?

Check One
Y ES

NO

(<•)

Check One
YES

NO

Is Cora being reasonable in refusing to d isc u ss
their sexual problems?
Should Don be more considerate of Francine by
not scattering his clothes around?

C Ye:
3 No
L_3 Y es
f j No
[ j Y es
[ j No

Should Pecer try to understand N ina’s wellplanned purchase of these particular shoes?
Is E laine justified in accusing Mark of being
an inadequate provider?

1 ! Ye
L_J
( □ Ye.No

Should Jack be more attentive to his wife at
parties?
Is Betty ju stifie d in feeling that their marriage is more important than any financial
considerations?

[ , ' Yev
L J No
Q j Ye:-

Should Susan be reading a magazine when her
household duties are not completed and dinner
is not prepared?

[PJ Ycv

Should John have a greater understanding of
why she is late?
Is Steve being unteasonable in blaming h is wife
for the work not getting done?
Should Charlotte be able to speak freely
with her mother?

Yey
□ No
“ 1 Ye.
jN o
1 Yc.-.
j*1 No

Is Larry neglecting h is respo n sib ilities by
not carrying out the garbage?
Should Bob trust his wife and not be upset that
she is enjoying the company of other men?

i Ye:
□ no
□ Ye*
□ No

Should Jerry understand and respond to Betty’s
boredom by going out in the evening?
Should Dick spend more time with h is wife?

i Yes
□ No
' Yes
i No
f ~ i Yes

Should Bob ask Frank to phone before
visiting?

16 .

Should Tom leave Betty alone and quit
pressuring her?

17

Should Chuck spend more time on Sundays with
his wife?
Is it John’s prerogative to decide how the
family money will be spent?

18

|

-No

| 1 No

“ iN o

1 ! Yes
No
Yes
l ” No

PLEASE m a k e s u r e y o u h a v e a n s w e r e d a l l t h e q u e s t i o n s a n d h a v e c h e c k e d o n e a n s w e r i n e a c h c o l u m n .

Wien you have completed th is answ er sheet, return this and the case descriptions to the research a s s is ta n t in the
. *°bby before completing the other m aterial.__________________________________________
______
NH-20-8 Amw#r S h e e t (W)
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE IMC DISCUSSION SESSION
Now we would like you to fully discuss the conflict
each couple is having and decide who is primarily responsible
for the problem.
As was previously mentioned, in some cases
the descriptions you each read represented different points
of view.
For example, if you and your spouse were involved
in a disagreement and subsequently you each were to relay
to me what happened during the conflict, it is highly probable
that each of you would present different points of view
regarding your marital conflict.
However, please do not be
distracted by such differences, for in every case each point
of view contains all the essential facts, and our primary
concern is how you resolve the conflict each couple is having.
In discussing these cases it is important that you use
only the information provided. Also, it is important that you
resolve each disagreement before going on to the next case.
Once again, I want to stress the importance of this
task for helping couples who are having conflicts.
It is
vital to our research that your answers be thoroughly discussed.
We will have a tape recorder on so that no one will have
to be present in the room while you are discussing these items.
You will have about 30 minutes to discuss these cases.
I will come in and remind you 5 minutes before your time is up.
If you finish before that time, please bring the materials to me.
These are your individual response sheets (GIVE TO
EACH SPOUSE) to help you recall your answers to each item.
However, while discussing these cases, do not show your spouse
your answer sheet. You will not have the case descriptions to
refer to, so do the best you can remembering the details of
the cases.
This is the sheet (JOINT DISCUSSION FORM) for recording
your joint answers.
The brief sentence for each item should
help you recall the cases. As you can see, on Part A you
must decide which spouse is primarily responsible for the
problem and on Part B you must choose one of the two alternatives.
On both Part A and Part B do not leave any question blank
and check only one answer for each.

NAME
C O U R T SH IP AND M A R R IA G E STUDY
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DATE

C O U P L E NO.

INVENTORY OF M ARITAL C O N F L IC T (IMC)
JOINT DISCUSSION

D I S C U S S IO N :

INSTRUCTIONS: I t i s v e ry im p o rta n t th a t for EACH ca se you decide which spouse, either the husband or wife,
i s p rim a rily r e s p o n s ib le for the problem. You should make ONE response for both PART A and

PART B. Do not leave any questions unanswered. Complete each case before going on to the next item.
PART A

C ase

J, Conflict over frequent v isits
by husband's friend and w ife's
annoyance.

2. Conflict regarding satisfactio n
during sexual relations.

PART B

V/ho is primarily
responsible for
the problem?
Check One
Husband Wife

Which of the following would be o better way to to resolve the conflict?
Check Only One
1 ! Should Bob ask Frank to phone before visiting?
OR

1 SShould Ja n is stop interfering in her husband’s
friendship?
1__1Is Cora being reasonable in refusing to d iscu ss
the problem of sex?
OR

1 1Is Jack justified in suggesting they d iscu ss
the problem of sex?
3. Conflict concerning h u sb an d 's
distributing his shirt, tie , jacket
and shoes around the apartment
when he gets home from work .
4. Conflict about wife’s purchase of
a pair of shoes to wear with new
dress.

1 j Should Don be able to relax th is way before dinner?
OR

1 1Should Don be more considerate of Francine by not
scattering his clothes around?
1 1Is it reasonable for P eter to question the n ecessity
of Nina’s purchase?
OR

1

i

Should P ete r try to understand N ina’s weJl-planncd
purchase of these particular shoes?

5. Conflict between Mark and Elaine
stemming from their d esire to have
a child but recognizing th e
financial burden.

1 1Is Elaine justified in accusing Mark of being an
inadequate provider?

6. Conflict caused by wife feeling
ignored by husband w hile at a
party.

□ .S h o u ld Jack be perm itted to talk to another woman at
a party without Colleen bec.oming upset?

OR

1 1Should E laine be more understanding concerning
Mark’s ability and achievements?

OR

I

| Should Ja c k be more attentive to h is wife at parties?

7. Conflict over when to seek profes
sional help for the mar i t al . . . .
difficulties between B etty and
Phil.

1 ! Is Phil justified in worrying about starting counseling ■
without being able to afford it?

8. Conflict concerning wife’s
inability to have house clean and
dinner ready upon husband’s
arrival.

1 1Should Susan be reading a m agazine when her household
duties are not completed and dinner is not prepared?

OR

1 1Is Betty justified in feeling th at their marriage is
more important than any financial considerations?

OR

□

Should Susan try to be a better housekeeper?

1 i Should Mary make a greater effort to be ready on time?
9. Conflict over wife’s la te n e ss
for dinner engagement.

10. Conflict over car breokdown
while taking a short weekend
trip.

2-49

OR

□

Should John have a greater understanding of why she is
late?

1 1Should Linda thoroughly carry out her respo n sib ilities
once she has accepted them?
OR

1 1Is Steve being unreasonable in blaming his wife for
the work not getting done?
P le o s e C on tin u e On R e v e r se S id e

I

"

1

— .1. 1 . . - .

%JOINT DISCUSSION - (C on tinu ed )
PART A
C a se

PART B

Who is primarily
r e s p o n s ib le for
th e problem?

Which o f th e fo llo w in g w ould be a b etter w ay to
r e s o lv e th e c o n flic t?

Check One
Husband Wife

Check Only One

11. Conflict over w ife ’ s
conversations with' her mother.
— ....

*-•

1 I Is Richard justified in becoming u p set with C harlotte
d iscu ssin g matters with her mother?
OR
I | Should Charlotte be able to speak freely with her
mother?

12. Conflict about th e r e sp o n s ib ility
for tlvowing th e garb age a w a y .

r 1Is Larry neglecting h is resp o nsibility by not
carrying out the garbage?
OR
1 1Is Judy expecting too much by asking her husband
to carry out the garbage?

13. Conflict over w ife ’ s c o n v e r sa tio n s
with men at p a rties.

1 1Should Nancy re alize that her behavior can be
interpreted by other men as flirtatio u s and could
unintentionally lead to further involvements
OR
1 1Should Bob trust h is wife and not be upset th at she
is enjoying the company of other men?

14. Conflict regarding e v e n in g
entertainment.

1 1After working hard a ll day should Jerry be allowed
to spend a quiet evening at home wich his wife?
OR
1 1Should Jerry understand and respond to B etty’s
boredom by going out in the evening?

15. Conflict over husband sp en d in g
time at the o ffic e .

1 1Should Dick continue ro devote the time th at he
knows is necessary to obtain advancement in h is
career?
OR
1 1Should Dick spend more time with h is wife?

16. Conflict over w ife ’ s sm oking.' -

1 1Should Tom feel he has the right to concern him self
with h is w ife’s health?
OR
1 1Should Tom leave Betty alone and quit pressuring
her?

O

17. Conflict over TV fo o tb a ll g a m es.

»-

18. Conflict of v a ca tio n v s . ste r e o
speakers.

1 1Should Chuck be able to w atch football on
Sunday afternoons?
___
OR
1 1Should Chuck spend more tim e on Sundays with h is
wife?

1 1Is it John’s prerogative to decide how the family
money will be spent?
OR
1 I Should financial expenditures be a joint decision?

P L E A S E T A K E A M IN U TE T O R E C H E C K Y O U R ANSW ERS ON E A C H Q U E S T IO N .
Y O U S H O U L D H A V E O N E C H E C K F O R P A R T A A N D O N E C H E C K F O R P A R T B.
A F T E R R E C H E C K IN C Y O U R R E S P O N S E S . R E T U R N T H IS FORM T O A R E S E A R C H
A S S I S T A N T IN T H E L O B B Y .
HH-20-9 (HW)
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APPENDIX C
MARITAL POWER ASSERTION CODING
SYSTEM (MPACS)

INTRODUCTION
MPACS is a scheme for coding power modes or types of
power assertion used by marital partners.
Power assertions
are attempts to alter group outcomes.
In the marital dyad,
they can be viewed as attempts to alter the other's behavior.
Power modes are specific types of power assertion, and are
operationalized here as the specific MPACS categories.
The
combination of all the MPACS categories can be taken as an
operationalization of power assertions.
Features
1. The system was developed for interaction elicited by
the Inventory of Marital Conflicts (IMC) task (Olson &
Ryder, 1970) . However, it could be adapted for use with other
verbal interaction tasks.
2. MPACS is not intended to provide exhaustive coverage of
all verbal behavior in an interaction session. Statements
not coded as power assertions are simply tallied in a sep
arate category ("98" - non-power assertion).
3. The formal structure of a statement (e.g., question/
command/statement) is generally disregarded except where
specified. For example, many attempts to give "information"
or express a partisan opinion are couched in the form of a
leading question which urges an agreement response from
the other. These are coded as if they were in statement
form.
4. Statements including expressions of agreement are not
automatically defined as non-power modes simply on that basis.
Whether and how the statement is elaborated are the deciding
factors.
5.

Unit of Coding:

(a) A statement is any "coherent" utterance bounded
at the beginning and end by another person's "coherent"
utterance.
(b) Statements considered incoherent, and therefore
ignored by the coder, are:
(1)
incomplete ideas which cannot be clas
sified.
(Example:
"Well, it's . . .") Usually fragments
of three words or less, but note that "coherent" statements
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of three words or less are coded, unless they fit (2)
below (Example:
"No, I disagree;" "That's not right;"
"Put down husband").
(2) Perfunctory social acknowledgments, usually
interspersed through the other's statement.
These merely
show that one is following the other (Example: "yeah;" "ok;"
"right;" "uhuh;" "mmm"). Note that these comments are not
always perfunctory— if they indicate active agreement or
response to a question, they are coded "98" (non-power
assertion).
(3) Statements which cannot be heard after
repeated efforts.
(c) A statement may contain more than one idea.
If more than one idea is expressed, more than one code may
be used for a statement. For example, a statement might
include two sentences.
If each expresses a different idea,
each would be coded differently.
But if both sentences
express the same thing, they are coded once together.
Double
coding of the same statement is allowed only if two distinct
ideas are contained in it.
If part of a statement can be coded in MPACS, do
not use "98" (non-power assertion) for another part of the
same statement.
"98" is used only if the whole statement
does not contain MPACS codes.
6. Priorities among codes are specified where necessary and
likely points of confusion among related codes are clarified
as much as possible.
However, it will often still be neces
sary to consider the overall context of a statement, the
couple's general "style," and/or your own assessment of the
statement's general impact, in deciding which code to use.
Try to get a sense of the statement as a whole, or the
distinct ideas embedded in it if it contains more than one
idea, and code on that basis.
Special Notes
1. All statements not covered even partially by the MPACS
codes are coded "98"— non-power assertion.
2. Statements coded "49"— other power assertion/related
behavior— should be listed, described, and location specified
on back of summary code sheet.
3. Interaction with the session administrator is ignored.
This is usually before, after, and at 20-minute reminder.
Couple's post-completion checking and interaction is also
ignored.
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4. For the present study discussions of only the twelve
conflict-inducing vignettes are coded (3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10,
11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17) .
Overview of Main MPACS Categories
Unqualified power assertions (UPA) are unilateral
attempts to alter group outcomes (or the other's behavior,
in a dyad), in which no effort is made to provide the partner
with a rationale for changing. These assertions may be blunt,
directive, relatively coercive in the sense that no effort
is made to obtain compliance "voluntarily." Further, the
actor may sometimes give off a sense of not attending to or
acknowledging the other.
Qualified power assertions (QPA) are also unilateral
in the sense that the presentation is one-sided or the
actor is operating with a view toward the other person, not
herself changing. However, here the actor is attempting to
provide some inducement or incentive for the other to alter
behavior, and thus may be seen as trying to obtain "voluntary"
compliance rather than to coerce the other.
The sub-types
of QPA represent different degrees of subtlety in the induce
ments for change offered by the actor.
In the most direct of these sub-types consequence
identification, the actor explicitly promises rewards or
threatens punishments in exchange (or as inducements) for
behavioral/positional change.
In qualified partisan assertion,
the actor presents rationales and persuasive arguments in an
effort to convince the other of the merits of his position.
The partner is offered some "good reason" for compliance.
The
most subtle type of QPA is definitional assertion. The
actor is presenting his definition of some aspect of the
situation, and thus laying the groundwork for behavior change
by the other.
If one can get the other•to accept one's own
view of "the facts of the case," one is closer to obtaining a
position change. Further, if the partner does change her
position she has been giVen an opportunity to rationalize the
change as a function of a new understanding of "the facts,"
rather than as "giving in" or losing the argument.
Bilateral power assertions are suggestions or offers
of change on the part of both partners simultaneously.
The
expectation is that partial concessions will be reciprocated
in kind. Thus, both actors "win" something and "lose" some
thing, but neither experiences total victory/defeat.
The
"sense" of the behavior is to be making contracts, bargaining,
negotiating, trading.
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SUMMARY OF MPACS CATEGORIES
I.

Unqualified Power Assertions (UPA)
01
02
03
04
05
06
07

II.

-

Reject/attack other
Command
"Do anyway" attempt
Surrender under protest
Reiteration
Unqualified disagreement/refusal
Unqualified partisan assertion

Qualified Power Assertions (QPA)
A.

Consequence Identification
10 - Promise
11 - Threat

B.

Qualified Partisan Assertions
20 - Qualified partisan assertions and persuasion
attempts

C.

Definitional Assertions
30
31
32
33
34

III.

-

Task/procedure definition
Situation definition (vignettes)
Personal definition
Other's position definition
Progress definition

Bilateral Power Assertions (BPA)
40 - Explicit position trade
41 - Other compromise/bilateral solution
42 - Role division solution

Other
49 - Other power assertion/related behavior
50 - Self-depreciation/deference
98 - Non-power assertion
Related Codes; Keep Separate
A.
B.
C.

05, 06, 07, 20, 31
30, 33, 34, 41
34(2), 20

(SPECIFY)
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DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF MPACS CATEGORIES
01

Reject/attack other
Direct, negative statements about the other which are
personally critical, not just disagreeing.
Example:
NOTE:

"That's really stupid."
"You're just being stubborn."

"Neutral"/"factual" characterizations of
other are coded 32. Example: "You don't take
out the garbage."

Also, other statements where voice-tone indicates
obvious sarcasm, disbelief, skepticism, impatience with
other, frustration with other, anger, ridicule, verbal
aggression.
Range from mild to extreme is included.
Example:

NOTE:

02

"Are you kidding?" (sarcasm)
"And I suppose you also think he enjoys it
(ridicule)

01 is a priority code. Regardless of what
else a statement represents, if it fits the
above, it is coded 01. Example:
"Don't
threaten me!" (angry)— code 01, not 02
(command).

Command
Any statement which is a formal command.
Examples:

NOTE:
03

"Put down this one."
"Turn the page."
"Just don't argue on this one."
"Don't do that."
"Listen to me."
"Tell me what you think."

This is a priority code, after 01 (reject/attack)

"Do anyway" attempt
Explicit attempt to ignore opposition and mark down own
position.
Unilateral imposition, disregard of other's
view. Usually occurs after some discussion, often at an
impasse. Must be explicit.

21.4

Example:

"Well, I'm gonna put her down, anyway."
W:

(06)
(02)
"You can't do that.
Erase it.
didn't agree yet."

We

A prior "do anyway" attempt by H
is inferred from W response, and
coded.
but:
04

"Put down the wife anyway."--code 02.

Surrender under protest
One-sided "giving in" or capitulation in which the message
is actually not "I give in," but just the opposite.
The
actor makes it quite clear that he has not been persuaded
by the other (in fact, his own position may have hardened),
but is yielding to the other's persistence only.
This is
a power assertion in that it represents a final attempt
to prick the other's conscience, or even threaten her,
for "browbeating" the actor.
It is something like a
"rhetorical question" in that it is not what it appears
to be at face value. This is a judgment call, and voicetone (often hostile) and context can help distinguish it
from related situations noted below.
Examples:

NOTE:

If the actor is bowing to the other's special
expertise or right to decide in a particular domain,
then code it 42 (role division solution), unless
the voice-tone indicates that 04 is more appro
priate.

Example:
NOTE:

"Do whatever you want.
I don't care."
(voice-tone may be hostile, exaggerated
indifference, pouting, etc.)
"I'm really unhappy with this, but I'll go
along."
"Well, if it's that important, ok, but I
don't like it."
"I'll go along with you, but just to get
it over with."

"You know more about this sort of thing,
so you decide."— code 42.

If the actor has genuinely been persuaded and is ack
nowledging that, or is saying "no matter what the
issue, you're better at this so I'll bow to your
judgment," then it is a real surrender and should
generally be coded 98 (non-power assertion). Or,
if self-depreciation is expressed, code the state
ment 50.

215

05

Reiteration
Flat repetition of one's position with no elaboration.
Any elaboration requires another code (basically the same
phrasing repeated, though not necessarily word for word).
May be seen as an attempt to "muscle" one's position
across, similar to nagging— if you say it often enough,
you may wear the other down.
Should not be used if the
actor seems to have just run out of arguments and is re
turning to an earlier one or trying to present an earlier
argument in a different way.
Rather, should include
blunt repetition which gives force, stress, or emphasis
to one's position, or has a wearing effect on the other.
Examples:

NOTE:

Takes priority over 06 (disagreement/refusal).

Example:
NOTE:

"That's just not right." repeated— code
05, rather than 06.

At the beginning of a new vignette, the first
statement by one of the spouses may be a direct
reading from the answer sheet.
If that is all
that's included in the statement, code it 98 (non
power assertion). But if the reading is followed
by disclosure of a position, the statement is
coded 07 (unqualified partisan assertion) or 20
(qualified partisan assertion). B u t , if later in
the discussion the actor rereads from the answer
sheet to emphasize her own position, this may be
coded 05.

Example:

06

"I still say it's the husband."
"Again, the wife should understand."
"It's just her fault, pure and simple."

"It says 'conflict caused by wife feeling
ignored' . . . " — code 05.

Unqualified disagreement/refusal
Disagreement/refusal with no elaboration.
Flat contra
diction.
If elaborated at all, another code is used.
Examples:

"No, I don't agree."
"I disagree.
It's the wife."
"It didn't say that."
"I w o n 't put that down."

NOTE:

If 01 is indicated, code 01.

NOTE:

05 (reiteration) takes priority.
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07

Unqualified partisan assertion
Non-elaborated one-sided statements of own position.
This includes more general partisan assertions than just
those specifically about the vignette events and people.
Includes initial disclosure of position, even though
speaker may be merely "informing" the other of her
position and voice-tone may not reflect a strong personal
commitment.
Non-elaborated normative (should/ought) statements about
the vignette characters are included here.
If elaborated,
code 20. Characterizations of the vignette characters,
even those interpretable as opinions, are coded 31.
Examples:

"I put down the wife."
"I think the husband is responsible."
"Oh, the wife, of course, don't you think?"
(leading question)
"She should have asked him first."

b u t : "He was being obnoxious."— code 31.
This code is not confined to position disclosures on the
specific IMC items.
It also includes opinion disclosures
on related, and not-so-related issues in the conversation.
Example:

NOTE:

Convention for when an actor's first disclosure is
an agreement statement is to code it 07 (or 20 if
elaborated).

Example:

10

"I really think couples should work to
gether on dividing up those sorts of
chores."

W:
H:

"I put the husband."— code 07.
"I did too."— also code 07.

Promise
Explicit or clearly implicit "if-then" statement in
which A promises material/expressive rewards in return
for desired behavior by B. Rare.
Example:

11

"If you'll just calm down, I'll be much
more ready to consider your position."

Threat
Same as 10, except A threatens material/expressive retalia
tion/punishment for undesired behavior by B. Rare.
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Example:
NOTE:

20

"If you keep on this way, I'll be really
angry."

Clear trade-offs in position are not included as
10 or 11. Code those 40. Example:
"I'll agree
to the wife on this one, if you'll say the husband
there."— code 40.

Qualified partisan assertions and persuasion attempts
Elaborated one-sided statements of one's own position
or attempts to persuade or convince the other.
Provides
arguments/rationales for position based on use of logic,
analogy, hypothetical/conditional examples, appeals to
empathic understanding.
It is assumed that even if the
partisan position is not explicitly stated, the persuasive
attempt is a qualification of the implicit position.
(For
example, read "If he had . . . then she would have . . . "
as having "therefore, I conclude that . . . " attached.)
Statements including "information" or characterizations of
the people/events/behavior in the vignettes are included
only if the "info" is explicitly a rationale for one's
position.
That is, the "information" is part of an
explititly partisan statement, as in "I think the husband
is responsible because he didn't explain what had to be
done."
Elaborated normative statements (should/ought) about the
vignette couples are included here.
Examples:

NOTE:

"I tried to understand how he felt, though,
and decided she really had to . . ."
(empathy)
"If she had been willing to listen, he
wouldn't have been so upset" (hypothe
tical/conditional example)
"I just have to say the wife, because she
was the one being extravagant" (explicit
information, rationale)
"Wouldn't it have been just the same, though,
even if he hadn't done that?" (hypothetical/
conditional example; leading question)
"I think he should have . . . because . . . "
(elaborated normative statement)

If the rationale for a position is based on personal
information, double code the statement 20 and 32
(personal definition). See 32 for rationale.
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30

Task/procedure definition
Supplies task/procedure "information" or suggests proce
dure. May be in opinion/suggestion form, but there is
little affect and no sense of personal commitment to a
position.
This code includes two fairly distinct contents:
(1)
information, questions and suggestions about the task/
procedure/equipment imposed by the investigator, and (2)
information, questions and suggestions on how the couple
might proceed within the externally imposed constraints
(like making a list of alternatives). (1) refers to how
we have to (must) do it, and (2) to how we can
do it.
Both refer to "how to do it."
Examples:

31

"I think we have to choose one."
"We have to finish this one first."
"Let's skip it and come back
to it."
"It's very hard to check one or the other,
because of the way they have it here."
(defines task itself as difficult)

NOTE:

Suggestions that some decision-rule (like flipping
a coin) be used, or bilateral solution suggestions,
would be coded as a bilateral power assertion (one
of the 40 codes— usually 41 or 42).

NOTE:

This code would be appropriate with any laboratory
task. Further, even in a natural setting with no
formal task, task definitions would occur. For
example, one partner might suggest making a list
of alternative solutions, or postponing discussion
of an issue, or define precedence of issues, as in
"We need to decide on how much money we have before
we decide where to go."

Situation definition (vignettes)
Gives "information" from vignettes, or clearly relevant
to vignettes.
Speaker is trying to supply the "facts
of the case." The speaker may be elaborating, distorting,
attributing motives or meaning, making generalizations,
or drawing conclusions about the people/events/behaviors
in the vignettes, but presenting this as "information."
Affect is generally neutral.
Normative statements (should or ought) about the vignette
couples would be coded 07 or 20, and hypothetical/condi
tional speculation about what might have happened would be
coded 20.
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Note that situation definitions, as well as other defini
tional assertions, may begin with "I think . .
"I
feel . . .
etc.
Examples:

"This is the one where the wife . . . "
"And the husband said . . ."
"It said she tried to help him."
"He was asking for it."
"She was really nagging him and being
obnoxious."
"Wasn't she just worried about his health?"
(leading question)

b u t : "No, it didn't say that."— code 06
(disagreement)
32

Personal definition
Gives personal "information" about self, spouse, couple,
relatives, or friends.
Includes descriptions/attributions
of "real life" behavior and emotions, summary characteri
zations of personality, relationships, etc. Also includes
observations on own or spouse's behavior in the laboratory
task, including whether that behavior is "in character"
or not (see example 1)
Examples:

"That just doesn't seem like you."
"Of course, I do that all the time."
"We never argue over such silly details."
"You're always watching football."
"I don't mind when you do that."
"Your parents do exactly the same thing.
Remember . . . "
"Well, you know we've talked about how
the Smith's over-reacted."

If personal information is explicitly part of a partisan
argument, as in clear "arguing by analogy," and is clearly
tied to one's position, then it is double coded 20 and 32.
Example:
but:

NOTE:

"It's just like your father."— code 32
"I had to say that the wife was responsible
since I saw it as just like the situation
with John and Mary that we've talked
about."— code 32 and 20.

Negative-toned attacks/evaluations of other are
coded 01.

Example:

"You're just being stubborn."— code 01
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NOTE:

Use 33 (other's position definition) for attri
butions/summaries of other's task-related posi
tions .

NOTE:

The notion of "mind-reading" in the clinical
literature (as in Bach and Wyden's Intimate Enemy)
is covered in codes 01, 32, and 33.
(Example:
"I know what you're thinking . . .").
If negative, attack, code 01.
If about position, code 33.
If about the other person, but not 01, code 32.

NOTE:

"We read them differently."— code 32
but:
"They gave us different stories."— code 30.

33

Other's position definition
Show understanding o f , repeat, summarize, or define other's
view or position.
Does not necessarily imply agreement
with other.
Includes "attribution" of a position to other,
or "leading" definitions of other's view (see examples
4-6) .
Examples:

34

"I see what you mean now . . . "
"Are you saying that . . .?"
"As I understand you, the husband . . . "
"I'm sure you would say she accepted the
responsibility."
"Naturally you agree it's a question of
long-range effects."
"I know deep down you feel the same way
on this."

NOTE:

The code refers to definition or summary of other's
position, while 32 (personal definition) would
include definition of other's personality, des
cription of behavior, etc.

NOTE:

Must be more than perfunctory social acknowledgments
("yeah;" "uh huh;" "ok") which are ignored in the
system.

Progressive definition
(1) Provides summary perspective/characterizes couple's
progress on task, or (2) weighs alternative views equally,
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or (3)
indicates need for new approach or tactic, or
(4) actually suggests a different approach in general
terms.
Usually occurs after considerable discussion— at
an impasse— and provides some broader perspective on the
couple's progress.
Examples:

(1)
(2)

"We really seem to
disagree onthisone."
"Well, on one hand he should be respon
sible because . . ., but on the
other hand, she . . . "
(3) ""This is going nowhere." "We'll have
to try something different."
(4) "Somebody just has to give in."

To distinguish (3) and (4) from 30, they are general
assessments of need or general suggestions, while 30 is
a specific suggestion. Also, 34 is a perspective-taking
move, while 30 is not.
40

Explicit position trade
Explicit offers or suggestions of trade-offs or bilateral
compromises.
Usually after considerable discussion.
Examples:

41

"I'll agree here, if you'll say the wife
on this part."
"How about putting your choice on this one
and mine on the other."
"If you'll give me this one, we can go back
and change #7."

Other compromise/bilateral solution
Explicit bilateral solutions or attempts at compromise,
other than direct trade-offs of position, such as:
(1) global compromise offer
Example:

"Why don't we compromise here."

(2) suggest arbitrary/external decision rule
Examples:

"Let's flip a coin."
"We should take turns."

(3) agree to disagree
Examples:

"Well, since we know that both are
all right, let's put . . . "
"Even though we disagree, why don't we
just put . . ., to settle the matter."
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42

Role division solution
This is actually a special case of 41 (other compromise/
bilateral solution), in which the outside decision rule
being used is one of individual expertise or a division of
labor.
The actor is genuinely saying that there is a
general rule which can be used to develop a solution, and
that is whose area the issue falls in.
Examples:

49

"You know more about this one, so you
decide it."
"Well, when it comes to working on cars,
that's my area, so why don't we go with
my answer."

Other power assertion/related behavior

(SPECIFY)

Other unilateral/bilateral; qualified/unqualified behavior
which seems important to the study of power assertions but
is not covered by the specific MPACS categories.
Must be listed and location specified on special form.
50

Self depreciation/deference
Statements of negative evaluation of self, lack of con
fidence in own judgment/ability, or self-depreciating
deference to other. Fairly broad.
Examples:

"I guess I didn't read it carefully."
"Oh, I misunderstood."
"I'm terrible at this."
"Now I don't know at all . . . "

If another code seems applicable, give the other code
priority.
Use this only for relatively clear behaviors.
98

Non-power assertions
Statements not covered by the MPACS categories.

APPENDIX D
DETAILED CORRELATION MATRIXES FOR POWER MODES
HUSBANDS AND WIVES

Table 0.1.

Detailed Correlation Matrix for Power Modes of Husbands

Power Mode
Unqualified Power Assertions (UPA)
01 Reject/attack other
02 Command
03 "Do anyway" attempt
04 Surrender under protest
05 Reiteration
06 Unqualified disagreement/refusal
07 Unqualified partisan assertion

01

.34
.41
.20
.64
.61
.16

02

03

04

05

06

07

20

.26

—

30

32

33

—
.32
.17
.05
.13 -.06

.04

31

34

40

41

.15 -.04
.10
.03

.12

—

49

50

98

—
.05

—

.13
.11
.21

-.01

.50
.35

.12

.29
.14

-.01

.13
.03

.22

.19

.06

.24

.15

.32

.22

.06
.41
.07
.39
.15
.46
.15
.03
.18
.34
.16
.18
-.08 -.06 -.14

.07
.16
.23
.04
.23

.19
.11
.28
.51
.33
.23
.02 -.01
.18
.17
.23 -.01
.05 -.06
.03

.78

Qualified Power Assertions (QPA)
Consequence identification:
10 Promise-.
.
11 Threat
*no S19nificant incidence)
Qualified partisan assertion:
20 Qualified partisan assertions
Definition assertion:
30 Task-procedure definition
31 Situation definition
32 Personal definition
33 Other's position definition
34 Progress definition

.26

Bilateral Power Assertions (BPA)
40 Explicit position trade
.09
.00
41 Other compromise/bilateral solution -.04 -.09
42 Role division solution (no signifi
cant incidence)
Other:
49 Other power-related behavior
50 Self-depreciation
09 Non-power assertion

-.06
.18
.32

.13
.03
.14 -.11

.02

.01

.19
.50
.36
.23
.18

.19 -.07
.07
.08
.04 -.08

—

.26
.13
.08
.22

—

.07 -.06
.18
.10
.01 -.06

—

—
.01 -.06
.03 -.09 -.06 -.02 -.22 -.14 -.12 -.09 -.10 -.03 -.06
.01
.10 -.08
•09
.05
.06 -.16 -.06 -.05 -.06
.03
.10 -.09 -.01 -.04
.39
.20
.34
.07 -.08
.35
.32
.43
.13
.32
.12
.06
.21
.09
.11 -.01
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Table D.2.

Detailed Correlation Matrix for Power Modes of Wives

Power Mode
Unqualified Power Assertions (UPA)
01 Reject/attack other
02 Connand
03 "Do anyway" attempt
04 Surrender under protest
05 Reiteration
06 Unqualified disagreement/refusal
07 Unqualified partisan assertion

02

03

04

—
.57
-.04 -.08
.40
.39
.60
.50
.52
.55
.03
.02

—
.06
.13
.29
.18

.47
.39
.04

01

05 . 06

07

20

.16

—

30

31

32

—
.29
.11
.24

.10
.27

33

34

40

41

.02
.05

.00

—

49

50

—
.01
.19

.27

98

—

Qualified Power Assertions (QPA)
Consequence identification:
10 Promise,
11 Threat * *no significant incidence)
Q ualified p a rtisa n a sse rtio n :
20 Qualified partisan assertions

.27

.3S

.06

.37

.43

.22

Definition assertion:
30 Task-procedure definition
31 Situation definition
32 Personal definition
33 Other's position definition
34 Progress definition

.13
.27
.19
.11
.32

.24 -.10
.45
.02
.13
.08
.10
.07
.32 -.07

.08
.29
.30
.08
.20

.19
.47
.06
.14
.26

.11 -.02
.29
.08
.08
.12
.03
.22
.16 -.11

.10
-.04

.17
.21

Bilateral Power Assertions (BPA)
40 Explicit position trade
.05
.06 -.06
41'Other compromise/bilateral solution .01 -.10 -.02
42 Role division solution (no signifi
cant incidence)
Other:
49 Other power-related behavior
50 Self-depreciation
98 Non-power assertion

•.07
.40
.06

.78 -.07
.00
.16 -.04
.20
.10
.22
.06

.07
-.07

.50
.08

.30
.41
.45
.20
.24

—

.36
.30
.26
.30

.22 -.10
.10
.10

.16
.33 -.02 -.06
.23 • .21 -.08 -.02
.18
.02
.44
.00

-.08
.11
.19

—

.28

.10 -.07
.14
.00
.03 -.02

.09
.07
.35

-.09 -.09 -.04 -.02 -.04
-.07
.00
.25 , .05 .-.02
.12
.02
.11
.15 -.02

—

to

to
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